Opinion
2015-07214 Ind. No. 7330/13
12-24-2019
The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Peter GITTENS, Appellant.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Robin Richardson of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Morgan J. Dennehy, and Sullivan & Cromwell LLP [Andrew N. Stahl ], of counsel), for respondent.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Robin Richardson of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Morgan J. Dennehy, and Sullivan & Cromwell LLP [Andrew N. Stahl ], of counsel), for respondent.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, ROBERT J. MILLER, HECTOR D. LASALLE, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Although a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to confront adverse witnesses through cross-examination (see U.S. Const 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6 ), that right is not unfettered (see People v. Caballero , 137 A.D.3d 929, 930, 27 N.Y.S.3d 84 ; People v. Francisco , 44 A.D.3d 870, 870, 843 N.Y.S.2d 439 ). "The trial court has broad discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination when the questions are irrelevant or only marginally relevant, concern collateral issues, or pose a danger of misleading the jury" ( People v. Francisco , 44 A.D.3d at 870, 843 N.Y.S.2d 439 ; see People v. Cato , 5 A.D.3d 394, 772 N.Y.S.2d 548 ). "In cross-examining a law enforcement witness, the same standard for good faith basis and specific allegations relevant to credibility applies, as does the same broad latitude to preclude or limit cross-examination" ( People v. Crupi , 172 A.D.3d 898, 899, 100 N.Y.S.3d 56 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Smith , 27 N.Y.3d 652, 661–662, 36 N.Y.S.3d 861, 57 N.E.3d 53 ). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding defense counsel from cross-examining a police witness concerning a certain finding made by a federal court in an unrelated criminal proceeding (see People v. McFaline , 167 A.D.3d 465, 466, 89 N.Y.S.3d 160 ; People v. McKenzie , 148 A.D.3d 936, 937, 49 N.Y.S.3d 708 ; People v. Cruz , 131 A.D.3d 706, 707, 15 N.Y.S.3d 692 ; People v. Elliot , 127 A.D.3d 779, 780, 4 N.Y.S.3d 612 ).
"The determination of an appropriate sentence requires the exercise of discretion after due consideration given to, among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction, i.e., societal protection, rehabilitation and deterrence" ( People v. Farrar , 52 N.Y.2d 302, 305, 437 N.Y.S.2d 961, 419 N.E.2d 864 ). Here, considering all of the circumstances, it cannot be said that the sentencing court failed to observe sentencing principles. Further, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte , 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
BALKIN, J.P., COHEN, MILLER and LASALLE, JJ., concur.