Opinion
10010014.01
04-08-2011
The People of the State of New York, v. Allison Heaney, Defendant
Appearances: Christine Price and Henry Nguyen, Leventhal & Sliney, Roslyn, NY, for the People Donald T. Rave, Locust Valley, NY, for defendant
Appearances: Christine Price and Henry Nguyen, Leventhal & Sliney, Roslyn, NY, for the People Donald T. Rave, Locust Valley, NY, for defendant
Martin I. Kaminsky, J.
Defendant is charged with violation of Village Ordinance §144-6(A)(4), when stormwater ran off from his property on Northern Boulevard in the Village of Muttontown and allegedly caused damage to adjoining property on Remsens Lane in the same Village. The ordinance requires a property owner to assure that "stormwater shall be collected by dry wells or directed toward roadways with adequate existing drainage facilities." §144-6(A)(4).
The residence in question was constructed over 90 years ago, and "there has been no change to the topography or structures which affect the absorption characteristics of the surface" [Rave Aff. §3]. Defendant contends that the ordinance which was enacted several years after the residence was constructed, and thus does not apply to his residence; so that he is not guilty of the charge. Rather, defendant contends, §144-6(A)(4) provides only "requirements of site approval for new subdivisions and applications for new building permits" , not for existing property such as defendant's property [Id.]. Defendant points out that §144-6(A)(4) is part of a Chapter of the statute entitled "Site Plan Review", and is surrounded and complimented by provisions which are all addressed to the filing of a site plan and other aspects of new construction and work to be performed in the future, rather than conditions on existing property [Transcript of March 17, 2011 at 2-3, 5-7].
Defendant also seeks dismissal under CPL 170.40 "in the furtherance of Justice". But, defendant has not explained what he is referring to in that part of his motion; hence, that it will not be dealt with here. Defendant may be referring to the 45 day period provided in CPL §255.20 for motions following arraignment. If so, the People do not object to an extension of that time period; and the Court grants such an extension on this motion.
The People contend that the statutory provision under which defendant is charged stands on its own, and is a separate codification of "the public policy favoring the containment of stormwater runoff to advance the health, safety and general welfare of the community" [Price Aff. §5; see also Transcript of March 17, 2011 at 4-5]. The People further contend that the heading of the Chapter containing the statute is not material, because §144-6(A)(4) itself "makes no reference to Site Plan approval" [Price Aff. §11]. The People say that a Chapter title should be considered only if and when statutory language itself is ambiguous, which they contend is not the case here [Id. §9]. Rather, the plain language of the statute, the People say, makes clear what it means and how it should be read and applied as written [Id. §13].
In making those contentions, the People rely on several basic principles of statutory construction. First, as explained in 1 McKinney's Consol. L of NY: Statutes [hereinafter "Statutes"] §92, "the primary consideration of the court in the construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature"; and, in Statutes §94, where possible, "the legislative intent is to be ascertained from the words and language used". A portion of Statutes §123(b) further provides that "the heading of a portion of a statute such as a chapter or sections usually is not part of the act and does not extend or restrict the language contained in the body of the statute...." See, e.g., Doctors Council Retirement v. NYC Employees System, 71 NY2d 699, 674-75; Mtr State v. Ford Motor Co., 74 NY2d 495, 500; People v. Kleber, 168 Misc 2d 824, 827 (Jus Ct Muttontown) ("the court's function is... to fulfill the intent of the Legislature; and the starting point in attempting to do so is the language of the statute or ordinance itself"; thus "unambiguous words in a statute or ordinance should ordinarily be given their plain meaning"). The People say that these rules require application of VO §144-6(A)(4) to defendant's property here.
Likewise, "the title of a statute may be resorted to as an aid in the ascertainment of the legislative intent only in case of ambiguity in meaning and it may not alter or limit the effect of unambiguous language in the body of the statute itself." Statutes §123(a).
However, as defendant points out, the Court may depart from the literal words of a statute when to apply them would flout rather than fulfill the purpose of the statute. "The general rule requiring a court to apply the plain meaning of a statute does not require the mechanical application of the language in all circumstances". 97 NY Jur2d: Statutes §111. See, e.g., Doctors Council Retirement, 71 NY2d at 674-75; Aronsky v. Board of Education, 75 NY2d 997, amended, 78 NY2d 576. The courts need not blindly adhere to the literal language of a statute if such language fails to express the clear overriding purpose of the language". 97 NY Jur2d: Statutes §112. See, e.g., Carr v. New York State Bd, 40 NY2d 556; Dodge v. Board of Education, 237 AD2d 806; Bolden v. Blum, 68 AD2d 600, aff'd, 48 NY2d 946.
To prevent that from occurring, "a statute or legislative act is to be construed as a whole and all parts of an act are to be read and construed together to determine the legislative intent". Statutes §93. Accord Statutes §130 ("all sections of a law must be read together to determine its fair meaning"). See, e.g., Levine v. Borenstein, 4 NY2d 241 ("all parts of an act are to be read together"); People v. Greenfield, 9 Misc 3d 1113A, 2005 NY Slip Op 51518U, 808 NYS2d 919 (Jus. Ct. Muttontown). Further, the history of the statute may be taken into account, particularly when the legislative intent is unclear from the face of the statute. 97 NY Jur2d: Statutes § 146; Riley v. County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455; In re Stupack, 274 NY 198.
