Opinion
4-23-0109
06-29-2023
In re G.D., a Minor v. Francisco V., Respondent-Appellant The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Woodford County No. 21JA7 Honorable Charles M. Feeney III, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Doherty concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
TURNER JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the circuit court did not err in terminating respondent's parental rights.
¶ 2 Respondent, Francisco V., appeals the circuit court's order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, G.D. (born in September 2018). Respondent argues the court erred in finding him unfit and concluding it was in G.D.'s best interests to terminate his parental rights. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On April 20, 2021, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship and shelter care, alleging G.D. was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)) because her environment was injurious to her welfare when she resided with her parents, respondent and Claudia D., due to domestic violence issues. We note Claudia D. is not a party to this appeal, but she filed a separate appeal docketed as Fourth District case No. 4-23-0108. Specifically, the wardship petition alleged respondent struck Claudia D. in the head and Claudia D. stabbed respondent with a pen at a time when G.D. was in their care. That same day, the circuit court entered an order placing G.D. in the temporary custody of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Following an August 2021 hearing, the court entered an adjudicatory order, finding G.D. was neglected as alleged in the wardship petition. On September 8, 2021, the court entered a dispositional order finding respondent and Claudia D. unfit to care for G.D. The court made her a ward of the court and granted custody and guardianship to DCFS. The court ordered respondent to cooperate with DCFS and comply with specific terms as directed by DCFS.
¶ 5 On October 6, 2022, the State filed a two-count petition to terminate respondent's and Claudia D.'s parental rights. As to respondent, the petition alleged respondent was unfit because he failed to make (1) reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for G.D.'s removal during a nine-month period after the neglect adjudication (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2022)) and (2) reasonable progress toward G.D.'s return during a ninemonth period after the neglect adjudication (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)). Both counts alleged the same nine-month period of January 1, 2022, through October 1, 2022.
¶ 6 On January 6, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on the State's petition to terminate respondent's parental rights. At the State's request and without objection, the court took judicial notice of the State's petition for adjudication of wardship and shelter care and the court's previous adjudicatory and dispositional orders. Without objection, the court also admitted a DCFS service plan. Additionally, the State presented the testimony of Brooke Bachtold, the caseworker in this matter.
¶ 7 Bachtold testified respondent was ordered to complete mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence services, along with parenting classes, cooperate with Bachtold's agency, attend visitation with G.D., and provide proof of stable housing and a legal source of income during the review period of January 1, 2022, through October 1, 2022. Bachtold stated respondent participated in the initial substance abuse services and domestic violence services intakes but did not complete either of the services due to lack of transportation. Bachtold stated respondent cooperated with Bachtold's agency, successfully completed mental health services, and appeared to have stable housing. Bachtold testified respondent's visitation with G.D. was "fairly consistent" after he was provided Amtrak train tickets to visit G.D. in Palatine, Illinois. Bachtold testified respondent did not provide proof of legal income. Further, Bachtold said respondent attended parenting classes but did not complete the program because he did not complete the final evaluation. Bachtold also testified her agency offered to assist respondent with transportation. On recross-examination, Bachtold stated respondent reported having transportation through his supervisor at work or friends to drive him to the Amtrak station.
¶ 8 G.D.'s guardian ad litem made a brief argument specifically criticizing respondent's claim of transportation issues. The guardian ad litem noted respondent's ability to procure transportation to Palatine, Illinois, for a visit with G.D. but inability to obtain transportation to Bloomington, Illinois, which was closer to him.
¶ 9 The circuit court found respondent unfit by clear and convincing evidence on both grounds alleged in the petition.
¶ 10 On February 3, 2023, the circuit court held a best interests hearing. The court considered the best interests report prepared by Bachtold, and Bachtold gave testimony consistent with the best interests report. Respondent was not present at the start of the hearing but arrived during Bachtold's testimony.
¶ 11 Bachtold testified G.D. had lived with her foster parent, Maria S., for nearly two years. Maria S. was unmarried with a two-bedroom apartment wherein G.D. had her own room, which was safe and appropriate and had toys. G.D. was appropriately clothed and well-fed and Maria S.'s home was safe and secure for G.D. Bachtold explained Maria S. and G.D. shared a Hispanic ethnic background and the household was bilingual, though they primarily spoke Spanish. G.D. was attached to Maria S., and placement with Maria S. was the least disruptive option for G.D. Bachtold testified G.D. was in a bilingual preschool and she was present for G.D.'s most recent parent-teacher conference, where she learned G.D. was doing well interacting with other children and had developed friendships. Bachtold stated Maria S. was willing to adopt G.D. On cross-examination, Bachtold stated respondent had since completed his final parenting class evaluation.
