Opinion
04-05-2017
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Johnathan GOLDEN, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, NY (Ronald Zapata of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Danielle M. O'Boyle of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, NY (Ronald Zapata of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Danielle M. O'Boyle of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, ROBERT J. MILLER, and JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Latella, J.), rendered May 5, 2015, convicting him of robbery in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, unlawful sale, possession, or use of an imitation pistol, aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, and operating a motor vehicle without a license, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Paynter, J.), of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence. "A suppression court's credibility findings are entitled to great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record" (People v. Bookman, 131 A.D.3d 1258, 1260, 16 N.Y.S.3d 848 ; see People v. Vargas, 123 A.D.3d 1149, 999 N.Y.S.2d 184 ; People v. Diggs, 38 A.D.3d 565, 833 N.Y.S.2d 518 ). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the court did not err in crediting the testimony of a police officer that he observed the defendant make a right turn without signaling, which justified the stop of the defendant's vehicle for a traffic infraction, ultimately leading to the recovery of the challenged physical evidence (see
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [a]; People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 133, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 30 N.E.3d 880 ; People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 ; People v. Bookman, 131 A.D.3d at 1260, 16 N.Y.S.3d 848 ; People v. Davis, 103 A.D.3d 810, 811, 962 N.Y.S.2d 174 ; People v. Glover, 84 A.D.3d 977, 978, 921 N.Y.S.2d 896 ; People v. Leiva, 33 A.D.3d 1021, 1022, 823 N.Y.S.2d 494 ). The court's credibility determination was supported by the record (see People v. Barnes, 129 A.D.3d 981, 982, 11 N.Y.S.3d 669 ; People v. Rowley, 127 A.D.3d 884, 885, 7 N.Y.S.3d 338 ; People v. Glenn, 53 A.D.3d 622, 624, 861 N.Y.S.2d 781 ; People v. James, 19 A.D.3d 617, 798 N.Y.S.2d 483 ; People v. Lam, 226 A.D.2d 554, 641 N.Y.S.2d 97 ; cf. People v. Lebron, 184 A.D.2d 784, 585 N.Y.S.2d 498 ).
The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials. The statements were made after the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ), and were not the product of coercion (see People v. Redd, 141 A.D.3d 546, 548, 35 N.Y.S.3d 402 ; People v. Baxter, 140 A.D.3d 1180, 1181, 34 N.Y.S.3d 505 ; People v. Cruz, 137 A.D.3d 1158, 1158–1159, 27 N.Y.S.3d 643 ; People v. Kaye, 137 A.D.3d 938, 939, 26 N.Y.S.3d 593 ).