As to headings of a Chapter in a statute, Statutes 123(b) provides, immediately after the portion relied on by the People (quoted above), that an exception to the general rule is that the heading "may be resorted to as an aid in ascertainment of the legislative intent where a provision is ambiguous in meaning". See, e.g., Smuli v. Delaney, 175 Misc 795; Sherwin v. Jonas, 150 Misc 342. See also Broderick v. Seinsler, 253 AD 213, aff'd, 278 NY 419. Headings placed on the statute by the Legislature thus may reveal the legislative intent and may be a basis for limiting or defining the effect of the statute. See, e.g., People v. Molyneux, 40 NY2d 113; Con. Edison Co v. Maltbie, 275 AD 475, rev'd on other grounds, 300 NY 196, app dism, 330 US 973.
"A basic consideration in the interpretation of a statute is the general spirit and purpose underlying its enactment, and that construction is to be preferred which furthers the object, spirit and purpose of the statute". Statutes §96. See, e.g., Rankin v. Shanker, 23 NY2d 111; Williams v. Williams, 23 NY2d 592; Home Office Ref. Lab v. Axelrod, 116 AD2d 858. Therefore, "the courts in construing a statute should consider the mischief sought to be remedied by the new legislation, and they should construe the act in question so as to suppress the evil and advance the remedy". Statutes §95. See, e.g., People v. Bell, 306 NY 110, 115-15, In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 253 AD2d 211, 217; People v. Lim, 2001 NY Slip Op 40291U, 2001 NY Misc LEXIS 1245 (Jus Ct Muttontown).
The overriding and guiding principle underlying all of these provisions is the desire to ascertain and fulfill the intent of the Legislature. Therefore, "where application of even the literal words of an ordinance or statute would flout the plain intent of the legislation, the Court will not do that, but rather construe them to fulfill that intent". Lim, 2001 NY Slip Op 40291U, 2001 NY Misc LEXIS 1245. Accord Doctors Council Retirement, 71 NY2d at 675; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Libow, 106 AD2d 110, 114, aff'd, 65 NY2d 807.
Similarly, "in construing a statute which is ambiguous the construction to be adopted is the one which will not cause objectionable results". Statutes §141.
The Legislature's intent here appears to be best ascertained by harmonizing and synthesizing those rules of statutory construction. Doing so, the Court considers the inclusion of the provision at issue within a Chapter in which all the other sections relate to new construction or modification of property to be significant, indeed persuasive. That indicates a legislative intent that §244-6(A)(4) be part of a multi-part statutory scheme to deal with that subject, and not be a stand-alone regulatory provision. Indeed, the particular subdivision allegedly violated by the defendant is itself one of several parts of that one section, the rest of which appear directed toward such new construction or modification of a site.
Nevertheless, the People say, "it is the long and continued policy of the Village, through Code enforcement, to interpret the Code generally, which itself should bring this case within the doctrine that "judicial construction of an ambiguous statute is often aided by the way the statue is interpreted by those administering" and that such a "course of action by executive or administrative officers may be entitled to great weight unless manifestly wrong". Statutes §129)(a). See, e.g., People v. Consol. Telegraph, 187 NY 58. In support of that contention, the People point out that, the statute has been in effect for almost two decades and that other related statutes also regulate non-stormwater runoff, evidencing a legislative intent to control that problem. See, e.g., Local Law 2 of 2007 Chapter 78 "Illicit Discharges, Activities, and Connections to Separate Storm Sewer System" prohibiting non-stormwater runoff. However, historical construction of a statute can not expand or enlarge the statute. Carey v. Morton, 190 Misc 205, aff'd, 273 AD 245, aff'd, 297 NY 361. Moreover, there are potentially significant differences between regulation of "non-stormwater runoff", a condition as to which a property owner will normally have prior notice, and "stormwater runoff" which may be an anomaly (e.g. the result of an unusual storm) and not anticipated by an owner .
The People's citation to the title of a Chapter in this instance is inconsistent with the People's argument that such a Chapter title is not material to construction of a statute.
Further, the inclusion of such a provision in another separate chapter may actually indicate a legislative intent to deal with "non-construction" runoff separately from controlling runoff when new construction is undertaken.
More apposite and persuasive as to the nature of history is that (as explained by defense counsel and not contested by the People), the section involved here was added at the same time as that entire Chapter containing it, all of whose other sections address new construction, etc. See Transcript of March 17, 2001 at 8-9. That indicates a legislative intent for all portions of the Chapter to apply to new construction and site plans for new construction.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the People have failed to show that the statutory provision at issue applies to the violation charged against defendant. Accordingly, the motion is granted; and this case is dismissed.
So ordered. Enter.
Dated: April 8, 2011
Muttontown, NY
________________________________________
Martin I. Kaminsky
Village Justice
GC 521,184,561v1 4-12-11