Opinion
1-22-1798
06-30-2023
In re Nev. H., Nai. H., Mes. E., Noa. E., and Al. H., Minors, v. FRANCISCA H., Respondent-Appellant. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Petitioner-Appellee,
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. Nos. 19JA1042 19JA1043 19JA1044 19JA1045 19JA1234 Honorable Patrick T. Murphy, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Navarro concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
LYLE, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the trial court's termination of respondent's parental rights finding that it was in the best interest of the minor children to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to their adoption.
¶ 2 This case concerns the termination of parental rights for respondent, Francisca H., with respect to her five minor children, Nev. H, born in June 2007, Nai. H., born in November 2010, Mes. E., born in April 2015, Noa. E., born in November 2016, and Al. H., born in October 2019. Ms. H. is the natural mother of each of the five children. The fathers are not parties to this appeal. The trial court terminated Ms. H.'s parental rights following unfitness and best interest hearings finding that Ms. H. was an unfit parent and that it was in the children's best interest to appoint an Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) Guardian with the right to consent to adoption of the minors.
¶ 3 On appeal, Ms. H. contends that the court erred in terminating her parental rights, particularly with regard to Nai. H. Ms. H. asserts that the evidence presented at the hearings shows that the children were bonded to her and the State failed to demonstrate that it would be in the children's best interests to permanently terminate her parental rights. She maintains that the evidence also demonstrated that continued interaction among the siblings was in the children's best interests, which could not be guaranteed if her parental rights were terminated. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In September and October 2019, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship for the five minor children. The petitions alleged that the minors were neglected and abused based on an environment that was injurious to their welfare under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)). As a factual basis, the petitions alleged that Ms. H. admitted to having a history of domestic violence and the minors had observed incidents of domestic violence between Ms. H. and her current paramour. On or about June 18, 2019, Ms. H. stated she was unable to care for the children. The petitions further noted that Ms. H. had unstable housing throughout the investigation. Based on the petitions, the trial court placed the children in the temporary custody of DCFS.
¶ 6 On January 4, 2021, the trial court adjudicated the five minor children neglected due to an injurious environment. In April 2021, the trial court adjudicated the children wards of the court and found that Ms. H. was unable or unwilling for some reason other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train, or discipline the children. The minors were placed in the guardianship of a DCFS Guardianship Administrator with the right to place the minors. The court also entered a permanency planning order that reflected a goal of return home within five months. The order noted that Ms. H. was involved in DCFS services, but needed to make progress to secure housing.
¶ 7 On August 13, 2021, the court suspended all visitation between Ms. H. and the children "until the indicated report of Human Trafficking is further reviewed by the court." The record shows that the indicated report concerned Ms. H. trafficking Nev. H. The court ordered that all information regarding the indicated report should be turned over to the State and the Chicago Police Department.
¶ 8 On January 4, 2022, the court entered a permanency goal of substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights. The court's reasoning for the change in permanency goal was that Ms. H. continued to have domestic violence issues with her boyfriend and because of the indicated report of human trafficking of Nev. H. The court also noted that the case had been in the system for more than two years.
¶ 9 On May 9, 2022, the State filed petitions to terminate Ms. H.'s parental rights to all five minors, as well as the parental rights of the fathers, and to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to their adoption. The petitions alleged that Ms. H. was unfit in that she failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the children's welfare in violation of section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)) ("ground (b)") and that she failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the children and failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children to her within nine months after the adjudication of neglect or abuse in violation of section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2020) ("ground (m)"). The petitions further alleged that the appointment of a guardian with the right to consent to adoption was in the best interests of the minors because they were in pre-adoptive homes, the foster parents desired to adopt the minors, and adoption by the foster parents was in the best interests of the minors.
¶ 10 The court conducted an unfitness hearing on October 25, 2022. The State introduced 16 exhibits at the hearing, including integrated assessments and service plans and reports from DCFS. At the hearing, Pleshette Hamb-Murphy testified that she was the Director of Foster Care Specialized Services for Kids Above All. In her role, she supervised the case supervisor, Virginia Towner, for the five minor children in this case. She testified that in addition to supervising Ms. Towner, she reviewed the integrated assessments prepared by DCFS, which contained information about the minors and their families, and also attended child and family "team meetings and staffings" for the case.
