Opinion
A148947
09-15-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID LEE HILL, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 196842)
Defendant and appellant David Lee Hill is serving a sentence of life in prison without parole for the 2004 murder of a police officer. In 2016, he moved for resentencing under recent United States Supreme Court cases prohibiting the imposition of mandatory life without parole sentences on juveniles, even though he was 21 years old when he committed the murder. We affirm denial of his motion.
BACKGROUND
On April 10, 2004, appellant, then age 21, shot and killed San Francisco Police Officer Isaac Espinoza and wounded his partner, Officer Barry Parker. (People v. Hill (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1108-1109 (Hill).) Among other offenses, appellant was convicted of second degree murder with a peace officer special circumstance and firearm enhancements (Pen. Code §§ 187, subd. (a), 190, subd. (c), 12022.5, subd. (b), 12022.53, subd. (d)), and a mandatory life without parole sentence was imposed on that count. (Hill, at p. 1109.) In Hill, this court addressed appellant's numerous claims on direct appeal, ultimately affirming the judgment. State and federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus were also denied. (See In re Hill (Jan. 13, 2011), A128348 [nonpub. opn.]; Hill v. Virga (N.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11305; Hill v. Virga (9th Cir. 2014) 588 Fed.Appx. 723, 724.)
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
This court granted appellant's motion for judicial notice of the record in his prior appeal, No. A117787.
In June 2016, appellant, acting in pro per, filed in San Francisco County Superior Court a "Motion for Reconsideration of Sentencing." Appellant sought resentencing under Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 136 S.Ct. 718 (Montgomery), which built on the high court's previous decision in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller). In Miller, the court held that the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibited the imposition of a mandatory life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender. Montgomery held that Miller announced a new substantive constitutional rule that applies retroactively in a state court collateral challenge to the lawfulness of a prisoner's confinement. (Montgomery, at p. 732.) Although appellant was not a juvenile when he committed his offenses, he argued he was entitled to relief because the California Legislature had, in response to Miller and its progeny, enacted a statute providing a "youth offender parole hearing" to most prisoners who committed their offenses when they were "under 23 years of age." (§ 3051, subd. (a).) Appellant argued the Legislature had "deemed juveniles to include youthful offenders" who committed their crimes before the age of 23.
The superior court denied appellant's motion. This appeal followed.
In August 2016, this court appointed counsel for appellant on appeal.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends his life without parole sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and violates the federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. He also contends that enactment of section 3051 entitles him to a resentencing hearing. We reject appellant's claims.
We reject respondent's contention that the superior court was without jurisdiction to consider appellant's claim for relief under Miller/Montgomery. The California Supreme Court has held that a "petitioner may obtain a Miller resentencing as a form of habeas corpus relief." (In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1043; see also People v. Padilla (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 656, 659, review granted Jan. 25, 2017, S239454 [retroactive Miller claim presented in petition for writ of habeas corpus]; People v. Berg (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 418, 423, review dism. [same].) Thus, regardless of the title of appellant's pleading, it is properly construed and considered as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Cox v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 855, 859 [" 'The label given a petition, action or other pleading is not determinative; rather, the true nature of a petition or cause of action is based on the facts alleged and remedy sought in that pleading.' "].)
I. Legal Background
"To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual," and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution, "courts must look beyond historical conceptions to ' "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." ' " (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 58 (Graham).) " 'Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law for the appellate court.' " (People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 971.)
A series of relatively recent United States Supreme Court opinions have resulted in constitutional limitations on the imposition of life without parole sentences on juveniles. In Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 (Roper), the court held juveniles may not be sentenced to capital punishment for any crime. Five years later, in Graham, supra, 560 U.S. 48, the court held the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from imposing life without parole sentences on juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses. (Id. at p. 75.) The court explained, "Roper established that because juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments. [Citation.] As compared to adults, juveniles have a ' "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility" '; they 'are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure'; and their characters are 'not as well formed.' " (Graham, at p. 68, quoting Roper, at pp. 569-570.) Furthermore, "developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence. [Citations.] Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of 'irretrievably depraved character' than are the actions of adults. [Citation.] It remains true that '[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed.' " (Graham, at p. 68, quoting Roper, at p. 570.)
In Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460, the Supreme Court held that in homicide cases, "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." (Id. at p. 479.) Miller explained: "Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys." (Id. at pp. 477-478.)
Miller did not, however, prohibit imposition of a life without parole sentence in a homicide case for " 'the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.' " (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 479-480, quoting Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 573.) Miller required "individualized sentencing;" that is, "a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles." (Id. at p. 489.) The court cautioned that "appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon," and in imposing such a sentence the trial court must "take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." (Miller, at pp. 479-480.)
