Opinion
No. 2014NY030875.
08-14-2014
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Davon HEATLEY, Defendant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., New York County District Attorney by ADA Alissa Marque, for the People. The Legal Aid Society by Sunny Jo, Esq., for the Defendant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., New York County District Attorney by ADA Alissa Marque, for the People.
The Legal Aid Society by Sunny Jo, Esq., for the Defendant.
Opinion
STEVEN M. STATSINGER, J.
This case requires the Court to consider the facial sufficiency of an information in which all of the allegations tending to demonstrate that an offense was committed and that defendant is the person who committed it are circumstantial.
Defendant, charged with Assault in the Third Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 120.00(1) and (2), Attempted Assault in the Third Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 110/120.00(1), and Harassment in the Second Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 240.26(1), moves to dismiss. For the reasons set out below, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.
In deciding this motion, the Court has considered defendant's motion papers, the People's opposition and the relevant statutes and cases.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Allegations
Early in the morning of April 18, 2014, Police Officer Frank Santos arrived at a Manhattan apartment soon after receiving a radio run. From outside the door he could hear defendant and the complainant, Shanise Allen, shouting at each other. He also heard Ms. Allen screaming and items breaking. He knocked on the door and, when no one answered, opened it. Defendant was in the apartment hallway with no visible injuries, while Ms. Allen was in the living room. She had blood on her chest, and a fresh, two-inch cut on her finger. She was upset and crying; her hair was disheveled, she was shaking and her eyes were bloodshot. There was also blood on the wall of the kitchen and on the living room floor, and there were dents in the living room wall.
Defendant told the officer, in substance, “We had a disagreement .”
B. Legal Proceedings
Defendant was arraigned on April 18, 2014, on an Information charging him with two counts of Assault in the Second Degree (Penal Law §§ 120.00(1) and (2) ), and one count each of Attempted Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law §§ 110/120.00(1)) and Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.26(1). The Court set bail and a motion schedule and adjourned the case to May 1, 2014, for response and decision.
By May 1, 2014, defendant had made bail and the People consented to hearings. The Court adjourned the case to June 18 for hearing and trial. Defense counsel filed the instant motion on June 18, and the People responded on July 9. The matter has been sub judice since July 9.
II. THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT
The Information, sworn to by Officer Santos provides that on April 18, 2014:
I received a radio run, and at approximately 1:50am, and responded to [2411 8th Avenue, New York County] at approximately 1:53am. I went up to an apartment located at [that] address and when I stood outside the door, I could hear a man and a woman shouting at each other. I could hear a woman screaming and items breaking inside the apartment. Despite my repeated knocks on the door, no one answered. I opened the front door, which was unlocked, and observed the defendant standing in the hallway without any visible injuries. I then observed Shanise Allen ... sitting in the living room with blood on her chest and a cut on her finger about two inches long. I observed that the laceration on her finger was fresh in that I observed it was red and bleeding. I also observed that Ms. Allen was visibly upset, in that she was crying hysterically, her hair was disheveled, she was shaking, and had bloodshot eyes.
I also observed blood on the kitchen wall, more blood smeared on the living room floor, and dents in the living room wall.
The defendant stated in substance and in part, “We had a disagreement.”
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the Information fails to make out a prima facie case that he committed any of the charged offenses, pointing out that it does not allege that the police officer “observed Mr. Heatley engaging in any activity that would amount to harassment, assault, or even attempted assault as defined in the Penal Law.” The People respond that the Information pleads a sufficient circumstantial case because “the logical inference that flows from the alleged facts is that the defendant inflicted [the injury described in the Information] on the complaining witness during an altercation.”
Determining facial sufficiency in a circumstantial assault case poses an unusual challenge because of the variety of ways that a person can be injured. Here, the Information alleges that a police officer entered an apartment and saw only two people, the complainant, who was injured, and the defendant, who was not. There are five primary inferences that can be drawn: (1) defendant intentionally injured the complainant; (2) defendant recklessly injured the complainant; (3) defendant accidentally injured the complainant; (4) the complainant caused her own injury, and; (5) a third person, no longer present when the officer arrived, injured the complainant. Only the first two of these could lead to a finding that there is reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed a criminal offense. Here, while the case is close, the Court agrees with the People that the Information makes out a sufficient prima facie circumstantial case.