¶ 11 Ms. Hamb-Murphy was also involved in developing and approving the service plan in this case. In March 2022, the DCFS set a recommended goal for the minor children of substitute care pending termination of parental rights. Ms. Hamb-Murphy testified that recommendation was based on the fact that Ms. H. had "domestic violence issues." Ms. Hamb-Murphy noted that Ms. H. had completed classes, but she had "not indicated that she had taken heed to the recommendations from the" classes. Ms. Hamb-Murphy testified that Ms. H. also had an issue where she had an "indicated report" from DCFS for human sex trafficking Nev. H. in July 2021.
¶ 12 Kendreia Redmond testified that she was a child welfare specialist for DCFS and was the case manager for Ms. H.'s five children from September 2019 through October 2021. Ms. Redmond testified that during her tenure, she participated in the creation of an integrated assessment for Ms. H. According to that assessment, in order for reunification to occur, Ms. H. was required to complete individual therapy, parenting classes, parenting coaching, and domestic violence for victims classes. Ms. Redmond testified that the goal during this period was "return home."
¶ 13 Ms. Redmond noted that she and her supervisor, Ms. Towner, did not recommend unsupervised visits for Ms. H. and the minor children because she had not made progress in her recommended services. Ms. Redmond also observed that Ms. H. did not have a good track record with her visits, and had missed several visits. Ms. Redmond supervised almost all of the visits between Ms. H. and her children during her time as case manager. She identified two visits that she found "concerning," one in July 2020, and one in November 2020. At the July 2020 visit, Al. H.'s father was present. Ms. H. had previously spoken to Ms. Redmond about domestic disputes and violence that occurred between her and Al. H.'s father in the presence of the children. Ms. Redmond observed that during the July 2020 visit, Ms. H. appeared to be "shocked" by the presence of Al. H.'s father and was "frightened," almost as if she was "surprised that he was there." Ms. Redmond noted that his presence was a concern for the agency because he was not authorized to attend the visit.
¶ 14 Ms. Redmond discussed with Ms. H. that it was not appropriate for Al. H.'s father to attend visitation. Ms. H. told Ms. Redmond that she did not tell him about the visit, but she told his mother. Ms. H. stated that she understood Ms. Redmond's concerns. Ms. Redmond noted Al. H.'s father attended another visit in August 2020 that took place in a park with agency staff supervising. Al. H.'s father did not physically participate, but was sitting some distance away observing the visit.
¶ 15 In November 2020, Ms. Redmond supervised a visit between Ms. H. and all five of the children. Ms. Redmond observed that during the visit, Nai. H. spent seven or eight minutes attempting to get Ms. H.'s attention, but Ms. H. did not respond to her. Ms. Redmond noted that Nai. H. was calling Ms. H.'s name, patting her, and trying to engage with her, but Ms. H. appeared to be ignoring her while engaging with the other children. Ms. Redmond addressed this issue with Ms. H. outside the presence of the children, and Ms. H. stated that she was focusing on the other children and did not hear Nai. H. calling her. Ms. Redmond noted that similar, but less egregious, events occurred at subsequent visits where Ms. H. would be focused on one of the children and would fail to pay attention to the others.
¶ 16 Ms. Redmond testified that Ms. H. never sent gifts to the children and rarely called the agency to check on the children. She noted, however, that Ms. H. would always bring snacks or other food to the visits for the children.
¶ 17 Harolita Gantt testified that in the middle of 2021 she was a case manager for Kids Above All and was assigned to Ms. H.'s case for three months. During those three months, she spoke with Ms. H. "[n]ot more than six times," and always by phone. Ms. Gantt noted that at the time she took over as the case manager, Ms. H. still needed to complete domestic violence services. Ms. H. told Ms. Gantt that she had completed the services, but when Ms. Gantt asked her to tell her which caseworker "released" her from domestic violence services so that she could prove that she completed the services, Ms. H. did not provide that information. Ms. Gantt also noted that Ms. H. was not engaged in individual counseling, which was a required by her service plan. Ms. Gantt submitted a form to help Ms. H. find housing, but by the time Ms. Gantt ceased being the case manager, Ms. H. had not attained housing.
