Opinion
A154698
07-14-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PATRICK HINES, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. CGC-16-555386)
The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) brought an administrative action against defendant Patrick Hines, who owned several telecommunication companies, alleging the companies placed fraudulent, unauthorized charges on customers' bills, a practice known as " 'cramming.' " The PUC found the allegations true and imposed over $19 million in fines against Hines and the companies, with Hines personally liable for half that amount. When Hines failed to pay, the PUC filed the instant enforcement action to recover them. The trial court granted the PUC's motion for judgment on the pleadings and ordered Hines to pay $9.88 million to the State of California.
Hines appeals from the judgment, asserting the court did not have personal jurisdiction over him and that, in any event, the PUC's action was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Hines, a Florida citizen, owned and operated two companies in California—Calling 10 LLC and Telseven LLC. In 2010, the PUC initiated an enforcement investigation into the business practices of the companies in relation to their directory assistance services and billing.
The PUC held three days of evidentiary hearings, at which Hines testified. Following the hearing, the administrative law judge set a briefing schedule. The companies then filed petitions for bankruptcy in United States District Court in Florida. The bankruptcy court later granted the PUC's motion to lift the automatic stay.
Almost three years later, the PUC issued its decision finding Hines and his companies billed California subscribers who had not authorized the charges without informing them of the nature of the services being offered. Hines and his companies controlled "up to one million toll-free telephone numbers" for which the "only apparent purpose" was to "catch misdialers." Upon misdialing one of these numbers, the recorded message "failed to clearly explain the nature of the services being offered and the price." Hines and his companies "did not inform subscribers that they would be charged upon completion of the call to the direct access number."
The PUC concluded it had personal jurisdiction over Hines because he voluntarily made a general appearance in the proceeding.
It also found "Hines directed the corporate respondents and testified on their behalf as their sole witness. . . . [T]he record is rich in this proceeding regarding Hines personal role in the ownership, benefit from, and control of the corporate respondents who would have been nothing without his actions." It thus concluded "Patrick Hines is an alter ego of Telseven and Calling 10 for the purposes of this proceeding, with the evidence demonstrating that Mr. Hines owned (either directly or indirectly) all entities involved in the scheme, that he changed these entities at his sole discretion, and that he controlled all aspects of the scheme at issue."
The PUC ordered Hines and his companies to "pay reparations to each subscriber so billed in the total amount collected from that subscriber." The PUC also ordered Hines and his companies "pay a fine of $19,760,000, to be allocated one-half to [the companies] and one half to Mr. Hines, with Mr. Hines to be personally liable for a minimum of half of the $19.76 million penalty. . . ."
Hines filed a petition for rehearing, claiming, among other things, the PUC lacked personal jurisdiction over him. As to personal jurisdiction, the PUC noted Hines had made a general appearance and testified in the proceedings "rather than filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction."
Hines then filed a petition for writ of review with this court in 2015, alleging lack of personal jurisdiction and challenging the alter ego finding, among other claims. We summarily denied review, as did the Supreme Court.
In 2016, the PUC filed a complaint in San Francisco Superior Court against Hines under Public Utilities Code section 2104, seeking recovery of the administrative fines imposed against Hines, totaling $9.88 million plus interest.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Public Utilities Code.
Hines filed a motion to quash claiming the court had no personal jurisdiction over him, which the court denied. The court noted the PUC's finding that Hines was the alter ego of the companies had preclusive effect and, even if it did not, Hines had the requisite minimum contacts with the state.
The court then granted the PUC's motions for judicial notice and for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment against Hines.
DISCUSSION
PUC Enforcement Actions
The PUC is " 'a state agency of constitutional origin with far-reaching duties, functions and powers. [Citation.] The Constitution confers broad authority on the commission to regulate utilities, including the power to fix rates, establish rules, hold various types of hearings, award reparation, and establish its own procedures. [Citation.] The commission's powers, however, are not restricted to those expressly mentioned in the Constitution: "The Legislature has plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of this constitution but consistent with this article [art. XII], to confer additional authority and jurisdiction upon the commission. . . ." [Citation.] [¶] Pursuant to this grant of power the Legislature enacted Public Utilities Code section 701, conferring on the commission expansive authority to "do all things, whether specifically designated in [the Public Utilities Act] or addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient" in the supervision and regulation of every public utility in California. . . . The commission's authority has been liberally construed.' " (Pacific Bell Wireless, LLC v. Public Utilities Com. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 718, 736, italics omitted (Pacific Bell).)
