Opinion
E052249 Super.Ct.No. RIF10005421
08-24-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FREDRICK TERENCE HARVEY, Defendant and Appellant.
Alan S. Yockelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Larrie R. Brainard, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Diego Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Alan S. Yockelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Fredrick Terence Harvey pled guilty to nine counts of obtaining the personal identifying information of another and using it for an unlawful purpose (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a)) and one count of possessing the identifying information of 10 or more persons with the intent to defraud (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (c)(3)). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted that he had suffered three prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to a total term of nine years in state prison with credit for time served. Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because defendant's sole issue on appeal involves the denial of his suppression motion, the factual background is taken from the hearing on the suppression motion.
Defendant filed a suppression motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, claiming his detention was unlawful because an investigator would testify that both of defendant's vehicle's brake lights were operational. The People subsequently filed their opposition, arguing the detention was lawful because defendant was in violation of the Vehicle Code.
A hearing on defendant's suppression motion was held on October 5, 2010. At that hearing, Riverside County Sheriff's Deputy Jason Argandona testified that he was on routine patrol on May 16, 2010, in the city of Mira Loma when he saw a vehicle with an inoperable brake light come to a stop at 48th and Marlatt Street. The vehicle was being driven by defendant. Deputy Argandona executed a three-point turn to position himself behind defendant's vehicle. Defendant turned on Marlatt Street, and the deputy proceeded to follow the vehicle. Deputy Argandona explained on cross-examination that, while defendant's vehicle was a "vehicle of interest" because of a confidential source, he decided to stop the vehicle due to the inoperable taillight.
Deputy Argandona attempted to catch up to defendant, but defendant sped up to between 40 and 45 miles per hour in the rural residential area. Although there were no posted speed limit signs in the area, the deputy believed the "prima facie speed law would be 25 miles per hour," based on the residential nature of the area. Deputy Argandona activated his patrol vehicle's overhead lights. Defendant immediately turned into a driveway on Marlatt Street. He exited the vehicle and began to walk briskly towards the residence.
Deputy Argandona made contact with defendant and advised him that he was being detained for a traffic violation. The deputy asked defendant for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Because defendant was unable to produce a driver's license, the deputy detained defendant in the back of the patrol car to confirm his identity. A computer check revealed that defendant's driver's license had been suspended. Defendant was subsequently arrested for driving on a suspended license. Pursuant to police protocol, Deputy Argandona impounded defendant's vehicle. A subsequent inventory search of the vehicle revealed a large box of documents and a computer bag.
Investigator Keith Kleinman of the Riverside County Public Defender's Office testified on behalf of the defense. He stated that he went to the tow yard where defendant's car was stored after it was impounded by police. Once there, he had tow yard personnel start the vehicle, turn the headlights on, push the turn signals left and right, and press the brakes while he stood behind the vehicle to check its operational status. Investigator Kleinman observed that the vehicle was functioning normally, including the turn signals and brake lights. These tests were conducted in the middle of the day with the sun shining.
On reexamination, Deputy Argandona testified that on the night of defendant's arrest, he and his partner had also conducted their own test on defendant's vehicle and confirmed that the right rear brake light was not operating.
Following argument from counsel, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, finding the officer had cause to stop defendant's vehicle.
II
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because he was detained without reasonable suspicion and the deputy's testimony was disingenuous. Thus, any evidence obtained from the illegal detention had to be suppressed.
The standard an appellate court employs in its review of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence is well settled. In evaluating a challenge to the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to its factual findings, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Sardinas (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 488, 493.) We then exercise our independent judgment to decide what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
"[A]n officer may stop and detain a motorist on reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the law." (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082.) In other words, an officer with a reasonable suspicion that a motorist has violated the California Vehicle Code may stop the vehicle involved for investigation. (People v. Watkins (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408.) A traffic stop is reasonable if the detaining police officer can point to specific articulable facts that objectively suggest the detainee is violating the law in light of the totality of circumstances. (People v. Colbert (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1072.) Supreme Court precedent "foreclose[s] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved." (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813 [116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89].) Therefore, the officer's subjective motivation in stopping the car is irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis where there is probable cause to stop the car. (Id. at pp. 809-810.)