¶ 18 Ms. Gantt testified that during her tenure as case manager, Ms. H.'s visits with the children were suspended because the DCFS had indicated her for sex trafficking Nev. H. Ms. Gantt testified that Ms. H. would send her text messages inquiring about the wellbeing of the children.
¶ 19 Ms. Towner, the Foster Care Supervisor at Kids Above All, testified that she was the supervisor on Ms. H.'s case since it came to the attention of the DCFS in October 2019. Ms. Towner testified regarding the indicated allegation of human sex trafficking against Ms. H. in April 2021. Because of the indication, Ms. H.'s visits with the children were suspended until the following year. However, Ms. Towner testified that she had temporarily suspended visitation in March 2021, before the indicated report, because Ms. H. made an "inappropriate comment" to the children during visitation. Ms. Towner testified that Ms. H. instructed the children to lie about the care they were receiving from their foster parents so that they could be removed from their foster homes. Ms. Towner testified that visits resumed in February 2022 after both the mother and the children underwent therapy sessions.
¶ 20 Ms. Towner further testified that in January 2022, the agency's recommended goal for all of the children was substitute care pending termination of parental rights. Before making this recommendation, the agency held a "staffing" where Ms. Towner, Ms. Hamb-Murphy, and the clinical director discussed the case. In reaching their determination, they looked at the reason the case came to the DCFS and the duration of the case. They also looked at the indicated report of sex trafficking, and Ms. H.'s failure to comply with the recommended services. They further considered the fact that none of the fathers, except Al. H.'s father, had come forward to be assessed for services.
¶ 21 With regard to Ms. H.'s failure to complete services, Ms. Towner noted that Ms. H. was discharged from therapy in July 2021 due to lack of attendance. Ms. Towner learned that in September 2021, Ms. H. had completed domestic violence services.
¶ 22 On cross-examination Ms. Towner acknowledged that while visitation was suspended, Nev. H. requested to start visiting with Ms. H. at the "beginning" of 2022. However, none of the other children requested visitations.
¶ 23 Nayeli Cervantes testified that she became the DCFS case manager for this case in March 2022. Ms. Cervantes testified that she spoke with Ms. H. about once a week, but communication with her was sometimes "choppy." Ms. Cervantes testified that she never recommended an increase in visitation because Ms. H. had not made enough progress in her services. Ms. Cervantes noted that during therapy, Ms. H. did not "acknowledge why her children are in care," and that it was a "huge concern" that Ms. H. "brought up a male family friend that was asking about" Nev. H. Ms. Cervantes also recalled a visit in April 2022 where Nai. H. cried at the end of the visit and said she did not want Ms. H. to leave. Ms. H. told Nai. H not to worry and that she would "get you guys back in a couple of months." Ms. Cervantes did not believe this was appropriate and attempted to quickly conclude the visit. Ms. Cervantes advised Ms. H. not to say things like that. Ms. Cervantes testified that these kinds of comments can give the children "false hope" and prevent them from bonding with their foster parents.
¶ 24 On cross-examination, Ms. Cervantes testified that Nev. H. had a history of suicidal ideation and attempts and was hospitalized for that reason during the April 2022 visit. Ms. Cervantes also recalled a clinical staffing with Nai. H. where Nai. H.'s therapist, her foster parent, Ms. Cervantes, and her supervisor, discussed Nai. H. staying with her foster parents for a few more years. Nai. H. started crying and said she was conflicted because she loved her foster family, but he was not sure that she wanted to let go of her mom just yet. Ms. Cervantes testified that the children and Ms. H. seem bonded and that she occasionally brings snacks to the visits.
¶ 25 Following argument, the court found that the evidence in this case was "overwhelming." The court observed that Ms. H. had been given "every opportunity to work through this" since the case first arose three years prior. The court found that the children required "permanency" and that during the pendency of the case Ms. H. had "fumbled the ball a couple of times, seriously fumbled it." The court stated that it did not consider the fact that Ms. H. did not attend the proceedings in terms of evidence, but noted it solely because she was not present to advocate for herself. The court found that the State had shown by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. H. was unfit pursuant to both ground (b) and ground (m).