"The Commission itself has consistently determined that it has the authority to directly impose fines on public utilities, and that it is required to commence an action in superior court only to collect unpaid fines. [Citations.] The Commission's interpretation of its own statutory authority ' "should not be disturbed unless it fails to bear a reasonable relation to statutory purposes and language. . . ." ' " (Pacific Bell, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 736.)
Section 2107 authorizes a penalty against "Any public utility that violates or fails to comply with any provision of the Constitution of this state or of this part, or that fails or neglects to comply with any part or provision of any order, decision, decree, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission, in a case in which a penalty has not otherwise been provided, [the public utility] is subject to a penalty of not less than five hundred dollars ($500), nor more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), for each offense." (§ 2107.)
"[A]ctions to recover penalties under this part shall be brought in the name of the people of the State of California, in the superior court in and for the county, or city and county, in which the cause or some part thereof arose, or in which the corporation complained of has its principal place of business, or in which the person complained of resides. The action shall be commenced and prosecuted to final judgment by the attorney or agent of the commission. All fines and penalties may be sued for and recovered." (§ 2104, subd. (a).)
Personal Jurisdiction in the PUC Proceeding and Res Judicata
Hines claims the superior court had no personal jurisdiction over him and therefore erred in ruling it lacked "jurisdiction" to entertain his affirmative defenses to enforcement of the PUC decision, including his claim that the PUC lacked personal jurisdiction over him.
The superior court's order stated: "[T]his Court only has jurisdiction to entertain a defense to the enforcement of a CPUC decision that is based on matters that arose after the date of the CPUC decision . . . [¶] . . . [thus] this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Hines' affirmative defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction." The superior court had previously denied Hines' motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting the PUC's finding that Hines was the alter ego of the corporations was res judicata, and that Hines had the requisite minimum contacts with the forum.
The PUC maintains the issue of personal jurisdiction was raised and resolved against Hines in the administrative earlier proceedings, and thus the doctrine of res judicata bars him from relitigating the issue in the trial court.
" 'Res judicata' describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 'precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.' [Citation.] Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be asserted in a subsequent lawsuit; a judgment for the defendant serves as a bar to further litigation of the same cause of action." (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-897, fn. omitted.)
" 'Traditionally, collateral estoppel has been found to bar relitigation of an issue decided at a previous proceeding "if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous [proceeding] is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the previous [proceeding] resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior [proceeding]." [¶] It is implicit in this three-prong test that only issues actually litigated in the initial action may be precluded from the second proceeding under the collateral estoppel doctrine. [Citation.] An issue is actually litigated "[w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined. . . ." ' [Citations.] . . . [T]he doctrine's purposes are: '(1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation. . . .' " (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1240 (Carter), italics omitted.)
The underlying PUC proceeding involved the same parties, and Hines raised the same issue of personal jurisdiction. The PUC concluded it had personal jurisdiction over Hines, noting he "submitted to our jurisdiction by appearing here to testify, rather than filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction." The decision further stated, "Hines sought to benefit himself through his testimony by arguing, among other things, that he had insufficient financial means to pay restitution to California consumers. [Citation.] Thus, Hines made a general appearance. . . ."
For purposes of res judicata/collateral estoppel, the PUC proceeding and denial of writ review resulted in a final adjudication on the merits. When PUC "determinations within its jurisdiction have become final they are conclusive in all collateral actions and proceedings. (Pub. Util. Code, § 1709.) Direct attack is made available by application for writ of review to this court in accordance with the provisions of section 1756 of the Public Utilities Code." (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 630.) "The sole means provided by law for judicial review of a commission decision is a petition to this court for writ of review [citation], which thereby serves in effect the office of an appeal." (Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 901, disapproved of on another ground by Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 896, fn. 2.) "It is established, however, that the denial by this court of a petition for review of an order of the [PUC] is a decision on the merits both as to the law and the facts presented in the review proceedings. [Citation.] This is so even though the order of this court is without opinion." (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., at pp. 630-631.)
"Petitions for a writ of review function as appeals from the administrative decisions of the [PUC] and are the exclusive means of judicial review of such decisions." (San Pablo Bay Pipeline Co., LLC v. Public Utilities Com. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 295, 309.)
Section 1756 provides in part: "any aggrieved party may petition for a writ of review in the court of appeal or the Supreme Court for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the original order or decision or of the order or decision on rehearing inquired into and determined." (§ 1756, subd. (a).)
