Opinion
2003-453 NCR.
Decided July 1, 2004.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the District Court, Nassau County (M. Reilly, J.), rendered March 13, 2003, as amended April 22, 2003, convicting her, upon her guilty plea, of driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192) and leaving the scene of an accident (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600), and imposing sentence.
Judgment of conviction unanimously affirmed.
PRESENT: McCABE, P.J., RUDOLPH and ANGIOLILLO, JJ.
The determination to vacate a guilty plea rests on the sound exercise of the court's discretion (CPL 220.60; People v. White, 226 AD2d 750). Because a trial judge is "best able to determine whether a plea is entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" ( People v. Alexander, 97 NY2d 482, 485), the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed absent an "abuse of discretion as a matter of law" ( People v. Feliciano, 53 NY2d 645, 646). Defendant insisted that her physical and mental condition was so impaired by her psychological condition and the effects of medication that she lacked the capacity to enter an enforceable plea. In support of her claim, defendant offered only a physician's letter to the effect that defendant complained of stress-related panic attacks and depression, and that the medication had improved defendant's condition and "potentiated the effect of alcohol on the day she had the . . . accident."
Unless the record supports an inference that the medication or condition "so stripped [her] of orientation or cognition that [she] lacked the capacity to plead guilty" ( People v. Alexander, 97 NY2d at 486), the plea should not be disturbed. Defendant's claim to an impairment of faculties is belied by the plea colloquy, "which shows that . . . [defendant] was rational, coherent and unequivocal in assuring the court that [she] fully comprehended the meaning of [her] plea and that [she] was pleading guilty of [her] own free will," ( People v. Rodriguez, 302 AD2d 317). A letter from defendant's physician suggested first, that the medication improved defendant's condition, and thus, in our view, her capacity to enter a plea, and second, that the alcohol intake was contraindicated by the medication, which underscored the improvidence of her decision to take medication, drink, and operate a motor vehicle. As it appears that the court properly "relied on the face of the plea allocution and its own clear recollection of defendant's demeanor and responses" in reviewing defendant's motion to vacate her plea, there was no abuse of discretion ( People v. Rodriguez, 302 AD2d 317; see also People v. Stone, 303 AD2d 782 [defendant's claim that "anxiety medication" whose detrimental effects on his concentration and emotional state fatally undermined his capacity to render an enforceable plea is belied by the court's own observations that defendant appeared fully to understand the proceedings and exhibited no mental impairment]).
Defendant's claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel also lacks merit. Defendant made no post-judgment motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the plea on the basis of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, and absent an evidentiary exploration of the "background facts" upon which defendant bases her ineffectiveness claim, namely that there were no meaningful discussions as to the factual and legal aspects of the case or the considerations relevant to her decision to negotiate and execute a plea agreement, the court properly denied the motion, without a hearing ( People v. Love, 57 NY2d 998, 1000; see People v. Brown, 45 NY2d 852, 854; People v. Kessler, 5 AD3d 504). To the extent that the available record permits review of her claim to the ineffective assistance of counsel, it cannot be said that defendant was denied meaningful representation ( People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147; People v. Lopez, 2 AD3d 234). Given the apparent strength of the People's case and the plea's terms pursuant to which, inter alia, defendant avoided incarceration, we cannot say that it was so inherently irrational or so contrary to her legal interests as to "cast doubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel" ( People v. Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 404).