Opinion
B328183
04-30-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID MICHAEL GARRISON, Defendant and Appellant.
Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. NA114197 Laura F. Priver, Judge. Affirmed.
Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ASHMANN-GERST Acting P. J.
Appellant and defendant David Michael Garrison appeals from the judgment entered against him, claiming that the trial court wrongly denied his motions to suppress evidence and to withdraw his no contest plea. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Car Accident and Subsequent Investigation
On March 23, 2020, defendant was "hanging out" and smoking methamphetamine with a friend, Juan Huitron (Huitron), in a parked car. About five minutes after they got into the car, Huitron asked defendant to move the car to a better parking spot. Instead, defendant began driving towards Long Beach.
From the front passenger seat, Huitron quickly grew alarmed as defendant sped towards the Pacific Coast Highway (PCH), tailgating other cars and running red lights. Defendant ignored Huitron's pleas to slow down. As he ran his third red light, defendant "t-boned" a red car driving down the PCH, with the front end of defendant's car crashing "straight-on" into the middle of the driver's side of the other car.
Long Beach Police Department officers responded to the scene of the accident. When the police arrived, defendant was still sitting in the driver's seat of his car. Both he and Huitron were injured and taken to the hospital. The driver of the red car was killed.
Officer Eileen Maes followed defendant to the hospital. She told defendant that she was conducting a driving under the influence (DUI) investigation and asked him to consent to a blood draw. Defendant agreed. His blood sample subsequently tested positive for PCP, methamphetamine, amphetamine, and caffeine.
II. The Charges
In the operative amended information, defendant was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a); count 2), and DUI causing injury within 10 years of another DUI offense (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (f); count 5).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Count 5 was originally designated as count 3 before being renumbered by interlineation.
The information further alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily harm on two victims (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and that he had been convicted of a prior DUI offense in Minnesota.
Finally, as aggravating factors, the information alleged that all the charged offenses involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, and other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); that the victims were particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3)); and that defendant took advantage of a position of trust and confidence to commit the charged offenses (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11)).
III. Motion to Suppress Evidence
In February 2022, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence (§ 1538.5), arguing that because the police had not obtained a warrant for a blood sample, the blood draw at the hospital amounted to an unlawful seizure. The People opposed the motion, arguing that defendant had consented to the blood draw.
The trial court heard argument on the motion over two days. The prosecution recalled Officer Maes, who provided additional details about her involvement in collecting defendant's blood sample. She testified that when she found defendant in the emergency room, she waited until medical personnel finished their initial assessment and treatment before asking defendant whether he was "willing to submit to a blood test[.]" Defendant, who had been screaming in pain moments before, responded "[y]eah." Defendant did not refuse the blood draw or attempt to withdraw his consent.
The defense presented a medical expert, Doctor Ryan O'Connor, who testified that defendant's significant injuries, in combination with the pain medication administered to him at the hospital, "could have affected his ability to consent" to the blood draw. Dr. O'Connor also stated that it was "possible for someone to be in an immense amount of pain and . . . impaired due to drugs and yet still be able to give consent[,]" "to make a voluntary decision[,]" and to "process .... [¶] [and] understand information[.]" And he confirmed that eight minutes after defendant consented to the blood draw, a doctor obtained his consent to undergo an "anesthetic procedure."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the issue boiled down to "whether or not [defendant's] consent" to the blood draw "was valid[.]" The trial court recognized that "defendant was in pain and that he had the injuries described, but . . . those things . . . in itself doesn't [sic] negate the ability to give consent." Looking at the totality of the circumstances, including that Officer Maes "testified truthfully about obtaining consent" and that "there's no evidence [that defendant] objected when the nurse came in to draw the blood[,]" the trial court found that "there was consent, even if . . . defendant had some level of impairment[.]" Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
IV. No Contest Plea
On July 14, 2022, the trial court held a hearing to handle several case management issues leading into trial. Eventually, the subject of a potential plea bargain arose. Prior to the hearing, defendant had rejected the prosecution's offer, primarily due to his reluctance to waive the substantial amount of custody credits he had accrued. At the hearing, his defense counsel presented a counteroffer, which the prosecution rejected.
The trial court gave a 90-minute recess for both sides to continue to work on the plea deal. After that recess, defendant said that he would accept the plea.
When the trial court asked if he understood that the deal required him to waive his accrued custody credits, defendant responded, "I don't agree with it, but I understand it." The trial court told defendant that "[i]f you don't agree with it, you don't have to do it. But you can also, even though you don't like it, choose to do it because you believe that the disposition is in your best interest." Defendant indicated that he understood. The trial court then asked defendant whether, "regardless of your feelings about liking it or not liking it, it's still your choice to go forward with this disposition?" Defendant responded, "[y]eah, I'm going forward."
