Opinion
751 KA 19–00510
08-22-2019
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jacob GERROS, Defendant–Appellant.
J. SCOTT PORTER, SENECA FALLS, FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. JON E. BUDELMANN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUBURN (BRITTANY GROME ANTONACCI OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
J. SCOTT PORTER, SENECA FALLS, FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
JON E. BUDELMANN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUBURN (BRITTANY GROME ANTONACCI OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, NEMOYER, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order determining that he is a level two risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act ( [SORA] Correction Law § 168 et seq. ). Contrary to defendant's contention, County Court properly assessed him 15 points under risk factor 11 for a history of drug or alcohol abuse. According to the SORA Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary (2006) (Guidelines), that factor "focuses on the offender's history of [substance] abuse and the circumstances at the time of the offense" (id. at 15). "[T]he fact that alcohol was not a factor in the underlying offense is not dispositive inasmuch as the [G]uidelines further provide that [a]n offender need not be abusing alcohol or drugs at the time of the instant offense to receive points in this category" ( People v. Cathy, 134 A.D.3d 1579, 1579, 22 N.Y.S.3d 747 [4th Dept. 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Guidelines at 15). As defendant correctly notes, that risk factor is not meant to include occasional social drinking, and a court may choose to score zero points for that risk factor in instances where the offender abused alcohol in the distant past, but his or her more recent history is one of prolonged abstinence (see People v. Madonna, 167 A.D.3d 1488, 1489, 89 N.Y.S.3d 504 [4th Dept. 2018] ). Nevertheless, we conclude that, here, the assessment of points under that risk factor was justified inasmuch as the People presented evidence that defendant had been previously diagnosed with alcohol dependence and that he had been convicted of driving while ability impaired in 2011, and defendant admitted to continuing to consume alcohol in social settings (see generally People v. Carlberg, 145 A.D.3d 1646, 1647, 45 N.Y.S.3d 729 [4th Dept. 2016] ).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, the court did not err in denying his request for a downward departure from his presumptive risk level. Initially, the alleged mitigating factors or circumstances asserted by defendant concerning the nature of his conduct are adequately taken into account by the Guidelines, and thus they are improperly asserted as mitigating factors (see People v. Reber, 145 A.D.3d 1627, 1627–1628, 43 N.Y.S.3d 925 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 906, 2017 WL 1719220 [2017] ; see generally People v. Gillotti, 23 N.Y.3d 841, 861, 994 N.Y.S.2d 1, 18 N.E.3d 701 [2014] ). In addition, "[a]lthough a defendant's response to treatment, if exceptional ..., may constitute a mitigating factor to serve as the basis for a downward departure," we conclude that, here, defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his response to treatment was exceptional ( People v. Bernecky, 161 A.D.3d 1540, 1541, 76 N.Y.S.3d 723 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 901, 2018 WL 4135030[2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Santiago, 137 A.D.3d 762, 764, 26 N.Y.S.3d 339 [2d Dept. 2016], lv. denied 27 N.Y.3d 907, 2016 WL 3151966 [2016] ). Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant established that there are personal factors that might warrant a downward departure, we conclude, upon examining all of the relevant circumstances, that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a downward departure (see People v. Uerkvitz, 171 A.D.3d 1491, 1492, 97 N.Y.S.3d 374 [4th Dept. 2019] ; see generally People v. Clark, 126 A.D.3d 1540, 1541, 6 N.Y.S.3d 357 [4th Dept. 2015], lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 910, 2015 WL 3605079 [2015] ).