Opinion
E068247
04-11-2018
In re I.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. I.C., Defendant and Appellant.
Kendall Dawson Wasley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael Pulos, Joy Utomi, and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.Nos. RIJ1300265, RIJ1300379) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. Kendall Dawson Wasley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael Pulos, Joy Utomi, and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
After the juvenile court adjudged defendant and appellant, I.C., a ward of the court, he was prohibited from owning or possessing firearms until age 30. (Pen. Code, § 29820, subds. (a), (b).) Eventually, I.C. successfully completed his probation, and the court dismissed the petitions against him and ordered the related records sealed. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (a).) I.C. then sought relief from the firearms prohibition, which the court denied. I.C. argues on appeal that the court erred in denying this relief. We affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
In September 2012, the People filed a petition in the Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging I.C. carried a concealed dirk or dagger on his person. (Pen. Code, § 21310.) The court placed I.C. on probation for this offense. In March 2013, the People filed a petition in the Riverside County Superior Court alleging I.C. made a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422), exhibited and used a deadly weapon in a fight (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)), vandalized property with graffiti (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)), and committed battery (Pen. Code, § 242). The Los Angeles County Superior Court revoked I.C.'s probation and transferred the 2012 case to Riverside County, where the trial court considered it, along with the 2013 petition. The court adjudged I.C. a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, committed him to juvenile hall for a period of time served, and placed him on probation.
In December 2015, the court terminated I.C.'s wardship, dismissed both petitions, and sealed the related records. I.C. was then 19 years old, had completed all requirements of probation, and had committed no new legal violations.
In February 2017, I.C. filed a request for hearing for relief from firearms prohibition (Bureau of Firearms Form No. 4009C). I.C. filed a letter with the court explaining that he was considering applying for a position in law enforcement, joining the military, or becoming an armed guard. The court held a hearing on I.C.'s request, but denied him relief from the firearms prohibition, holding that he was prohibited from carrying firearms until age 30.
III. DISCUSSION
Under Penal Code section 29820, any person who has committed certain enumerated offenses and is subsequently adjudged a ward of the court "shall not own, or have in possession or under custody or control, any firearm until the age of 30 years." (Pen. Code, § 29820, subds. (a), (b).) The juvenile court must notify the Department of Justice, "on forms prescribed by the Department of Justice," when a person is subject to this firearms prohibition. (Id., subd. (d).) "Notwithstanding any other law, the forms required to be submitted to the department pursuant to this section may be used to determine eligibility to acquire a firearm." (Ibid.)
The parties do not dispute that I.C. committed an offense qualifying him for the firearms prohibition. --------
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, if a ward of the juvenile court satisfactorily completes probation, the court shall order the petition dismissed and seal all records pertaining to the dismissed petition that are in the custody of the court, law enforcement agencies, probation department, or the Department of Justice. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (a).) The court shall specify a date by which the agencies shall destroy the sealed records. (Ibid.) Once the court dismisses the petition, "the arrest and other proceedings in the case shall be deemed not to have occurred and the person who was the subject of the petition may reply accordingly to an inquiry by employers, educational institutions, or other persons or entities . . . ." (Id., subd. (b).)
Defendant contends the firearms prohibition no longer applied to him once the court dismissed his petitions and sealed his records, even though he was not yet 30 years old. He argues that once a person's offense is deemed never to have occurred under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, the person no longer qualifies for the firearms prohibition. I.C.'s argument involves an issue of statutory interpretation. We thus apply de novo review. (In re Joshua R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 864, 867 (Joshua R.))
In Joshua R., our colleagues in Division Three of this court rejected the same argument I.C. raises. We agree with the decision in Joshua R. There, the court held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 and Penal Code section 29820 could be harmonized such that the former ward of the court was subject to the firearms prohibition even after the court had dismissed his petition. (Joshua R., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 868-870.) Penal Code Section 29820 states that the forms the juvenile court is required to submit to the Department of Justice may be used to determine eligibility for a firearm "'[n]otwithstanding any other law.'" (Joshua R., supra, at p. 869, quoting Pen. Code, § 29820, subd. (d).) Thus, according to the plain language of the statute, the forms required for the firearms prohibition are "exempt from the requirement of destruction for the limited purpose of determining 'eligibility to acquire a firearm.'" (Joshua R., supra, at p. 869, quoting Pen. Code, § 29820, subd. (d).) While the court must seal the rest of the former ward's records and order them destroyed, the firearms forms need not be destroyed until the person's 30th birthday. (Joshua R., supra, at p. 869.)
The Joshua R. court explained this outcome furthered the primary purpose of both statutes: "The goal behind Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, as we read the statute, is to allow certain juvenile offenders who have successfully completed their probation to lead productive lives without the black mark of a record hanging over their heads for employment and educational purposes. The only purpose of [Penal Code] section 29820 is to prevent those who have committed certain offenses as juveniles from owning firearms before they turn 30 years old. Ordering the record sealed, as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, while at the same time allowing the [Department of Justice] to maintain the Firearm Form until Joshua turns 30 will serve both purposes." (Joshua R., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 869.)
In sum, we reject I.C.'s argument and conclude the juvenile court correctly denied his request for relief from the firearms prohibition of Penal Code section 29820.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. SLOUGH
J.