Opinion
October 25, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Starkey, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court correctly weighed the competing factors when it ruled that it would allow the prosecutor to inquire into the defendant's prior conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance during cross-examination if the defendant were to take the witness stand (see, People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282; People v. Williams, 56 N.Y.2d 236; People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371). Furthermore, the mere similarity between the prior conviction and the crime charged was insufficient to preclude its use on cross-examination (see, People v. Rahman, 46 N.Y.2d 882; People v. Roman, 190 A.D.2d 831). Accordingly, the trial court's Sandoval ruling was not an improvident exercise of discretion (see, People v. Pavao, supra; People v. Mackey, 49 N.Y.2d 274; People v. Sandoval, supra).
Similarly, we find no merit to the defendant's assertion that the identification testimony of the undercover police officer who observed the defendant sell crack cocaine to another undercover officer should have been precluded due to the People's failure to serve a CPL 710.30 notice that it would be used against him in court. The undercover officer's identification of the defendant at the police station less than an hour after the drug transaction occurred was merely confirmatory and, therefore, not subject to CPL 710.30 (see, People v. Rodriguez, 79 N.Y.2d 445; People v. Roberts, 79 N.Y.2d 964; People v. Newball, 76 N.Y.2d 587; People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Thompson, J.P., Miller, Lawrence and Copertino, JJ., concur.