¶ 12 Respondent testified he wanted custody of G.D. because he is her father and works hard to provide for her.
¶ 13 The circuit court found the State proved by both a preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence it was in the best interests of G.D. to terminate respondent's parental rights.
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 A. Compliance with Rule 341(h)
¶ 17 We first address the State's argument this court should (1) strike respondent's statement of facts for failing to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) and (2) find his arguments forfeited for failing to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 18 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) sets forth the rules governing the contents and requirements for an appellant's brief. Rule 341(h)(6) states an appellant's statement of facts "shall contain the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and with appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal." Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h)(7) states an appellant's argument "shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on." Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h) is not a mere suggestion, and it is within this court's discretion to strike an appellant's brief and dismiss the appeal entirely for failing to comply with Rule 341(h). Niewold v. Fry, 306 Ill.App.3d 735, 737, 714 N.E.2d 1082, 1084 (1999). However, a brief with violations of supreme court rules that do not "hinder or preclude our review" need not be stricken in whole or in part. Gaston v. City of Danville, 393 Ill.App.3d 591, 601, 912 N.E.2d 771, 779 (2009).
¶ 19 The State argues respondent's statement of facts should be stricken for violating Rule 341(h)(6) because it does not contain any testimony from the fitness or best interests hearings. Our review of respondent's statement of facts shows a brief reference to testimony. We also note respondent's statement of facts contains argument or comment in violation of Rule 341(h)(6). However, we conclude the respondent's statement of facts is minimally sufficient for our review of the issues presented in this appeal.
¶ 20 The State further argues because respondent's argument section "fails to cite any case law" pertaining to reasonable progress, reasonable efforts, or best interests factors, respondent's arguments on these subjects should be forfeited. We disagree with the State's contention respondent's arguments fail to cite any case law, but we do note respondent's citation to authorities is minimal. Ultimately, our ability to review the issues presented is not precluded, but we caution counsel to carefully adhere to the requirements of the supreme court rules in future appeals.
¶ 21 B. Issues on Appeal
¶ 22 Respondent argues the circuit court erred in finding him unfit and finding it was in G.D.'s best interests to terminate his parental rights. We disagree and affirm the court's judgment.
¶ 23 Under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022)), the involuntary termination of parental rights involves a two-step process. First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is "unfit," as that term is defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill.2d 234, 244, 850 N.E.2d 172, 177 (2006). If the circuit court makes a finding of unfitness, then the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence it is in the minor child's best interests that parental rights be terminated. In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d 347, 366, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1228 (2004).
¶ 24 Since the circuit court has the best opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and witnesses, it is in the best position to determine the credibility and weight of the witnesses' testimony. In re E.S., 324 Ill.App.3d 661, 667, 756 N.E.2d 422, 427 (2001). Further, in matters involving minors, the circuit court receives broad discretion and great deference. E.S., 324 Ill.App.3d at 667, 756 N.E.2d at 427. Thus, a reviewing court will not disturb a circuit court's unfitness finding and best interests determination unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 354, 830 N.E.2d 508, 516-17 (2005) (fitness finding); In re J.L., 236 Ill.2d 329, 344, 924 N.E.2d 961, 970 (2010) (best interests determination). A circuit court's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d at 354, 830 N.E.2d at 517. We address each stage in turn.
¶ 25 1. Unfitness Finding
¶ 26 One of the bases on which the circuit court found respondent unfit was under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)), which provides a parent may be declared unfit if he or she fails "to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act." Illinois courts have defined "reasonable progress" as "demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Reiny S., 374 Ill.App.3d 1036, 1046, 871 N.E.2d 835, 844 (2007). Moreover, they have explained reasonable progress as follows:
" '[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent's "progress toward the return of the child" under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent's compliance with the service plans and the court's directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which later became known and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.'" Reiny S., 374 Ill.App.3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d at 844 (quoting In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 216-17, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1050 (2001)).
Additionally, this court has explained reasonable progress exists when a circuit court can conclude the following:
"[T]he court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody. The court will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the directives previously given to the parent in order to regain custody of the child." (Emphases in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (1991).
We have also emphasized" 'reasonable progress' is an 'objective standard.'" In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88, 19 N.E.3d 227 (quoting L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d at 461, 577 N.E.2d at 1387).