Accordingly, the PUC's determination that it had personal jurisdiction over Hines has preclusive effect and forecloses any further challenge to the PUC's jurisdiction over him.
Personal Jurisdiction in the Superior Court
Hines maintains the res judicata issue is a "Red Herring as there are insufficient bases upon which to find the trial court has jurisdiction over [himself]." (Underscoring omitted.) He asserts: "It is one thing for the PUC to issue a decision as to Hines. It is entirely something else for the Court to determine if due process permits the [Superior] Court to enforce the PUC determination against Hines."
The PUC maintains that having established in the administrative proceeding that it had personal jurisdiction over Hines, it was not required to do so again in an enforcement action in the superior court.
" 'California courts may exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of California and the United States. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) The exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with these Constitutions "if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate ' "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." ' " ([Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996)], 14 Cal.4th [434,] 444, quoting Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316. . . .)' " (Snowney v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1061 (Snowney).)
The minimum contacts test considers " 'whether the "quality and nature" of the defendant's activity is such that it is "reasonable" and "fair" to require him to conduct his defense in that State.' [Citations.] The test 'is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite "affiliating circumstances" are present.' " (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1061.)
Under the minimum contacts test, " '[p]ersonal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.' . . . [¶] 'When determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider the " 'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.' " [Citations.] A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) "the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits" [citation]; (2) "the 'controversy is related to or "arises out of" [the] defendant's contacts with the forum' " [citations]; and (3) " 'the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and substantial justice" ' " [citations].' [¶] 'When a defendant moves to quash service of process' for lack of specific jurisdiction, 'the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.' [Citation.] 'If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, then the defendant has the burden of demonstrating "that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable." ' [Citations.] Where, as here, ' "no conflict in the evidence exists . . . the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record." ' " (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1061-1062.)
The facts relevant to personal jurisdiction were alleged in the complaint and documented in records of which the trial court took judicial notice. These included the PUC's decision, Hines's application for rehearing, the PUC's order denying rehearing, and Hines's petitions for writ of review and supporting declarations filed in this court and the Supreme Court.
Applying the specific jurisdiction factors, Hines had the requisite minimum contacts with California necessary to support specific jurisdiction. Hines "purposefully availed himself" of the forum benefits by conducting business in California. He offered services in the forum, had customers in the forum, and caused charges to be placed on bills in the forum. The PUC proceedings and superior court enforcement action arose out of Hines' contacts with the forum. Hines voluntarily participated in the underlying PUC proceedings. And personal jurisdiction over Hines in this action would comport with notions of "fair play and substantial justice."
Hines does not dispute that these contacts with California were sufficient minimum contacts. Rather, he maintains these were contacts and actions by his companies, not by him personally.
The PUC, however, determined Hines was the alter ego of the companies. It concluded "the evidence demonstrat[ed] that Mr. Hines owned (either directly or indirectly) all entities involved in the scheme, that he changed these entities at his sole discretion, and that he controlled all aspects of the scheme at issue."
Hines is thus mistaken that res judicata is immaterial to the issue of personal jurisdiction in the superior court. The PUC's decision that Hines was the alter ego of the companies is preclusive on that issue, and Hines' alter ego status establishes that he can be charged with the companies' contacts supporting special jurisdiction. (Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1240; § 1709; see Martensen v. Koch (N.D. Cal. 2013) 942 F.Supp.2d 983, 995 [allegation that "persons who did perpetrate the tort were acting as Defendant's agent" sufficient to satisfy the prima facie requirement for personal jurisdiction over defendant.])
Thus, even assuming the PUC was required to separately establish personal jurisdiction over Hines in the superior court action to enforce the penalties imposed in the PUC proceedings, the superior court properly exercised jurisdiction over Hines given the conclusive alter ago finding of the PUC.
The Statute of Limitations and Equitable Estoppel
Hines further asserts the PUC's action is time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340, which provides for a one-year statute of limitation in "[a]n action upon a statute for a forfeiture or penalty to the people of this state." (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (b).) He maintains the PUC's cause of action accrued on December 14, 2014, the date of the PUC decision imposing the penalty. Thus, he claims the limitations period had run by the time the PUC filed its enforcement action on November 15, 2016.
The PUC asserts that even if that one-year statute of limitations applies, the trial court properly found that the doctrine of equitable tolling applied.
The PUC also asserts that Code of Civil Procedure section 340 does not apply to their action in the superior court to enforce the fines, and that either a three-year or a 10-year limitations period is applicable under Code of Civil Procedure section 338 or section 337.5. As we shall explain, we need not and do not reach this issue.
