Opinion
June 1, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Friedmann, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We have previously held that, in the absence of prejudice, reversal is not required solely because the prosecution is permitted to pursue a conviction based on accessorial liability, even though the indictment charged the defendant as a principal (see, People v. Smith, 156 A.D.2d 756, citing People v. Duncan, 46 N.Y.2d 74, 79-80; see also, People v. Rogers, 177 A.D.2d 666). In the present case, there was no possibility of prejudice to the defendant, and reversal, therefore, is not warranted (cf., People v. Roberts, 72 N.Y.2d 489 [actual prejudice noted]; see also, People v. Curro, 161 A.D.2d 784; People v. Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245, 261-262 [nonprejudicial variance between indictment and theory employed at trial harmless]).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Santucci, JJ., concur.