Opinion
March 25, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Rosato, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
In this prosecution for a gunpoint robbery of the complainant by the defendant and two accomplices, the hearing court properly denied suppression of two showup identifications of the defendant by the complainant. The People met their burden of establishing that the first showup identification, which was spontaneously made by the complainant shortly after the crime, was not the result of a police arranged identification procedure (see, People v Whisby, 48 N.Y.2d 834; People v Webster, 169 A.D.2d 796; People v Rios, 156 A.D.2d 397). The second showup, which subsequently took place at the station house, was not arranged by the police. In any event, it was merely confirmatory since the complainant had already spontaneously identified the defendant as one of the robbers (People v Johnson, 169 A.D.2d 779; People v Griffin, 161 A.D.2d 799; People v Jackson, 159 A.D.2d 640).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15).
Finally, we find unpersuasive the defendant's contention that he was denied a fair trial by the court's allegedly unbalanced marshalling of the evidence during its charge. The record shows that the court referred to the evidence to the extent necessary to explain the application of legal principles to the factual issues in this case (see, CPL 300.10). The court placed no undue emphasis on the People's contentions. Also, the court referred to the defendant's contention that he was mistakenly identified (see, People v Glenn, 160 A.D.2d 813), and discussed the factors the jury was to consider in determining the complainant's reliability (see, People v Gray, 144 A.D.2d 483). Finally, the court instructed the jurors that they were not to infer from its comments anything with respect to the court's views in the matter (see, People v Gray, supra; People v McDonnald, 144 A.D.2d 701). Thus, considered as a whole, we do not find that the court's charge warrants reversal (see, People v Beaumont, 170 A.D.2d 513). Thompson, J.P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.