Opinion
No. 348867
03-19-2020
In re JAYDA MARIE HARRELL, Minor. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JAYDA HARRELL, Respondent-Appellee.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Oakland Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2018-865660-DL Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SERVITTO, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals by leave granted an order granting respondent's motion to exclude evidence of prior acts of domestic violence in this juvenile-delinquency proceeding. We vacate the order and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
People v Harrell, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 13, 2019 (Docket No. 348867).
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from an incident in which respondent allegedly threatened to strike her mother with a chair, and then kicked and scratched police officers who responded to the scene. Petitioner filed a notice of intent to introduce, under MCL 768.27b, evidence of respondent's two prior acts of domestic violence, in which respondent assaulted her mother with household objects and resisted responding officers. Respondent filed a motion to exclude the evidence under MRE 403, arguing that the jury would be incapable of presuming her innocent in this case if that evidence was admitted. Respondent also alleged that her mother had fabricated the allegations in this case. Following a hearing, the trial court granted respondent's motion on the ground that the evidence would be too prejudicial given that respondent was a juvenile with mental-health issues. Petitioner now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly excluded the other-acts evidence because: 1) the trial court was required to weigh the propensity inference from the evidence as probative rather than prejudicial under MRE 403; 2) the evidence was highly probative because respondent's prior acts were substantively identical to the acts that led to charges in this case; and 3) the evidence would not inflame a jury's passions so as to distract from respondent's guilt or innocence in this case. We agree. The trial court abused its discretion when it excluded petitioner's MCL 768.27b evidence as too prejudicial under MRE 403.
A trial court's decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion which occurs when the court "chooses an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes." In re Kerr, 323 Mich App 407, 411; 917 NW2d 408 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The interpretation of statutes and court rules are reviewed de novo, with consideration that unambiguous language is enforced as written. Id.
MCL 768.27b(1) states:
[I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence or sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of other acts of domestic violence or sexual assault is admissible for any purpose for which it is relevant, if it is not otherwise excluded under Michigan rule of evidence 403.MCL 768.27b "expands the admissibility of domestic-violence other-acts evidence beyond the scope permitted by MRE 404(b)(1)[.]" People v Mack, 493 Mich 1, 2; 825 NW2d 541 (2012). In fact, "in cases of domestic violence, MCL 768.27b permits evidence of prior domestic violence in order to show a defendant's character or propensity to commit the same act." People v Railer, 288 Mich App 213, 219-220; 792 NW2d 776 (2010). However, such evidence may still be excluded under MRE 403. MCL 768.27b(1).
MRE 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.When considering the application of MRE 403 to the very similar MCL 768.27a, our Supreme Court noted the intended effect of MCL 768.27a "is to allow juries to consider evidence of other acts the defendant committed to show the defendant's character and propensity to commit the charged crime." People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450, 486; 818 NW2d 296 (2012). Therefore,
when applying MRE 403 to evidence admissible under MCL 768.27a, courts must weigh the propensity inference in favor of the evidence's probative value rather
than its prejudicial effect. That is, other-acts evidence admissible under MCL 768.27a may not be excluded under MRE 403 as overly prejudicial merely because it allows a jury to draw a propensity inference. [Id. at 487.]In Mack, 493 Mich at 3, our Supreme Court acknowledged the similarity of MCL 768.27b to MCL 768.27a.
In this case, it is clear from the trial court's explanation in support of its ruling to exclude the other-acts evidence that it did not properly evaluate whether the evidence was likely to have an unfairly prejudicial effect which outweighed its probative value. The trial court ruled:
[W]e are dealing with a child in this matter, these are instances that allegedly happened on back-to-back dates with regard to this matter; there are circumstances, including the fact that there was medication issues with regard to mental health issues that played into at least one of the other events, and this Court does find that pursuant to MRE 403, the exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time is substantial, and with regards to this matter, the Court is not going to allow the jury to hear anything with regard to the prior instances of domestic violence that are alleged, because of the fact of the unfair prejudice to the respondent child in this matter.Contrary to the trial court's reasoning, MCL 768.27b and MRE 403 do not apply differently in a juvenile-delinquency case than in a criminal case. See In re Kerr, 323 Mich App at 411-415 (holding that the Michigan rules of evidence apply as written in juvenile-delinquency cases and that there is no provision in the juvenile code or court rules that prohibits application of MCL 768.27a in juvenile cases). And although the trial court cited medication and mental health issues, it gave no explanation of how those matters would render the other-acts evidence unfairly prejudicial. There is no support in the text of MCL 768.27b, the text of MRE 403, or in caselaw for the trial court's reasoning that the statute and rule apply differently when the party charged has been diagnosed with and treated for a mental health condition.
When petitioner asked the trial court to clarify the nature of the unfair prejudice it anticipated, the court responded:
The unfair prejudice, sir, is that with regard to the acts of a young child that you're indicating with the domestic violence, that those facts would prejudice, in my opinion, the jury with regard to a third act that you're indicating was committed. If you can meet your elements and you can convince a jury with regard to this incident, you should do so without the weight of the prior acts that the prosecutor is alleging happened. It's going to be excluded pursuant to 403.The trial court weighed the propensity inference from petitioner's MCL 768.27b evidence as unfairly prejudicial rather than probative, in violation of the Watkins instruction that courts do the opposite. Watkins, 491 Mich at 487 ("[W]hen applying MRE 403 to evidence admissible under MCL 768.27a, courts must weigh the propensity inference in favor of the evidence's probative value rather than its prejudicial effect."). Accordingly, the trial court came to an erroneous conclusion under MRE 403's balancing test because the trial court did not find any valid "danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Evidence of two substantively similar domestic-violence incidents in the past year—one of which resulted in a guilty plea in exchange for dismissal of charges from the other—was highly probative of respondent's guilt and the victim's credibility in this case in which respondent has asserted that the victim fabricated the facts underlying the charges. Other-acts evidence of respondent assaulting her mother with household objects and resisting the interventions of responding police officers is far less likely to inflame the passions of a jury than the other-acts evidence of criminal sexual conduct against children that this Court has held to be admissible under MCL 768.27a and MRE 403. See, e.g., In re Kerr, 323 Mich App at 409-410, 415. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded petitioner's MCL 768.27b evidence under MRE 403.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto