Opinion
2015-09-3
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael S. GOODWIN, Appellant.
Teresa C. Mulliken, Harpersfield, for appellant. Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Susan Rider Ulacco of counsel), for respondent.
Teresa C. Mulliken, Harpersfield, for appellant. Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Susan Rider Ulacco of counsel), for respondent.
Before: LAHTINEN, J.P., McCARTHY, GARRY and EGAN JR., JJ.
EGAN JR., J.
Appeal from a decision of the County Court of Chemung County (Keene, J.), dated December 19, 2013, which classified defendant as a risk level II sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.
Defendant pleaded guilty to rape in the second degree in full satisfaction of a five-count indictment and was sentenced to nine months in jail. The underlying charges stemmed from an incident where defendant, then 19 years old, engaged in sexual intercourse with the 14–year–old victim. In anticipation of his release from jail, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders completed a risk assessment instrument in accordance with the Sex Offender Registration Act ( see Correction Law art. 6–C) that presumptively classified defendant as a risk level II sex offender (105 points). Following a risk assessment hearing, County Court accepted the Board's risk factor scoring, classified defendant as a risk level II sex offender and denied defendant's request for a downward departure. Defendant now appeals.
County Court was required to “render an order setting forth its determinations and findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the determinations are based” (Correction Law § 168–n[3] ), and such order must be “entered and filed in the office of the clerk of the court where the action is triable” (CPLR 2220[a] ). Here, the record does not reflect that a written order was ever issued or entered and filed. We note that while County Court executed the standard form designating defendant's risk level classification, that form is not identified as an order ( seeCPLR 5512[a] ) and does not contain the “so ordered” language (People v. Joslyn, 27 A.D.3d 1033, 1035, 811 N.Y.S.2d 807 [2006]; see People v. Rogowski, 96 A.D.3d 1113, 1113 n., 945 N.Y.S.2d 810 [2012] ). Therefore, this appeal is not properly before this Court at this time and must be dismissed ( seeCPLR 5513, 5515[1]; People v. Kemp, 130 A.D.3d 1132, 1132, 12 N.Y.S.3d 394 [2015]; People v. Laurange, 97 A.D.3d 995, 996, 948 N.Y.S.2d 567 [2012]; Matter of Graziano v. County of Albany, 12 A.D.3d 819, 820, 783 N.Y.S.2d 893 [2004] ).
ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs. LAHTINEN, J.P., McCARTHY and GARRY, JJ., concur.