Summary
In People v. Harris, 151 AD2d 981, 542 N.Y.S.2d 71 (4th Dept. 1989), the Fourth Dept. found that CPL Section 60.42 does not bar evidence of a claim of prior sexual abuse by a complainant; it bars evidence of prior sexual conduct of a complainant.
Summary of this case from People v. FoulkesOpinion
June 2, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Monroe County, Doyle, J.
Present — Dillon, P.J., Denman, Green, Pine and Balio, JJ.
Judgment unanimously reversed on the law and new trial granted. Memorandum: On appeal from his conviction of first degree rape, third degree rape, and three counts each of first degree sodomy and third degree sodomy, defendant contends that the court erroneously precluded him from cross-examining the complainant concerning whether she had made prior false claims of rape, and that the court admitted impermissible hearsay and bolstering testimony. Those claims were raised by defendant on a prior appeal on which we reversed his conviction and granted a new trial because of that court's erroneous evidentiary rulings (People v. Harris, 132 A.D.2d 940, 941). We agree with defendant's contention that the court disregarded our prior decision and thus erred in concluding that inquiry into complainant's allegedly false claims of rape was proscribed by CPL 60.42. Such evidence does not come within the proscriptive scope of CPL 60.42 and its admissibility rests within the discretion of the trial court (People v. Mandel, 48 N.Y.2d 952, cert denied and appeal dismissed 446 U.S. 949, reh denied 448 U.S. 908; People v. Harris, supra). The People argue that the court properly exercised its discretion in precluding this inquiry. We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to prohibit inquiry into the complainant's prior rape complaints. Defendant offered sufficient proof, in the form of complainant's conflicting statements to hospital personnel and to the prosecutor, to demonstrate a good-faith basis for inquiring whether the previous rape complaints were in fact false (cf., People v. Mandel, supra; People v. Lippert, 138 A.D.2d 770, 771).
With respect to defendant's bolstering argument, we conclude that the testimony of the treating physician relating the victim's statements concerning the attack was properly admitted. Such statements were relevant to diagnosis and treatment, as the doctor testified. Moreover, the testimony of the complainant and the investigating officer concerning her statements constituted admissible evidence of prompt complaint (see, Richardson, Evidence § 292 [Prince 10th ed]).