"The equitable tolling of statutes of limitations is a judicially created, nonstatutory doctrine. [Citations.] It is 'designed to prevent unjust and technical forfeitures of the right to a trial on the merits when the purpose of the statute of limitations—timely notice to the defendant of the plaintiff's claims—has been satisfied.' [Citation.] Where applicable, the doctrine will 'suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.' [Citation.] [¶] Though the doctrine operates independently of the language of the Code of Civil Procedure and other codified sources of statutes of limitations [citations], its legitimacy is unquestioned. We have described it as a creature of the judiciary's inherent power ' "to formulate rules of procedure where justice demands it." ' " (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99-100 (McDonald.)
The equitable tolling doctrine applies " ' "[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one." ' [Citations.] Thus, it may apply where one action stands to lessen the harm that is the subject of a potential second action; where administrative remedies must be exhausted before a second action can proceed; or where a first action, embarked upon in good faith, is found to be defective for some reason. [Citation.] [¶] Its application in such circumstances serves 'the need for harmony and the avoidance of chaos in the administration of justice.' [Citation.] Tolling eases the pressure on parties 'concurrently to seek redress in two separate forums with the attendant danger of conflicting decisions on the same issue.' [Citations.] . . . The tolling doctrine does so without compromising defendants' significant 'interest in being promptly apprised of claims against them in order that they may gather and preserve evidence' because that notice interest is satisfied by the filing of the first proceeding that gives rise to tolling. [Citations.] Lastly, tolling benefits the court system by reducing the costs associated with a duplicative filing requirement, in many instances rendering later court proceedings either easier and cheaper to resolve or wholly unnecessary." (McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 100.)
"In assessing whether a statute of limitations will be equitably tolled in a particular situation, the courts examine the presence or absence of three factors: '(1) timely notice to defendants in filing the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to defendants in gathering evidence to defend against the second claim; and (3) good faith and reasonable conduct by plaintiffs in filing the second claim.' " (California Restaurant Management Systems v. City of San Diego (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1581, 1594 (California Restaurant), italics omitted.)
" ' "The timely notice requirement essentially means that the first claim must have been filed within the statutory period. . . . [T]he filing of the first claim must alert the defendant in the second claim of the need to begin investigating the facts which form the basis for the second claim. Generally this means that the defendant in the first claim is the same one being sued in the second." [Citation.] "The second prerequisite essentially translates to a requirement that the facts of the two claims be identical or at least so similar that the defendant's investigation of the first claim will put him in a position to fairly defend the second." [Citation.] "The third prerequisite of good faith and reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff is less clearly defined in the cases. But in Addison v. State of California [(1978)] 21 Cal.3d 313 . . . [,] the Supreme Court did stress that the plaintiff filed his second claim a short time after tolling ended." ' " (California Restaurant, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1594.)
Hines does not dispute all three elements of equitable estoppel were met here. He had timely notice of the PUC's action and decision. He mounted a defense and testified at the hearing before the PUC in that initial action. Hines was well-aware of the penalty imposed and that the PUC was seeking to enforce it. Indeed, Hines's counsel informed the PUC that its demand to enforce the penalty was premature because Hines was pursuing rehearing of the PUC decision.
Hines maintains "equitable tolling is not available as the limitations period of CCP § 340 is procedural and therefore jurisdictional," citing Tielsch v. Anaheim (1984) 160 CalApp.3d 576. That case did not involve equitable tolling, but whether Code of Civil Procedure section 1013, which extends the time in which to act if the relevant notice was mailed, applied. (Tielsch, at pp. 577-578.) He also mistakenly claims Jones v. Tracy School District (1980) 27 Cal.3d 99 holds that equitable tolling "only applies 'when an injured person has several formal legal remedies and reasonability and in good faith pursues one.' " It does not. (Id. at p. 108.)
As to the second element, Hines has shown no prejudice which would result from equitable tolling. The PUC's action to enforce the penalty was based on the identical set of underlying facts at issue in the PUC proceeding, and Hines's investigation of the claims in the PUC proceedings " ' "put him in a position to fairly defend the second." ' " (California Restaurant, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1594.) Indeed, tolling of the statute during Hines' pursuit of writ review inured to his benefit, because even denial of his petitions delayed the time for having to pay the fine.
