Opinion
Submitted May 10, 1999
August 9, 1999
Johanna G. Hendrix, Staten Island, N.Y., for appellant.
William L. Murphy, District Attorney, Staten Island, N Y (Karen F. McGee and David Frey of counsel), for respondent.
LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, J.P., CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, THOMAS R. SULLIVAN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Kuffner, J.), rendered October 7, 1996, convicting him of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, kidnapping in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
During the trial, the court denied the defendant's request for an adjournment to secure certain medical records of the complainant. In light of the collateral nature of the information sought, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant's request ( see, People v. Watson, 248 A.D.2d 737; People v. Chen Liu, 244 A.D.2d 352; cf., Matter of Estate of Lovick, 201 A.D.2d 736).
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that, despite its limiting instruction, the court erred in allowing testimony as to his violent acts against his father. While evidence of uncharged crimes is not admissible to show the defendant's criminal disposition ( see, People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40), such evidence is admissible to establish, as here, the complainant's state of mind, providing however, that the probative value of such evidence exceeds the potential for prejudice resulting to the defendant ( see, People v. Chase, 85 N.Y.2d 493; People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 242; People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264).
The defendant's claim that his conviction for kidnapping in the second degree should be barred by the judicially-created merger doctrine, which precludes a conviction for kidnapping based on acts which are integrally related but subordinate to another, substantive crime is without merit ( see, People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146; People v. Salimi, 159 A.D.2d 658).
The defendant's sentence is not excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
BRACKEN, J.P., O'BRIEN, THOMPSON, and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.