Defendant argues that there was no evidence, other than the deputy's testimony, to show that defendant's brake light was inoperable and that there was conflicting evidence to show that the brake lights were operable. He therefore claims that Deputy Argandona's testimony was incredible. Insofar as there was a conflict in the evidence between Deputy Argandona's testimony and Investigator Kleinman's testimony, the court resolved it in favor of the deputy by believing the deputy's testimony that the brake light was not working and denying the motion to suppress. As the trial court pointed out, "lighting can also be fickle and intermittent. We've all even seen that on our own vehicles sadly. Who knows what was done by the tow truck, so forth, in terms of connecting lights or changing the circumstance." Under the circumstances, the trial court's factual determination is not arbitrary or irrational. Accordingly, we defer to that determination. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327.) This is so because the trial court "'sits as a finder of fact with the power to judge credibility, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw inferences . . . .'" (People v. Needham (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 260, 265.)
As noted previously, on appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, the appellate court must defer to the trial court's express and implied factual findings as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 362.) The trial court, not the Court of Appeal, has the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh the evidence, and to draw factual inferences. (People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 107.) In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court articulated express and implied factual findings. We must defer to the court's pivotal factual finding that the officer had articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on the inoperable brake light and that "the vehicle was moving substantially too fast."
Defendant's reliance on People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137 is misplaced. There, the defense alleged that the police officer had lied when he stated he stopped the defendant's car because the brake light was "'burnt out,'" and presented uncontradicted testimony from the defendant's employer that "when he picked up [the defendant]'s car at the police impound lot three days after the arrest both taillights and brake lights were operational." (Id. at p. 1141.) "The trial court ruled it did not need to decide whether the police made up their claim [the] defendant's car had a 'burnt out' right brake light because any taint arising from the alleged unlawful stop was dissipated by the discovery of the arrest warrant prior to the search." (Id. at p. 1140.) The appellate court reversed and "remand[ed] the cause to the trial court to rehear [the] defendant's suppression motion and make a factual determination as to whether at the time of the traffic stop [the] defendant's car had a burnt-out brake light as the officers claim, or if they could reasonably believe it was burnt out." (Id. at p. 1141.) It noted that the trial court could find the taillight was not operational simply by finding that the defendant's witnesses were not believable. (Id. at p. 1149.)
In the present matter, the trial court made the factual finding that the brake light was inoperable when Deputy Argandona stopped the vehicle. In Rodriguez, the trial court did not determine whether the officer's testimony about the vehicle's defective taillights and brake lights was credible. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1142.)
This case is akin to People v. Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th 1403. In that case, the defendant, like here, argued that the stop was illegal because photographs of the defendant's impounded car, which were taken by a defense investigator five days after the defendant's arrest, showed all the brake lights were working. The appellate court rejected the defendant's claim that the traffic stop was not justified where the police officer observed the defendant's vehicle's brake light was not operable as the vehicle approached a stop sign at an intersection. (Id. at pp. 1406-1408.) The court explained: "The magistrate expressly credited the officer's testimony that one of [the] defendant's brake lights was not working properly. This was substantial evidence that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect a Vehicle Code violation. [Citation.] It does not matter whether the officer's suspicion proved correct. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1408, fn. omitted.)
We conclude the factual findings resolve the constitutional inquiry. Here, Deputy Argandona testified that he stopped defendant's vehicle because he had witnessed an inoperable brake light as defendant approached a stop sign on 48th and Marlatt Street. The trial court found his testimony to be believable. Hence, Deputy Argandona's testimony, like the testimony in Watkins, provided specific and articulable facts to support an objectively reasonable conclusion to suspect a Vehicle Code violation. There was no error in denying the suppression motion.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI
J.
We concur: RAMIREZ
P.J.
HOLLENHORST
J.