Lastly, the PUC's conduct in seeking to enforce the fine was in good faith and pursuant to statute. The PUC reasonably refrained from filing the superior court action while Hines pursued his petitions for writ review before this court and the Supreme Court, and filed this action a " ' "short time after tolling ended." ' " (California Restaurant, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1594.)
In concluding equitable estoppel applied, the trial court relied on City of Los Angeles v. Centex Management, Inc. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1384. (Centex). In that case, the City of Los Angeles brought an action against Centex for money due on an unpaid tax assessment. (Id. at p. 1386.) After the city issued a "notice of tax due," Centex sought an administrative hearing before the City's board of review. (Ibid.) About two and a half years after the board's affirmance of the assessment, the City filed an action in superior court seeking enforcement of the assessment, which the parties agreed was governed by a three-year statute of limitations. (Id. at pp. 1386-1387.) The City maintained the limitations period was tolled during the time Centex was exhausting its administrative remedies, a form of equitable estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1386-1387, see McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 99-101.) The trial court disagreed, but the Court of Appeal reversed. (Centex, at pp. 1387, 1389.)
"[T]he statute of limitations for the City's collection action," said the appellate court, "did not commence until Centex had exhausted its administrative remedy with the board of review's issuance of a decision." (Centex, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1389.) The court rejected Centex's claim that "the doctrine of exhaustion is not applicable when it is the taxing entity, rather than the taxpayer, that brings the legal action; in other words, the City was required to file its lawsuit even though Centex was availing itself of an administrative process the result of which could have been a determination that no additional taxes were due." (Id. at p. 1388.) The court explained: "The corollary to this position is that, by failing to file its action while awaiting the outcome of the administrative process, the City had forfeited the taxes which the administrative process in fact confirmed were due. To state the argument is to expose its lack of logic and merit." (Ibid.)
Hines maintains Centex is inapplicable because it involved the exhaustion of administrative remedies rather than exhaustion of an "appellate process" like the writ of review procedure applicable to PUC decisions. In substance, we see no distinction between the two contexts. Furthermore, exhaustion of administrative remedies is only one of the circumstances in which equitable tolling can apply.
"[E]quitable tolling may extend even to the voluntary pursuit of alternate remedies." (McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 101, italics omitted.) "We rejected the assertion that equitable tolling should be limited to cases in which a plaintiff was required to pursue a particular alternate remedy before initiating suit, and instead espoused 'the principle that regardless of whether the exhaustion of one remedy is a prerequisite to the pursuit of another, if the defendant is not prejudiced thereby, the running of the limitations period is tolled.' (Elkins v. Derby [(1974)] 12 Cal.3d [410,] 414.) . . . The filing of an administrative claim, whether mandated or not, affords a defendant notice of the claims against it so that it may gather and preserve evidence, and thereby satisfies the principal policy behind the statute of limitations. [Citation.] Both courts and legislatures have, and should, 'liberally appl[y] tolling rules or their functional equivalents to situations in which the plaintiff has satisfied the notification purpose of a limitations statute.' [Citation.] Failing to afford plaintiffs equitable tolling in these circumstances would both create procedural traps for the unwary [citation] and encourage duplicative filings, with attendant burdens on plaintiffs, defendants, and the court system." (McDonald, at pp. 101-102.)
"[I]n Addison v. State of California [(1978)] 21 Cal.3d 313, we confirmed that equitable tolling applies equally to the voluntary pursuit of alternate remedies against public defendants. We reiterated that this court ' "is not powerless to formulate rules of procedure where justice demands it. Indeed, it has shown itself ready to adapt rules of procedure to serve the ends of justice where technical forfeitures would unjustifiably prevent a trial on the merits." ' [Citations.] Thus, we could announce 'general equitable [rules] which operate[] independently of the literal wording of the Code of Civil Procedure.' " (McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 102.)
Lastly, Hines claims that even if the equitable tolling doctrine could apply, the PUC's complaint was still filed "24 days too late" because "the statute ran for 29 days from March 2, 2015 to April 1, 2015, until filing of the writ of appeal." (Underscoring omitted.) The court in Centex explained in regard to exhaustion of administrative remedies, "[e]xhaustion of the administrative process does not occur until the taxpayer either files or fails to file its exceptions to the board's decision." (Centex, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388, italics added.) Relying on Centex, the trial court concluded, "the limitations period did not commence till Mr. Hines exhausted his review rights in the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court."
In sum, the trial court properly applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this case to conclude the PUC's enforcement action was timely.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal to respondent.
/s/_________
Banke, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P.J. /s/_________
Sanchez, J.