Opinion
March 13, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldstein, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We disagree with the defendant's claim that he was denied effective cross-examination of the one eyewitness to the crimes. Although a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to confront all adverse witnesses through cross-examination (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673; Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308), that right is not unlimited (People v. Stanard, 42 N.Y.2d 74, 83, cert denied 434 U.S. 986; People v. Martinez, 177 A.D.2d 600). "Evidence, while technically relevant, may be excluded if it is too * * * remote or conjectural to have any legitimate influence in determining the fact in issue" (People v. Martinez, 177 A.D.2d 600, 601, supra).
Here, the defense attorney's offer of good faith for seeking responses to the questions which he was precluded from asking, was that he had been told by some residents of the housing project where the witness resided that the witness had previously dealt in stolen goods. The information allegedly obtained from people in the housing project constituted hearsay, and the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in precluding questioning on the subject (see, People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282; People v. Brown, 124 A.D.2d 667).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Santucci, J.P., Joy, Friedmann and Florio, JJ., concur.