In People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Caballero), the California Supreme Court applied Graham and Miller in reversing a sentence imposed on a juvenile that was so long as to constitute the "functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence." Caballero directed the trial court on remand to "consider all mitigating circumstances attendant in the juvenile's crime and life, including but not limited to his or her chronological age at the time of the crime, whether the juvenile offender was a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor, and his or her physical and mental development, so that it can impose a time when the juvenile offender will be able to seek parole from the parole board." (Id. at pp. 268-269.)
In Montgomery, supra, 136 S.Ct. 718, the Supreme Court considered whether Miller was applicable in a state proceeding in which a prisoner sought to collaterally challenge the lawfulness of his confinement. The court observed, "[w]here state collateral review proceedings permit prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional right that determines the outcome of that challenge." (Id. at p. 732.) The court held that "Miller's prohibition on mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders indeed did announce a new substantive rule that, under the Constitution, must be retroactive." (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the court observed that, "Giving Miller retroactive effect . . . does not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender received mandatory life without parole. A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them. [Citation.] Allowing those offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment." (Id. at p. 736.)
Before issuance of the decision in Montgomery, the California Legislature had enacted Senate Bill No. 260 in response to Graham, Miller, and Caballero. The Legislature found and declared "that youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs, these individuals can become contributing members of society. The purpose of this act is to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity, in accordance with the decision of the California Supreme Court in [Caballero] and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in [Graham] and [Miller]." (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1, p. 2.) "At the heart of Senate Bill No. 260 was the addition of section 3051, which requires the Board to conduct a 'youth offender parole hearing' during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of a juvenile offender's incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b).) The date of the hearing depends on the offender's 'controlling offense,' which is defined as 'the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment.' (Id., subd. (a)(2)(B).) A juvenile offender whose controlling offense carries a term of 25 years to life or greater is 'eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing, unless previously released or entitled to an earlier parole consideration hearing pursuant to other statutory provisions.' (Id., subd. (b)(3).) The statute excludes several categories of juvenile offenders from eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing: those who are sentenced under the "Three Strikes" Law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) or Jessica's Law (§ 667.61), those who are sentenced to life without parole, and those who commit another crime ' subsequent to attaining 23 years of age . . . for which malice aforethought is a necessary element of the crime or for which the individual is sentenced to life in prison.' (§ 3051, subd. (h); see Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1 [changing the age after which malice aforethought crimes are disqualifying from 18 to 23].)" (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 277-278 (Franklin).)
Franklin held that the enactment of Senate Bill No. 260 rendered moot a defendant's challenge, under Miller, to his lengthy mandatory sentence for a murder he committed when he was 16, because he had "a meaningful opportunity for release during his 25th year of incarceration." (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 268, 280.) The court stated it expressed "no view on Miller claims by juvenile offenders who are ineligible for such a hearing under section 3051, subdivision (h)," such as a juvenile tried as an adult and sentenced to life without parole. (Franklin, at p. 280.)
As originally enacted, section 3051 provided for parole hearings where the controlling offense was committed before the offender was 18 years old. (In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 981 & fn. 6.) By an amendment that became effective on January 1, 2016, the Legislature extended the availability of parole hearings to offenders who were under 23 years old when they committed their controlling offenses, if they were not ineligible under section 3051, subdivision (h). (Trejo, at p. 981 & fn. 6; Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1; see also Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.)
II. Appellant's Sentence Does Not Violate the Eighth Amendment
The Legislature's extension of the benefits of section 3051 to certain young adults provides the primary basis for the claims on appeal. Appellant first contends his mandatory life without parole sentence is in violation of the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Although he was a 21 year-old young adult when he murdered Officer Espinoza, appellant argues that, through Senate Bill No. 261, "California law ha[s] extended Montgomery-Miller to include youthful offenders." The superior court rejected the claim, concluding Miller did not apply to appellant because he was over 18 at the time of the murder. Further, section 3051, subdivision (h) explicitly excludes persons, like appellant, who were sentenced to life in prison without parole.
We reject respondent's contention that appellant's claim is precluded by the law of the case doctrine because this court previously rejected appellant's Eighth Amendment claim in the direct appeal. This court's prior decision was filed before Miller was decided and therefore did not encompass appellant's claim in this appeal. (See People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 638 [the law of the case doctrine "prevents the parties from seeking appellate reconsideration of an already decided issue in the same case absent some significant change in circumstances"].)
Appellant contends the Legislature, through section 3051, has created a class of "youthful offenders" entitled to the benefits of Miller and its progeny. He asserts, "the statute and the legislative intent was to expand Miller protection to those offenders who commit their offenses while under the age of 23." He further claims the Legislature "had authority to create the class of youthful offender for purposes of Miller" because the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the line between a juvenile and an adult is not precise. Specifically, in Roper, the court stated, "Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn. . . . The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest." (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 574; accord Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 74.)
