Opinion
2803.
Decided February 5, 2004.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Harold Silverman, J.), rendered November 28, 2001, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of sodomy in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 8 years and 4 years, respectively, unanimously affirmed.
William K. Clark, for Respondent.
Carl S. Kaplan, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Ellerin, Williams, JJ.
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the victim, defendant's daughter, 11 years old at the time of trial, to testify to prior uncharged crimes or immoral acts that he allegedly committed against her. The victim's description of these acts completed her narrative and assisted the jury in its comprehension of the crimes charged, providing necessary background material to explain her relationship with defendant while they lived together in the homeless shelters, and to place the events in a believable context ( see People v. Feliciano, 301 A.D.2d 480, lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 583; People v. Santiago, 295 A.D.2d 214, lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 701; People v. Steinberg, 170 A.D.2d 50, 72-74, affd 79 N.Y.2d 673). Furthermore, given the fact pattern, the People were entitled to anticipate and address a potential issue as to whether defendant was seeking sexual gratification ( see People v. Nowlin, 297 A.D.2d 554, lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 770; People v. Young, 99 A.D.2d 373; compare People v. Lewis, 69 N.Y.2d 321, 327).
The court properly exercised its discretion in admitting expert testimony regarding Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome. This testimony tended to explain matters beyond the ken of the typical juror, such as reactions and behavior of children as a result of sexual abuse, including a general explanation of such victims' untimely disclosures ( see People v. Grant, 241 A.D.2d 340, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 1011; People v. Sanchez, 200 A.D.2d 363, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 1007) . The court gave appropriate limiting instructions negating any likelihood that the jury considered the testimony for an improper purpose.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.