Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. BF130942A Michael G. Bush, Judge.
Joshua G. Wilson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Levy, J. and Gomes, J.
Officers stopped a vehicle with an object hanging from the rearview mirror and found a clear plastic bag of methamphetamine on the passenger’s lap. Juan Garcia, the passenger, filed a motion to suppress on the basis that the officers had no articulable facts reasonably suggesting a Vehicle Code violation. The court denied the motion. On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the search. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On April 15, 2010, an information charged Garcia with transportation of methamphetamine (count 1; Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), possession for sale of methamphetamine (count 2; Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and possession of methamphetamine (count 3; Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) The information alleged he committed the crimes while released from custody before final judgment on an earlier felony. (Pen. Code, § 12022.1.) He pled not guilty, denied all the allegations, and filed a motion to suppress. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.)
On April 20, 2010, the court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to suppress. On April 23, 2010, Garcia withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession for sale of methamphetamine on condition that the court dismiss all other charges and allegations and that he serve not more than two years in prison. The court sentenced him to the middle term of two years in prison.
DISCUSSION
Garcia argues that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress because the object hanging from the rearview mirror did not provide the officers with a reasonable basis for conducting the traffic stop. The Attorney General argues that the officers had specific and articulable facts to reasonably believe that the object violated Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a)(2) (hereinafter section 26708(a)(2)) which provides that “A person shall not drive any motor vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed, or applied in or upon the vehicle that obstructs or reduces the driver’s clear view through the windshield or side windows.”
In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court finds the historical facts, selects the rule of law, and applies the rule of law to the facts to determine if the law as applied has been violated. (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1133-1134.) Our duty is to defer to the trial court’s factual findings, both express and implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362; People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205.)
“The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299, citing U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) Since routine traffic stops are considered investigatory detentions, an officer must have specific and articulable facts to justify the suspicion that an offense is occurring. (In re Raymond C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303, 307; People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082-1083.) It is permissible for law enforcement officers to “draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273.) However, an investigative stop is unlawful if it is based on “mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch, ” even though the officer may be acting in good faith. (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893.) Courts examine the totality of the circumstances to determine if an officer’s investigative detention was reasonable. (Arvizu, supra, at p. 273.)
The question before us is not whether the object hanging from the rearview mirror obstructed the driver’s view but whether it was reasonable for the officers to believe it did so. One of the officers testified that, on February 9, 2010, while stopped at a traffic light, he noticed that the vehicle in which Garcia was a passenger on the other side of the intersection “had a medium-sized object dangling from its mirror.” The officer pulled the vehicle over on the basis of a possible violation of section 26708(a)(2).
After approaching the vehicle, the officer saw that the object “appeared to be some type of necklace or beads hanging from the rear view about six to eight inches” and a two-by-four block object that was similar to an “air freshener or a picture hanger of some sort.” He testified that the object “would obstruct a pedestrian or other vehicle traffic in front of the vehicle from the driver’s perspective” and that during a turn the object might swing back and forth, creating a distraction for the driver. At the hearing, the court determined that the officer’s testimony provided sufficient evidence that the stop was justified on the basis of his reasonable suspicion that the driver’s view was obstructed.
Garcia relies on People v. White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636 (White) for his argument that the stop was an unreasonable violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. In White, the appellate court reversed the denial of a suppression motion to exclude evidence seized during a traffic stop based on an alleged violation of section 26708(a)(2). (White, supra, at p. 642.) This case is distinguishable from White. In White, the object hanging from the rearview mirror was a tree-shaped air freshener. (Id. at pp. 641-642.) Here, the object included not only a two-by-four block, similar to a tree-shaped air freshener, but also a necklace or beads that could swing in front of the driver. (Id. at pp. 641-642.) In White, the officer did not testify that he believed the air freshener would obstruct the driver’s view, unlike the officer here, who testified that he believed the object would obstruct the driver’s view. (See id. at pp. 639-642.) Further, in White, the driver of the vehicle testified that his view was not obstructed, while here, the driver never testified that her view was not obstructed. (Id. at p. 642.)
In White, the defense presented testimony from an expert whose experiment concluded that the air freshener did not obstruct the driver’s view. (White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 642.) In contrast, Garcia presented a defense investigator who never testified that the object did not obstruct the driver’s view. In White, the trial court stated that it had “difficulty accepting” that the air freshener obstructed the driver’s view. (Ibid.) Here, on the other hand, the trial court articulated, “Given that the officers saw from across the street at the intersection an object along with some chains, there was reasonable suspicion to stop the car to further investigate whether or not the driver was, in fact, in violation of Vehicle Code Section 26708(a)(2).”
Garcia seeks to distinguish People v. Colbert (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1068, in which specific and articulable facts justified an officer’s conclusion that an air freshener hanging from a rearview mirror violated section 26708(a)(2). Garcia intimates that the officer in Colbert could justify his reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation on his personal experience hanging a similarly shaped object from his own rearview mirror. (Colbert, supra, at p. 1070.) We disagree. Nothing in Colbert requires that an officer have a personal experience on which to ground a reasonable suspicion of a violation. Additionally, the officer in Colbert, like the officer here, testified that he believed the air freshener would obstruct the driver’s view. (Colbert, supra, at p. 1072.)
Here, specific and articulable facts support the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the driver was violating section 26708(a)(2). The object hanging from the rearview mirror was large enough to be visible from across the intersection. The officer testified to his belief that the object not only would obstruct the driver’s view but also could swing as the vehicle was turning, potentially distracting the driver. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, both express and implied, which are supported by substantial evidence.
In light of our holding, we need not address the Attorney General’s alternative argument that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop because the driver failed to signal prior to changing lanes. (Veh. Code, § 22107.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.