A. Facial Insufficiency in General
A misdemeanor information serves the same role in a misdemeanor prosecution that an indictment serves in a felony prosecution: It ensures that a legally sufficient case can be made against the defendant. People v. Dumay, –––N.Y.3d ––––, 2014 WL 2515692 (June 5, 2014) ; People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 138–39, 517 N.Y.S2d 927, 930–31, 511 N.E.2d 71, 74 (1987). Accordingly, a misdemeanor Information must set forth “nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof.” People v. Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228–29, 906 N.E.2d 381, 383, 878 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655 (2009) (citing People v. Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d 677, 679, 685 N.Y.S.2d 409, 708 N.E.2d 165(1999) and CPL 100.40(1)(c) ). This is known as “the prima facie case requirement.” Kalin, 12N.Y.3d at 229, 906 N.E.2d at 383, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
The prima facie case requirement does not necessitate that the Information allege facts that would prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103, 115, 512 N.Y.S2d 652, 657, 504 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (1986). Rather, the information need only contain allegations of fact that “give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense.” People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 717 N.Y.S2d 88, 91, 740 N.E.2d 233, 236 (2000). A court reviewing for facial insufficiency must subject the allegations in the information to a “fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading,” id., assume that those allegations are true, and consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them. CPL §§ 100.40, 100.15 ; People v. Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 747, 944 N.Y.S2d 715, 721–22, 967 N.E.2d 1160, 1166–67 (2012). See also Casey, 95 N.Y.2d at 360, 717 N.Y.S2d at 91, 740 N.E.2d at 236.
B. The Sufficiency of Circumstantial Pleadings
1. Indictments
The legal standard for trial sufficiency in any circumstantial case is well known: “A jury, faced with a case in which the proof of a particular charge, or element thereof, consists entirely of circumstantial evidence, must exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis.” People v. Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534, 6 N.E.3d 1108, 1111, 983 N.Y.S.2d 752, 755 (2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
But the “moral certainty” standard does not apply to a pleading. Where a defendant is charged by indictment, the indictment is sufficient “as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference; the standard that every hypothesis but guilt be excluded to a moral certainty' is to be applied only by the trier of fact.” People v. Burrell, 236 A.D.2d 240, 653 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st Dept.1997) (quoting People v. Jennings, ) 69 N.Y.2d 103, 504 N.E.2d 1079, 512 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1986).
2. Misdemeanor Informations
What is true for an indictment is also true for a misdemeanor information: A circumstantial misdemeanor accusatory instrument does not need to exclude all innocent inferences to a moral certainty. Rather, as with any misdemeanor information, one that pleads a circumstantial case is facially sufficient where the court reviewing it finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the offense or offenses charged occurred and that the defendant committed them. E.g., People v. Hightower, 18 NY3d 249, 254, 961 N.E.2d 1111, 1113, 938 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (2011).
This case accordingly turns on an examination of reasonable cause. Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense “exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it.” CPL § 70.10(2). The terms “reasonable cause” and “probable cause” are generally considered to be synonymous. People v. Omowale, 83 AD3d 614, 618 (1st Dept 2011) ; People v. Lloyd, 31 Misc.3d 1223(A) at *2 (Just. Ct Town of Webster (2011)). For either to exist, the evidence must be strong enough to support a finding that it was more likely than not that the defendant committed a crime. People v. Mercado, 68 N.Y.2d 874, 877 (1986) (probable cause existed where it was “more probable than not” that criminal activity was taking place); People v. Carrasquillo, 54 N.Y.2d 248, 254 (1981) (probable cause for an arrest requires facts establishing that it is “at least more probable than not that a crime has taken place and that the one arrested is its perpetrator”); People v. Carpenter, 213 A.D.2d 747, (3d Dept 1995) (reversing denial of suppression motion where search warrant affidavit did not establish that it was “more probable than not” that defendant was selling drugs out of the target location); People v. Skrine, 125 A.D.2d 507 (2d Dept 1986) (where defendant was one of several people matching description in radio run, evidence failed to establish that it was “more likely than not” he was the person who committed the crime); People v. Miranda, 106 A.D.2d 407, 409 (2d Dept 1984).
