Opinion
G036944
6-1-2007
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BOUDEWYN RONALD HANSS, Defendant and Appellant.
Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Pamela Ratner Sobeck and Ronald A. Jakob, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alleging insufficient evidence, appellant challenges his convictions for receiving stolen property and possessing burglary tools. We find ample evidence to support the convictions and affirm the judgment.
* * *
On July 12, 2005, Christopher Friedrich was renovating beach cottages at Crystal Cove State Park in an area that was gated off and closed to the public. Around 7:30 a.m., appellant approached him near Cottage 32 and asked for a job. They spoke briefly, and then appellant left on a Harley Davidson motorcycle that had been stolen nine weeks earlier from a carport in Huntington Beach.
About half an hour later, Park Captain Kenneth Kramer noticed the motorcycle. It was illegally parked near his patrol vehicle in the area of Cottage 30, which is rather far from Cottage 32. And unlike the area around Cottage 32, there was no renovation work going on around Cottage 30. Kramer determined the motorcycles license plate was registered to a Honda motorcycle. While he was trying to find who the bike belonged to, he received a call that someone was climbing a ladder up to Cottage 30s deck.
Kramer proceeded to Cottage 30 and saw appellant standing out front. He wrote him a citation for trespassing and escorted him back to the motorcycle. As Kramer got closer to the motorcycle, he realized it was a Harley Davidson, not a Honda. Kramer then searched appellant and found a pair of pliers and a picklock, which he recognized as burglary tools. No registration or keys for the motorcycle were discovered.
I
Appellant argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for receiving stolen property. Specifically he contends there is nothing in the record to support the jurys finding he knew the motorcycle was stolen. We disagree.
"When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the verdict, drawing all inferences that reasonably support it, and determine whether it contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a trier of fact could rationally find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] In making this determination, we do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, draw inferences contrary to the verdict, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] Moreover, because it is the jury, not the reviewing court, that must be convinced of the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we are bound to sustain a conviction that is supported by only circumstantial evidence, even if that evidence is also reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that suggests innocence. [Citation.]" (People v. Little (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 766, 771; see also People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
"Proof of the crime of receiving stolen property requires establishing that the property in question was stolen, that the defendant was in possession of it, and that the defendant knew the property to be stolen. [Citations.]" (People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 420.) Only the knowledge requirement is at issue here.
"[K]nowing possession by a defendant of recently stolen property raises a strong inference of the other element of the crime: the defendants knowledge of the tainted nature of the property. This inference is so substantial that only `slight additional corroborating evidence need be adduced in order to permit a finding of guilty. [Citation.]" (People v. Anderson, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 421.) Courts have not attempted to draw a bright line in terms of what constitutes "recently" stolen property. (Id. at p. 422.) However, the fact the motorcycle in question here was found in appellants possession nine weeks after it was taken would qualify the bike as being recently stolen under California case law. (See ibid. [four and a half month time span from theft to possession deemed recent]; People v. Lopez (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 274 [nine month span deemed recent].) Therefore, only slight corroboration was required to prove appellants guilt.
That minimal standard was met on the evidence presented. For one thing, appellant did not have the key to the motorcycle or any proof of registration. That alone is highly suggestive he knew something was amiss with respect to the bike. (See People v. Ricketts (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 441, 446 [upholding conviction for receiving stolen property where defendant had stolen car seven weeks after theft but no key or registration for vehicle].)
In addition, the license plate on the motorcycle was not in order. The bike was a Harley, but the plate was for a Honda, indicating someone had "cold plated" the bike in order to avoid police detection. (See Weaver v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 188, 195.) Taken together, these circumstances were more than enough to permit the jury to find that appellant knew the property was stolen. Therefore, we reject his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the receiving stolen property count.
II
Appellant also contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possessing burglary tools. Again, we must disagree.
In order to support a conviction for possessing burglary tools, there must be evidence the defendant possessed an instrument or tool with the felonious intent to break or enter into any building. (Pen. Code, § 466.) "[Felonious] intent must usually be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence [since it is rarely proved directly]. [Citations.] When the evidence justifies a reasonable inference of felonious intent, the verdict may not be disturbed on appeal. [Citations.]" (People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 41.)
When arrested, appellant was in a restricted area that was closed to the public. True, he had contacted someone about getting a job. But that was 30 minutes earlier in an entirely different area of the park. There was no apparent explanation for appellant lingering in the area a full half-hour later, and there was no apparent explanation for his climbing up a ladder to an unattended cottage with a picklock and pliers, tools that Captain Kramer associated with the crime of burglary. The reasonable inference from this peculiar set of circumstances is that appellant had the felonious intent to break and enter one of the cottages. We therefore uphold his conviction for possessing burglary tools.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
SILLS, P. J.
MOORE, J.