Defendant pled no contest to counts 2 (gross vehicular manslaughter) and 5 (DUI). Defendant also admitted the aggravating factor that the victims were particularly vulnerable, and, with respect to count 5, the allegation that he inflicted gross bodily harm to the victim.
The People dismissed count 1 (murder) pursuant to defendant's plea negotiation.
V. Motion to Withdraw Plea
On September 9, 2022, defendant informed the trial court that he wished to withdraw his no contest plea. At the request of both defendant and his attorney, the trial court appointed new counsel for defendant.
Three months later, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant argued that, at the time he entered his plea, "he was under duress due to losing confidence in his prior attorney, and believed that the attorney was not prepared to proceed to trial." While acknowledging that he "was asked at the time of the plea if [it] was free and voluntary, and whether [he] had sufficient time to discuss the case," defendant now declared that he "regret[ted] answering these questions in the affirmative, because these answers did not reflect [his] true feelings."
On December 19, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion. The court disagreed with defendant's assessment of his original attorney; based on the attorney's performance at prior pretrial hearings, including the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court said that it "ha[d] no doubt [that the attorney] was prepared to go to trial." The trial court also noted that it "d[id]n't accept that [defendant] was panicked" at the time he entered into the plea "because he was present in this court .... [¶] . . . [¶] And I also observed his demeanor." Further, the trial court found that defendant "clearly . . . understood his plea. He was given significant time-more time, really, than most individuals are given .... [a]nd he was thoroughly advised of his rights and the consequences of his plea."
VI. Sentence and Appeal
Pursuant to defendant's plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 11 years eight months in state prison.
After obtaining a certificate of probable cause, defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of both his motion to suppress evidence and his motion to withdraw his no contest plea. We examine each of these issues in turn.
I. Motion to Suppress
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the blood test because the Fourth Amendment required law enforcement to obtain a warrant before taking a sample of his blood.
A. Applicable Law
"A blood draw is a search governed by the Fourth Amendment. (Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016) 579 U.S. 438, [455][.]) A warrantless blood draw is presumed unreasonable unless justified by a recognized exception" to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirement. (People v. Nault (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1148 [citing U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 569 U.S. 141, 148].) "A defendant's free and voluntary consent to a blood draw constitutes [such] an exception[.]" (People v. Nzolameso (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1186 (Nzolameso).)
"[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 227.)
B. Standard of Review
When reviewing denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, but we exercise independent judgment as to whether a challenged search and seizure was legal. (People v. Arebalos-Cabrera (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 179, 185-186.)
In particular, "'"'[t]he . . . voluntariness of [defendant's] consent is to be determined in the first instance by the trier of fact; and in that stage of the process, "The power to judge credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings-whether express or implied-must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence."'"' [Citation.]" (People v. Balov (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 696, 701 (Balov).)
C. Analysis
The trial court did not err in concluding that defendant validly consented to the blood draw. Officer Maes testified that she asked defendant whether he would be willing to submit to a blood test, and that defendant affirmatively agreed to have his blood drawn. Although defendant had been screaming in pain earlier, when Officer Maes asked about the blood test, he cogently responded "yeah." Defendant did not object to or otherwise resist the blood draw at any time. (People v. Lopez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 317, 327-328 [defendant who "did not object or refuse to undergo the test" voluntarily consented]; Balov, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 704 [defendant who did not "indicate any objection" to a blood test "before or after [defendant] consented . . . to the blood test" voluntarily consented].) And shortly after his conversation with Officer Maes, a doctor sought and obtained defendant's consent to undergo anesthesia.
This evidence substantially supports the trial court's findings that defendant was capable of giving consent and that he voluntarily consented to the blood draw. Thus, the warrantless blood draw was reasonable. (Nzolameso, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1186.)
Because we affirm the judgment as to the motion to suppress on this ground, we need not reach the parties' alternative arguments about whether the inevitable discovery doctrine authorized the blood draw.
Defendant raises four counterarguments against our conclusion. First, he contends that any evidence of valid consent is outweighed by conflicting evidence that his capacity to consent was diminished by his injuries and by the pain medication he received in the hospital. Similarly, defendant attempts to discredit Officer Maes's testimony, pointing out her relative inexperience in conducting DUI investigations. However, under our deferential substantial evidence standard of review, we "must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the ruling below" and "may not reweigh the evidence or any credibility findings." (Estate of Berger (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1293, 1307.) Here, the trial court expressly considered both defendant's level of impairment and Officer Maes's relative inexperience, and still found that defendant had voluntarily consented to the blood draw. We will not second guess that determination on appeal.
We note that defendant does not claim-and Dr. O'Connor did not opine-that defendant was actually incapacitated or incapable of giving consent. Instead, defendant argues merely that his injuries and medication "likely impaired [defendant's] ability which possibly affected his capacity to consent." (Italics added.)
