Opinion
C082310
04-19-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STANLEY B. HAYES, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15F02032)
Defendant Stanley B. Hayes entered a plea of guilty to battery on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)) in exchange for 16 months of incarceration. He timely appeals the trial court's decision to run his 16-month county jail sentence consecutive to his 2004 state hospital commitment, which he was serving at the time of the assault, plea, and sentencing. We will modify the judgment to stay defendant's custodial sentence pending restoration of his sanity and otherwise affirm.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2004, defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity on charges of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. He was committed to Patton State Hospital for restoration of sanity. (§ 1026.) While at Patton, he became physically assaultive, verbally abusive, threatening, and disrupted treatment. In 2009, he was transferred to California State Prison--Sacramento (CSPS) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 7301, which provides for such transfer where a committed person "needs care and treatment under conditions of custodial security which can be better provided" in a prison as opposed to a hospital. Defendant's maximum commitment date is 2022.
Section 1026 sets forth the procedure for trial on a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The statute specifies that if the jury finds a defendant was insane at the time the offense occurred, commitment to the State Department of State Hospitals or another facility (if approved by the community program director) for restoration of sanity is appropriate. (See § 1026, subds. (a) & (b).)
On March 2, 2015, defendant struck a correctional officer at CSPS. In 2016, defendant entered his plea to battery as described above, with an agreed upon sentence of 16 months in state prison. At sentencing, the parties agreed that defendant's sentence was in fact required by statute to be served in the county jail (see §§ 243, subd. (c)(2), 1170, subd. (h)(2)), and the court sentenced defendant accordingly. The parties disputed whether the sentence should run concurrent or consecutive to defendant's 2004 commitment; the court sentenced defendant to consecutive time. Defendant appeals, contending the term for the battery offense must be concurrent or stayed. The Attorney General responds that the 16-month term must be stayed pending restoration of defendant's sanity. We agree and will modify the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that his county jail sentence should run concurrently to his state hospital commitment, currently being served in state prison, because he "can be punished and receive treatment at the same time." He relies on two related cases from the Second District, Division Four to make this argument. (People v. Cleveland (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 820 (Cleveland I); People v. Cleveland (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 547 (Cleveland II).) But these cases are distinguishable.
In Cleveland I, a jury found defendant guilty of five counts and found that he was insane during commission of one of the counts. (Cleveland I, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at p. 823.) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison on the counts he was found sane and made no mention of the insanity verdict. (Id. at pp. 831-832.) Cleveland I remanded for resentencing, reasoning: "Section 1026 requires that the defendant be committed on count III to the state hospital for the criminally insane, whereas other statutes require that he be sentenced to state prison on counts I, II and IV. Obviously he cannot be confined in two places at once. Since the purpose of the confinement under sections 1026 and 1026a is to protect society and to afford an opportunity for psychiatric treatment, and since the Department of Corrections has facilities that can be utilized for both purposes, we conclude that, in the eventuality under consideration, it would serve the purposes of all the statutes if the confinement, under all counts, were in the state prison." (Id. at pp. 832-833, fn. omitted.)
On remand for sentencing, the trial court dismissed count III and again sentenced defendant to prison on the remaining counts. (Cleveland II, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 550.) On appeal, defendant challenged the dismissal of count III. The Cleveland II court affirmed, commenting that: "Since . . . all of the objectives of a section 1026 commitment can, in the case at bench, be accomplished under the disposition now made by the trial court, we cannot say that it erred in electing not to impose on defendant, the People and a busy court, the holding of a hearing which would have had no discoverable public or private value." (Id. at p. 550.)
Defendant does not discuss the fact that his 16-month term of incarceration is not a state prison term; he was sentenced to county jail. Further, although he is currently housed at a state prison, he is not currently serving a prison sentence. In Cleveland, as we have described, the defendant was actually sentenced to serve state prison sentences on multiple counts at the same time as he was to be committed for restoration on the remaining count. The issue was whether he should serve the prison sentences on the three counts of conviction at the same time as his section 1026 commitment. Here, there is no prison sentence at all, and the restoration commitment preceded the county jail commitment. These differences distinguish the Cleveland cases from defendant's case.
The Attorney General does not address these differences, but instead relies wholly on People v. Chavez (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 882 (Chavez). In Chavez, the Second District, Division One explained that: "Treatment and punishment are two separate and distinct concepts. The state Legislature has declared 'that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.' [Citation.] In contrast, a commitment to a state hospital under section 1026 is 'in lieu of criminal punishment' [citation] and 'is for purposes of treatment, not punishment' [citation]. [Citation.] An individual found not guilty by reason of insanity is not subject to punishment in prison but rather must be committed to a state hospital for treatment. [Citations.] The language of section 1026 is mandatory [citations] and 'allows no discretion' for defendants who have been acquitted of criminal charges due to insanity. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 895-896.)
Chavez rejected the defendant's assertion that his state prison sentence had to run concurrently to his state hospital commitment. "The question whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences applies only when there are multiple convictions and multiple terms of imprisonment. [Citations.] . . . Inasmuch as this is not a case involving multiple terms of imprisonment stemming from crimes committed on separate occasions, we conclude that there is no legal basis to order a state hospital commitment and a state prison sentence to run concurrently with or consecutively to one another." (Chavez, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 896.) Chavez concluded the defendant's state prison sentence had to be stayed until his sanity was restored. (Id. at p. 897.)
Defendant's transfer from Patton State Hospital to CSPS did not change his legal rights and status--he is still a committee, not subject to punishment, and has the right to care and treatment within limits and with a goal of restoring his sanity so that he can be tried on pending charges from 2004. (See In re Cathey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 679, 693-694, disapproved on other grounds in In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 477, fn. 8; see also People v. Gram (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1141-1142.)
Noting that the defendant was not eligible to participate in a conditional release program, Chavez cited the language of section 1026.2, subdivision (m), which provides (in relation to participation in a conditional release program): " 'This subdivision shall apply only to persons who, at the time of the petition or recommendation for restoration of sanity, are subject to a term of imprisonment with prison time remaining to serve or are subject to the imposition of a previously stayed sentence to a term of imprisonment. Any person to whom this subdivision applies who petitions or is recommended for restoration of sanity may not be placed in a forensic conditional release program for one year, and a finding of restoration of sanity may be made without the person being in a forensic conditional release program for one year. If a finding of restoration of sanity is made, the person shall be transferred to the custody of the California Department of Corrections to serve the term of imprisonment remaining or shall be transferred to the appropriate court for imposition of the sentence that is pending, whichever is applicable.' " (Chavez, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 897, second italics added.) Chavez concluded a state prison term is to be stayed until the defendant regains his sanity, a result "compelled by the language of subdivision (m) of section 1026.2." (Ibid.) Chavez, although not precisely on point, is persuasive, and its facts and necessary analysis are much more similar to defendant's case than are the Cleveland cases.
Defendant has not provided us with any legitimate avenue through which to conclude that his 16-month sentence to county jail could, much less should, run concurrently to his 2004 state hospital commitment. His sentence should be stayed pending restoration of sanity.
DISPOSITION
Defendant's sentence stayed pending restoration of sanity. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the modification and provide certified copies to the relevant authorities.
/s/_________
Duarte, J. We concur: /s/_________
Raye, P. J. /s/_________
Hull, J.