Putting aside that section 3051, subdivision (h) reflects an intent that offenders like appellant should not be entitled to a youth offender parole hearing, we agree that Senate Bill No. 261 appears to reflect a legislative judgment that young adults share some of the same characteristics as juveniles that justify different treatment with respect to access to parole. Appellant does not, however, cite any authority that the Legislature's decision to treat young adults the same way as juveniles for certain purposes means those young adults must be treated as juveniles for purposes of the federal Constitution. That is, section 3051, by its own terms, does not apply to defendant and appellant fails to explain why it would be logical to construe that enactment as broadening Miller's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment to effectively invalidate section 3051 subdivision (h). That drawing the line between children and adults at age 18 is imprecise does not mean state legislatures are entitled to extend federal constitutional protections beyond the limits specified by the United States Supreme Court. Appellant points to nothing in the Supreme Court's cases suggesting otherwise.
Similarly unavailing is appellant's apparent assertion that, even without Section 3051, he is entitled to individualized sentencing because youthful offenders above the age of 18 may have the types of juvenile characteristics relied upon by the United States Supreme Court in deciding Roper, Graham, and Miller. As noted previously, Roper recognized that juvenile characteristics may be present in varying degrees in persons under the age of 18 and those characteristics may persist past the age of 18. (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 574.) Nevertheless, the court concluded "a line must be drawn" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. (Ibid.) The court drew that line at age 18 and did not extend its "categorical rules"—such as the ban on mandatory life without parole sentences—to adults. (Ibid.; Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2475.) Regardless of the merit of the suggestion that young adults should be treated as juveniles for purposes of sentencing, this court is without authority to modify the line drawn by the Supreme Court. (See People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482 [declining to extend Miller to defendant who committed murder five months after eighteenth birthday]; accord People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1220-1221; People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 617.) As the Perez court stated in declining to apply Miller to a defendant who was 20 at the time of the offense, "We decline Perez's invitation to conclude new insights and societal understandings about the juvenile brain require us to conclude the bright line of 18 years old in the criminal sentencing context is unconstitutional. Our nation's, and our state's, highest courts have concluded 18 years old is the bright line rule and we are bound by their holdings." (Perez, at p. 617.)
Because the United States Supreme Court is the final authority on interpretations of the federal Constitution, we reject appellant's contention that, under section 3051 or otherwise, he is entitled to the protections of Miller and its progeny. (Moon v. Martin (1921) 185 Cal. 361, 366 ["the state courts are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on questions depending upon the construction of the United States Constitution"]; see also People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86; Perez, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 617.) Accordingly, appellant's claim that his mandatory life without parole sentence violates the Eighth Amendment fails.
We also reject appellant's alternative argument that a mandatory sentence of life without parole imposed on an adult violates the Eighth Amendment; the Supreme Court has only required individualized sentencing before such sentences may be imposed on juveniles. (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471 ["children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing"]; accord Montgomery, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 733.)
III. Appellant's Sentence Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (See also Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) " 'The constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws has been judicially defined to mean that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances in their lives, liberty and property and in their pursuit of happiness.' [Citation.] 'The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.' [Citation.] In other words, 'an equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis, unless there is some showing that the two groups are sufficiently similar with respect to the purpose of the law in question that some level of scrutiny is required in order to determine whether the distinction is justified.' [Citation.]" (People v. Watson (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 496, 517, review granted May 10, 2017, S240584.)
The California Supreme Court granted review in Watson and deferred further action pending the decision in two other cases. In those cases, the question presented is whether Miller and Montgomery require a trial court to make a finding that a juvenile's crime reflects "irreparable corruption resulting in permanent incorrigibility" before imposing a sentence of life without parole. (People v. Padilla, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th 656, review granted Jan. 25, 2017, S239454; People v. Arzate (Sept. 25, 2016, B259259 [nonpub. opn.]), review granted Jan. 25, 2017, S238032.)
Appellant contends his sentence is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause because of a "disparity in treatment between juveniles and youthful offenders who commit their crimes while under the age of 23." However, he fails to explain what State enactment reflects that disparate treatment. Section 3051 treats juveniles and young adults alike, granting youth offender parole hearings equally to both groups and equally excluding certain offenders from both groups under subsection (h). It may be that juveniles tried as adults and denied parole hearings under subsection (h) have claims for relief under Miller. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 280.) But if that is so, and juveniles can obtain relief not available to youthful offenders over the age of 18, the distinction would result from the line drawn in Miller, not from the Legislature's enactment. Thus, appellant has failed to show State law has subjected him to disparate treatment requiring scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
Respondent construes appellant's argument to be that section 190, subdivision (c), violates the Equal Protection Clause because it mandates a life without parole sentence for an adult convicted of the murder of a peace officer, but not for a juvenile convicted of the same crime. Appellant never references that statute with respect to his equal protection claim, but if that is appellant's argument, we reject it on the basis that juveniles and young adults are not similarly situated, despite the possibility that some juvenile characteristics may persist in young adults. (See, e.g., Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 481 ["We have by now held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children."]; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 405 ["We previously have rejected the argument that a death penalty scheme that treats differently those who are 18 years of age and older, and those younger than 18, violates equal protection."].) Watson, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th 496, is instructive. There, the court rejected the defendant's challenge to a sentencing scheme that sentenced minors aged 16 or 17 more harshly than minors aged 14 or 15. (Id. at p. 518.) The court concluded the groups were not similarly situated because it was not uncommon for legal distinctions to be made between minors above and under age 16. (Id. at pp. 518-519.)