¶ 26 The court then proceeded to a best interest hearing. Ms. Towner testified that Nev. H. was currently in a residential facility due to suicide attempts at her foster home. Ms. Towner testified that the agency determined after several staffings that Nev. H. should be free for adoption and the parental rights for Nev. H.'s mother and father be permanently terminated. Ms. Towner acknowledged that the agency did not currently have an adoptive parent lined up for Nev. H., but testified that Nev. H. told her that she wanted to be adopted so that she could have a place to call home. Ms. Towner testified that Nev. H.'s chances at being adopted would increase if parental rights were terminated.
¶ 27 Ms. Cervantes testified that Mes. E. and Noa. E. were placed together in nonrelative foster care for the past two years. The placement was safe and appropriate and there had been no signs of abuse or neglect. Ms. Cervantes testified that Mes. E. and Noa. E. got along very well with their foster family and are bonded with each other. Ms. Cervantes testified that Al. H. had been with her foster family since birth. Ms. Cervantes testified that the placement was safe and appropriate and there had been no signs of abuse or neglect. Al. H. calls her foster parents "Mommy and daddy." Ms. Cervantes testified that Nai. H. had been in nonrelative foster care "since the start of the case." Her placement was safe and appropriate and there had been no signs of abuse or neglect. Nai. H. had a good relationship with her foster family, but was bonded with Ms. H.
¶ 28 Ms. Cervantes testified that the siblings have monthly visits with each other and are comfortable with each other and bonded. Ms. Cervantes testified that it would not be in the children's best interest if they did not see each other again.
¶ 29 Ms. Cervantes testified that they staffed the issue of whether to terminate Ms. H.'s parental rights several times, particularly with regard to Nai. H. Based on all of these staffings, the agency recommended that the parental rights for the mother and father of each child be permanently terminated. With regard to Nai. H., Ms. Cervantes testified that the agency wanted her to have a stable home and they did not believe Ms. H. could provide that for her. Ms. Cervantes believed that Nai. H.'s relationship with her foster parent and siblings was strong and they wanted her to be able to develop that bond. Ms. Cervantes noted that the three sets of foster parents interacted with each other.
¶ 30 Toya Ambrose, Al. H.'s foster mother, testified that she wished to adopt Al. H. Ms. Ambrose testified that Al. H. was very well integrated into their family and was "thriving." Ms. Ambrose testified that she would "[a]bsolutely" maintain contact with Al. H.'s siblings. Ms. Ambrose testified that was very important to her because she was not in touch with her siblings when she was growing up. Al. H.'s foster father, Garvin Ambrose, also testified that he wished to adopt Al. H.
¶ 31 Nicole Smith, the foster parent for Mes. E. and Noa. E. testified that she wished to adopt both children. Ms. Smith testified that she believed they needed her help and they needed a better place to be. She testified that she would "encourage" Mes. E. and Noa. E. to maintain a relationship with their siblings because "they need to see more of family, be around and see their family so they know they're not alone."
¶ 32 Sherita Shelby, the foster parent for Nai. H., testified that Nai, H. had been placed with her for three years and that she wanted to adopt Nai. H. She thought Nai. H. was a "great child" and testified that her daughters treated her as a little sister. Ms. Shelby testified that she intended to make sure that Nai. H. had a continued relationship with her siblings. Ms. Shelby testified that if Nai. H. asked to see Ms. H. after adoption, she would attempt to facilitate that.
¶ 33 The court then continued the hearing until November 2, 2022, to give Ms. H. an opportunity to appear and testify. Ms. H. testified that when she sees her children they are all happy to see her and run to greet her. They play board games and play games around the park. She testified that the children cry when she leaves. Ms. H. believed that the children were bonded and wanted to stay together. Ms. H. testified that her main concern was that the children did not see each other enough and did not communicate as much as they should. Ms. H. told the court that she wanted to be reunited with her children because she was "incomplete" without them.
¶ 34 Following argument, the court found that all of the potential adoptive parents were "very credible" with regard to keeping the children in touch with each other. The court noted that under Illinois law, they had no obligation to do so, but the court believed that they would. The court stated that it "hate[d]" to take children away from their parent, "but sometimes you got to do it." The court determined that it was "beyond a doubt that it's in the best interest to terminate" parental rights and appoint a guardian with the right to place. The court then set a goal of adoption for all five children.
