Opinion
February 5, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Owens, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, we find that the Trial Judge did not improvidently exercise his discretion in denying the defendant's motion for recusal. As we have recently observed, "[t]he question of whether a Judge should recuse himself, to avoid an appearance of impropriety, is a matter left to the personal conscience of the court" (People v Fischer, 143 A.D.2d 1036; see also, People v Bartolomeo, 126 A.D.2d 375). The record reveals that the Trial Judge in the case at bar determined that he harbored no prejudice against the defendant, and that he had not reached any preconceived conclusion as to his guilt (see, People v Bartolomeo, supra). Nor do we find that the record reflects any instance in which the court displayed prejudice towards the defendant. Accordingly, we reject the defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by reason of the trial court's alleged inability to serve with complete impartiality.
Furthermore, the defendant's conclusory assertions failed to make out a prima facie case that the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were employed for a discriminatory purpose (see, Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79; People v Scott, 70 N.Y.2d 420; People v Malbon, 144 A.D.2d 698). Notably, the defendant makes no assertion that all members of his race were excluded from the jury (see, People v Dove, 154 A.D.2d 705; People v Hassell, 149 A.D.2d 530; People v Malbon, supra) and has failed to dispute the People's assertion that at least four venirepersons of the defendant's race ultimately served on the jury (see, People v Malbon, supra).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., Kunzeman, Kooper and Balletta, JJ., concur.