Technically, the statute only distinguishes between young adults and juveniles who are not tried as adults. (See § 707 [describing fitness hearing procedure for transfer from juvenile court to criminal court]; see also People v. Cervantes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 569, 602-603, review granted May 17, 2017, S241323.) Arguably, then the real question is whether it is an equal protection violation to require fitness hearings before trying juveniles in criminal courts as adults but not before trying young adults in criminal courts.
The same reasoning applies in the present case: There may be no more common legal distinction than that between juveniles and adults. Appellant's contention that juveniles and young adults are similarly situated is premised on the Supreme Court cases recognizing that the presence of juvenile characteristics may vary in persons over and under age 18. But those same cases nevertheless drew distinctions between juveniles and adults on critical determinations under the Eighth Amendment. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 283 ["It is because of these 'marked and well understood' differences between children and adults [citation] that the law categorically prohibits the imposition of certain penalties, including mandatory [life without parole], on juvenile offenders."].) Further, in light of this abundance of authority distinguishing between juveniles and adults for purposes of criminal sentencing, the legislative decision to treat juveniles and young adults in a similar manner under section 3051 does not require the conclusion sought by appellant that the groups are similarly situated for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. Such a conclusion would potentially mandate, among other things, a wholesale application of juvenile sentencing rules to a vastly expanded criminal population.
Section 3051, subdivision (h) actually undermines any argument that the statute reflects a legislative judgment that juveniles and young adults are similarly situated. Other than the exclusion of persons who commit "malice aforethought" crimes after the age of 23, the exclusions in subdivision (h) relate to persons receiving particular sentences in criminal court. (§ 3051, subd. (h) ["This section shall not apply to cases in which sentencing occurs pursuant to Section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, of Section 667, or Section 667.61, or in which an individual was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole."].) That is, the subdivision largely only applies to young adults and juveniles tried as adults. Thus, in enacting section 3051, the Legislature actually chose to treat young adults and juveniles tried as adults different from the class of juveniles as a whole.
IV. Appellant Has Not Shown He is Entitled to Resentencing
Appellant contends he is entitled to resentencing because section 3051 had not been enacted at the time he was originally sentenced; he contends the trial court was unaware that imposition of a sentence of life without parole would make appellant ineligible under subsection (h) for youth offender parole hearings. He suggests the court should be given an opportunity to exercise discretion under section 1385 to impose a life term instead of a life without parole term for the murder of Officer Espinoza.
Appellant argues a trial court has discretion under section 1385 to strike, in "furtherance of justice," the allegations necessary to support a life without parole sentence under section 190, subdivision (c). (§ 1385, subd. (a); see also People v. Williams (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470, 489 [stating trial court had "authority under section 1385 to dismiss special circumstance findings in order to make it possible for a person to be eligible for parole"].) Respondent disagrees that section 1385 gives a trial court discretion to strike the police officer special circumstances allegations underlying appellant's sentence of life without parole.
Section 1385, subdivision (a) provides, "The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal shall be stated orally on the record. The court shall also set forth the reasons in an order entered upon the minutes if requested by either party or in any case in which the proceedings are not being recorded electronically or reported by a court reporter. A dismissal shall not be made for any cause that would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory pleading."
Regardless of whether the trial court would have had the discretion to strike the section 190, subdivision (c) allegations, appellant has shown no basis to remand for resentencing. Appellant does not claim the sentence was improper when it was imposed (which, of course, would be an untimely argument), and he cites no authority that a resentencing hearing is necessary any time a subsequent legal development adds new implications to a sentence (here, appellant's ineligibility for the newly created youth offender parole hearings.) Because appellant does not show the sentence is "unauthorized," there is no basis for resentencing. (See People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1205 [" 'The unauthorized sentence exception is "a narrow exception" to the waiver doctrine that normally applies where the sentence "could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case," . . . . The class of nonwaivable claims includes "obvious legal errors at sentencing that are correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings." ' "].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
SIMONS, Acting P.J. We concur. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J. /s/_________
BRUINIERS, J.