¶ 35 Ms. H. filed a timely notice of appeal on December 1, 2022. We find that we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules and 307(a)(6) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) and 311(a) (eff. Jul. 1, 2018).
¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 37 On appeal, Ms. H. contends that the court erred in terminating her parental rights where the termination was not in the best interests of the children. Ms. H.'s contentions chiefly focus on Nai. H., asserting that the evidence demonstrated a strong bond between them and that Nai. H. would experience trauma if her parental rights were terminated, but contends that the evidence also showed that all of the children were bonded to her. Ms. H. also maintains that the evidence demonstrated that the children's best interests would be served by continued sibling contact, which could only be ensured by not terminating her parental rights.
¶ 38 A. Standard of Review
¶ 39 The Juvenile Court Act provides a two-stage process for the involuntary termination of parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et. seq. (West 2020). First, the State must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). In re Tr. A., 2020 IL App (2d) 200225, ¶ 32. "If the trial court finds the parent unfit, the State must then show by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest." Id. We will reverse a trial court's unfitness or best interest determination only if that finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.B., 2019 IL App (2d) 180797, ¶¶ 30, 43. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence "only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Tr. A., 2020 IL App (2d) 200225, ¶ 32 (quoting In re N.B., 2019 IL App (2d) 180797, ¶ 30).
¶ 40 B. Unfitness
¶ 41 Initially, we observe that Ms. H. does not raise any challenge to the trial court's finding of unfitness. Accordingly, we find that Ms. H. has forfeited any argument that the trial court's unfitness ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See. In re M.R., 2020 IL App (1st) 191716, ¶ 26 (citing In re H.S., 2016 IL App (1st) 161589, ¶ 36); In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 17; see also, Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) ("Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing."). Nonetheless, the record shows that the trial court's finding of unfitness was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence presented at the hearing showed that Ms. H. did not understand the effect of continued domestic violence on the children and failed to make satisfactory progress on her service plans and therapy during the three years the case was before the court.
We note that Ms. H. did not file a reply brief.
¶ 42 C. Best Interests
¶ 43 Following a finding of unfitness, the focus shifts from the parent's rights to the children's needs. In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d 347, 364 (2004). "The issue is no longer whether parental rights can be terminated; the issue is whether, in light of the child's needs, parental rights should be terminated." (Emphasis in original). Id. Therefore, "the parent's interest in maintaining the parentchild relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life." Id. In making this determination, the Juvenile Court Act provides a variety of factors for the court to consider, including: the physical safety and welfare of the child, the development of the child's identity, the child's sense of attachments, the child's community ties, the child's need for permanence, and the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. In re M.R., 2020 IL App (1st) 191716, ¶ 27 (citing In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d at 366).
¶ 44 Here, the trial court found that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate Ms. H.'s parental rights so that the children could be free for adoption; particularly, so that Nai. H., Mes. E., Noa. E., and Al. H., could be adopted by their current foster parents. The court acknowledged that Nev. H. did not have a current prospective adoptive parent, but determined that freeing her for adoption by terminating Ms. H.'s parental rights would make it easier for her to find a prospective parent. "While the current availability of an adoptive home is one consideration in a termination case, it is not the only consideration. [Citation]. Courts have recognized that [i]t may be just as important to free children from continued involvement with a mother whose chaotic and disruptive lifestyle is a detriment to their welfare." (Internal quotation marks omitted). Id. ¶ 30. Nev. H. also expressed a desire to be adopted.
¶ 45 The other four children had been with their foster families for several years, and each child demonstrated a strong sense of attachment to their foster parents and their communities. Each child had developed an identity within their foster homes as testified to by their foster parents. Al. H.'s foster mother testified that Al. H. was "thriving" in her home. Nai. H.'s foster mother testified that her other daughters treated Nai. H. like a "little sister." Mes. E. and Noa. E.'s foster mother testified that the two children are integrated into her family and they have outings together. The court recognized that the case had been with DCFS and proceeding through the court for three years and emphasized the children's need for permanence. Significantly, Ms. H. was an indicated by DCFS for human sex trafficking Nev. H. in 2021. Although the record does not reveal the resolution of the indicated report, and visitation eventually resumed many months later, the indicated report loomed heavily over the proceedings. The indicated report also influenced DCFS's service plans, which Ms. H. failed to adequately complete. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court's determination that it was in the children's best interests to terminate Ms. H.'s parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 46 Ms. H. contends, however, that the State failed to affirmatively show that termination would be in Nai. H.'s best interest because the evidence showed that she had a strong bond with Ms. H. and was upset when the caseworker suggested that Nai. H. stay with her foster parent for a few more years. Ms. H. also points out that the caseworkers were concerned that the termination of parental rights could cause Nai. H. trauma, which could be exacerbated if Nai. H. did not see her siblings again. Ms. H. makes similar arguments with regard to the other children, arguing that they were bonded to her as well as each other.