Second, defendant argues that he may not have known that he was giving consent to a police officer because there is no evidence that Officer Maes was in uniform or identified herself as an officer. These contentions are speculative at best, and are not supported by any evidence in the record. And, by failing to raise this argument before the trial court, defendant has forfeited it on appeal. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 ["On appeal, defendant may argue that the court erred in its ruling [denying his request to exclude evidence]. But he may not argue that the court should have excluded the evidence for a reason different from his trial objection"].)
Indeed, some evidence in the record supports the contrary inference that defendant knew Officer Maes was a police officer. Not only did Officer Maes expressly testify that she told defendant that she was conducting a DUI investigation but, at the motion to suppress hearing, defendant's counsel questioned Officer Maes about her decision to not activate her body camera in the hospital, even though she had turned the camera on when responding to the scene of the accident. The fact that Officer Maes was wearing a body camera, a common component of modern police uniforms, suggests that she was uniformed during her interactions with defendant.
Third, defendant argues that Officer Maes knew that he was impaired and should have realized he was obviously incapable of giving consent. Defendant further claims that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from "cho[osing] to ask a clearly incapacitated and mentally compromised" person "for consent" to a blood draw instead of obtaining a warrant, but cites no authority for this proposition. And in any event, as discussed above, defendant was not obviously incapable of consenting; substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that, despite some impairment, defendant was capable of providing voluntary consent.
Fourth, defendant claims that the trial court misstated the evidence during the motion to suppress hearing, including by concluding that (1) "Officer Maes knew the other driver was dead and that knowledge informed and validated her decision to ask for a blood draw" and (2) Huitron told Officer Maes defendant had ingested drugs. But even assuming arguendo that these statements misrepresent the evidence, defendant does not explain how these statements relate to the trial court's findings on consent. (People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282 (Dougherty) [arguments that "are bereft of . . . argument" require no discussion].) Officer Maes's reasons for deciding to ask defendant whether he would voluntarily submit to a blood draw are simply irrelevant to the question of whether defendant provided express consent.
Lastly, defendant urges that the proposition that "drivers on California roads are deemed to have provided advance consent [for a D.U.I. blood draw]" in certain circumstances (see Balov, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th 696) should not apply in this case. This argument is also irrelevant, since the trial court's finding does not rely on advance consent.
II. Motion to Withdraw the Plea
A. Applicable Law
"On application of the defendant at any time before judgment . . ., the court may, . . . for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.... This section shall be liberally construed to effect these objects and to promote justice." (§ 1018.)
"The defendant has the burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is good cause for withdrawal of his or her guilty plea. [Citations.] 'A plea may not be withdrawn simply because the defendant has changed his . . . mind.' [Citation.]" (People v. Breslin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1415-1416 (Breslin).) "To establish good cause to withdraw a guilty plea, the defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she was operating under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming the exercise of his or her free judgment, including . . . duress. [Citation.] The defendant must also show prejudice in that he or she would not have accepted the plea bargain had it not been for the mistake. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1416.)
B. Standard of Review
On appeal, defendant must make a clear showing of abuse of discretion. (People v. Shaw (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 492, 496.) No abuse of discretion will be found unless it appears that the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner, and that a manifest miscarriage of justice resulted. (Ibid.) "'Moreover, a reviewing court must adopt the trial court's factual findings if substantial evidence supports them.' [Citation.]" (Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th 1409 at p. 1416.)
C. Analysis
Defendant argues that his motion to withdraw his plea should have been granted because, "[w]hether warranted or not, [defendant] had completely lost any confidence in his then attorney's ability to effectively represent him at trial," which "drove [him] to accept the People's offer." He urges us to accept that his declaration attached to his motion sufficiently "established that he was under duress and in a panic when he entered into the plea."
But defendant cites-and we have found-no authority that a defendant is subjected to duress by the loss of confidence in his attorney's ability, without more. (Dougherty, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 282 [arguments that "are bereft of . . . argument[] and/or authority" require no discussion].) Here, there is no evidence that defendant was subjected to pressure to accept the plea deal by either the trial court or his attorney. (Contra, People v. Weaver (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 131, 150 [defendant pled under duress when the trial court "ma[de] repeated comments that suggest[ed] a less-than-neutral attitude about the case or the defendant, [creating] great pressure exists for the defendant to accede to the court's wishes"]; see also People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208 ["Nothing in the record indicates [that defendant] was under any more or less pressure than every other defendant faced with serious felony charges and the offer of a plea bargain"].)
Moreover, the trial court, who presided over the plea hearing and "observed [defendant's] demeanor[,]" "d[id]n't accept [that defendant] was panicked" or under duress at the time he entered into the plea. (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 918 [trial court may "consider its own observations of the defendant[,]" and "the defendant's credibility" in ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea]; see also Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th 1409 at p. 1416 [reviewing court accepts the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations].)
In view of defendant's failure to establish good cause for the motion to withdraw his plea, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:, J. CHAVEZ, J. HOFFSTADT