¶ 27 In determining a parent's fitness based on reasonable progress, a court may only consider evidence from the relevant time period. Reiny S., 374 Ill.App.3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d at 844 (citing In re D.F., 208 Ill.2d 223, 237-38, 802 N.E.2d 800, 809 (2003)). Courts are limited to that period "because reliance upon evidence of any subsequent time period could improperly allow a parent to circumvent her own unfitness because of a bureaucratic delay in bringing her case to trial." Reiny S., 374 Ill.App.3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d at 844. In this case, the petition alleged the relevant nine-month period was January 1, 2022, through October 1, 2022.
¶ 28 Respondent argues the circuit court erred because it found him unfit (1) while recognizing his significant accomplishments (e.g., completing mental health treatment and visiting G.D. consistently) and (2) even though respondent was the victim of the domestic violence at issue.
¶ 29 Respondent fails to demonstrate the circuit court's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See TSP-Hope, Inc. v. Home Innovators of Illinois, LLC, 382 Ill.App.3d 1171, 1173, 890 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (2008) (stating the appellant bears the burden of showing error). Respondent essentially argues, because his case was a closer call than Claudia D.'s case, this court should reweigh the evidence in favor of respondent and arrive at a different conclusion. However, we do not reweigh the evidence. See In re S.M., 314 Ill.App.3d 682, 687, 732 N.E.2d 140, 144 (2000) (noting "[t]he reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses").
¶ 30 During the relevant nine-month period, respondent was required to complete substance abuse services, complete domestic violence services, cooperate with DCFS, maintain a legal source of income, have stable housing, visit with G.D., complete parenting classes, and engage in mental health services. Respondent did successfully complete mental health services. He also had stable housing but was inconsistent with keeping appointments for safety checks on the residence. He was also "fairly consistent" with visits with G.D. and behaved appropriately. Respondent also signed his consents and communicated with DCFS. Respondent also stated he had a job but failed to provide pay stubs. As to substance abuse and domestic violence services, respondent did the initial intake but did not participate in classes due to a lack of transportation. Bachtold testified respondent was offered help with transportation. With parenting classes, he attended but did not complete the "post-test."
¶ 31 While respondent did make some progress during the relevant nine-month period, the progress was not substantial. In the adjudicatory order, the circuit court found both parents inflicted the neglect on G.D. by having issues of domestic violence in her presence. Thus, the basis for G.D. coming into care was domestic violence, and respondent failed to complete domestic violence services as ordered. As such, G.D. was never close to being returned to respondent's care.
¶ 32 Given the above evidence, the circuit court's finding respondent failed to make reasonable progress during the nine-month period of January 1, 2022, through October 1, 2022, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Since we have upheld the circuit court's determination respondent met the statutory definition of an "unfit person" on the basis of respondent's failure to make reasonable progress, we do not address the other basis for the circuit court's unfitness finding. See In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill.App.3d 883, 891, 819 N.E.2d 813, 820 (2004).
¶ 33 2. Best Interests Finding
¶ 34 "At the best-interest portion of a termination hearing, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest." In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 31, 147 N.E.3d 953. At this stage, the focus shifts from the parent to the child, and "the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life." D.T., 212 Ill.2d at 364, 818 N.E.2d at 1227. In making the best interests determination, the court must consider the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022)). These factors include the following:
"(1) the child's physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child's identity; (3) the child's background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (4) the child's sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive placement alternative; (5) the
child's wishes; (6) the child's community ties; (7) the child's need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parental figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child." In re Jay. H., 395 Ill.App.3d 1063, 1071, 918 N.E.2d 284, 291 (2009) (citing 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2008)).
¶ 35 On appeal, respondent argues he had transportation issues related to attending substance abuse treatment, cooperated with DCFS, maintained employment, completed parenting classes, and was successfully discharged from mental health services. Respondent contends nothing in the record suggests "he was not safely equipped and not able to parent."
¶ 36 We need not dispute these claims. If we take respondent's arguments as true, they fail to show the circuit court's finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court's determination did not involve whether respondent was making efforts. The only question for the court was what was in G.D.'s best interests.
¶ 37 G.D. had been in a loving and caring environment with Maria S. for nearly two years. Maria S. provided G.D. stability, safety, care, food, and shelter. The pair had developed a bond. Maria S. expressed a willingness to provide permanency for G.D. through adoption.
¶ 38 Our review of the record demonstrates the circuit court properly considered the evidence before it and weighed each of the statutory factors in reaching its decision to terminate respondent's parental rights. We conclude the court's finding it was in G.D.'s best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 40 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 41 Affirmed.