Carrasquillo instructs that “conduct equally compatible with guilt or innocence will not suffice” to establish probable cause. 54 N.Y.2d at 254. Accordingly, when the facts are in equipoise-that is, so evenly balanced such that there can be no finding that the necessary inference of criminality is more likely true than not-there can be no finding of reasonable cause or probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 643 F3d 1292, 1299 (10th Cir.2011) (affirming district court's conclusion that, where evidence was in equipoise as to whether exigent circumstances existed, warrantless search was unlawful).
Accordingly, if the allegations in a misdemeanor information create a complete equipoise between the inference of guilt and any innocent inferences, there can be no rational basis for a finding of reasonable cause. This Court examined such an equipoise situation in People v. David, 2014 WL 3583535 (Crim Ct New York County 2014) (Statsinger, J.) There, a police officer placed two individuals in an otherwise empty holding cell in a stationhouse, then noticed a bag of drugs on the floor of the cell. The Court dismissed an Information that charged one of the two individuals with possessing those drugs:
The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts in the Information is that either defendant or the ... individual with whom he shared a holding cell dropped a bag of cocaine to the floor. However, absent any fact that would tend to show that it was the defendant, and not the other person, who did so ... the Information is facially insufficient.
This “perfectly balanced” evidence reflected an “an exact fifty percent chance that either defendant or the other person did it, and the Information contain [ed] no fact that might tip the scale, even slightly, in favor of the conclusion that it was more likely than not the defendant.”
4. The Information Here is Facially Sufficient
Here, as in David, for the Information to be facially sufficient it must allege some fact that renders an inference of guilt more likely, even if only slightly, than the other inferences. The Court concludes that such additional facts are present and the Information is facially sufficient. First, the facts pled reasonably eliminate the possibility that an unseen third party caused the complainant's injury. The officer arrived three minutes after receiving the radio run, and could hear that the dispute that in all likelihood caused the complainant's fresh injury was still going on. The dispute involved only the complainant and the defendant, and there was no one else in the apartment when the officer entered.
There are also sufficient facts to establish reasonable cause to believe both that the defendant caused the complainant's injury and that he did not do so accidentally. The officer heard the defendant and the complainant shouting, heard items breaking and, when he entered the apartment saw indentations in the wall that could reasonably be attributed to the items the officer heard being broken. In addition, the complainant was in the same room where the officer saw the indentations, and there was blood on the floor of that room. Only the complainant was injured, the officer had heard her screaming before he entered, and she was in an extremely agitated emotional state. These facts together reasonably overcome the possibility that the complainant injured herself. Finally, the defendant admitted that he and the complainant had had a “disagreement.” This, when added to the other available facts, reasonably overcomes the possibility that the defendant injured the complainant accidentally. To be sure, these facts do not entirely eliminate the possibilities that the defendant accidentally injured the complainant, that a third party caused her injuries or that she injured herself, but that is not the test. These facts make the defendant's criminal culpability more likely than these other theories, even if only to the very small but sufficient degree necessary to establish reasonable cause.
Finally, the Court notes that these facts distinguish this case from People v. W.J., 27 Misc.3d 1212(A), 910 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Crim Ct New York County). There, a police officer outside an apartment heard yelling and screaming, which grew louder as he approached. When he entered, only the defendant and the complainant were present. There was blood on the complainant's shirt and bleeding lacerations on the complainant's face. The court there found that there were no facts that would establish “any actus reus committed by the defendant that would have caused the injuries of the complainant.” The court accordingly dismissed the information as facially insufficient. “While it is interesting to circumstantially analyze the allegations of blood on the complainant's shirt and face, the allegations of blood alone cannot compensate for the complete lack of allegations to establish” a criminal assault.
Here, by contrast, the additional facts pled in the Information, discussed above, permit a reasonable inference that the defendant either recklessly or intentionally caused the complainant's injuries during their “disagreement,” and lead to the conclusion that this inference is more likely, even if only slightly, then the other, exculpatory, inferences that might be drawn. Accordingly, since the Information in fact establishes reasonable cause, it is facially sufficient.
D. Conclusion
The Information is facially sufficient as to both counts. The motion to dismiss is accordingly denied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.