¶ 47 In support of her contention that the bond with her children, particularly Nai. H., should have precluded the termination of her parental rights in this case, Ms. H. relies on In re B.B., 386 Ill.App.3d 686 (2008) and In re M.F., 326 Ill.App.3d 1110 (2002). In B.B., this court reversed the trial court's determination that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the minors where the evidence demonstrated that there was a strong bond between the two minor children and the mother. The trial court terminated the mother's parental rights finding that the mother had not been cooperative with DCFS and had a long history of substance abuse. Id. at 69697. The court observed that it was clear that the minors were bonded to their mother, but determined that the mother would not be able to provide a stable and safe environment for the children. Id. at 697.
¶ 48 In reversing the termination decision, this court emphasized the "flawed and unstable" foster placement approved by DCFS. Id. at 701. The court noted that the mother lived in the same house with the foster mother and the children for several months. Id. at 701-02. Days after DCFS discovered the mother was living in the foster home, the mother, with the help of the foster mother, moved the children to Florida. Id. at 702. The children were eventually returned to Illinois. Id.
"In light of these unusual circumstances, it is not surprising that the children were bonded to their mother at the time of the best interest hearing. The first nine months, following the nine-month period after dispositional unfitness, was a period of time when mother and the foster mother acted together, without discovery or intervention from DCFS,
to maintain an unlimited and unsupervised relationship between mother and her children." Id.
The children were eventually moved to a second foster family, but by the time of the best interest hearing, they had only been separated from their mother for 10 months. Id. at 703. During those 10 months, the mother was employed and completing services. Id. The court found that in viewing the evidence from the best interest hearing, the trial court should have considered the evidence in light of the fact that the original foster placement permitted the children to "share an uninterrupted relationship with their mother" and that terminating the children's relationship with their mother 10 months after the effective removal from her control through placement with a second foster family "created an unnecessarily accelerated timetable for these young children." Id. The court concluded that the trial court "overlooked the fact that the children's bonds to their mother continued and may have grown stronger due to the mismanaged first placement." Id.
¶ 49 Here, unlike the children in B.B., the children in this case have been separated from Ms. H. for three years, which is longer than the timeline discussed in B.B. The three years that this case was pending prior to the best interest hearing was not an "unnecessarily accelerated timetable." Moreover, the evidence showed that the minors, aside from Nev. H., were thriving in their foster homes. While the children loved Ms. H., the court noted her failure to progress in services and the children's need for stability. Thus, the unique facts of B.B. are not present here.
¶ 50 In M.F., 326 Ill.App.3d at 1117-18, this court reversed the trial court's order terminating the mother's parental rights with regard to one of her two minor children where the evidence showed that the mother and the minor child had an "ongoing relationship" and there was no showing that the termination would benefit the child. Crucially, the court determined that there had been no showing that the minor would benefit from the termination of parental rights because the minor was not in a position to be adopted. Id. at 1118. The court observed that there was no prospect of adoption because the minor already lived with her natural father, who had full custody and guardianship. Id. The mother had regular visitation for more than seven years. Id. The court stated the only result of the termination would be to "deprive [the minor] of an already established relationship with her mother." Id.
¶ 51 The circumstances in this case are clearly distinguishable from those present in M.F. Here, the court noted the importance of freeing the children up for adoption and introducing stability into their lives by terminating Ms. H.'s parental rights. That was not a concern in M.F. where adoption was not an issue and the court found that termination would create more instability. Thus, the evidence in M.F. showed the minor would not benefit from the termination of the mother's parental rights, while the evidence in this case was clear that each minor would benefit from termination of Ms. H.'s parental rights by freeing them for adoption.
¶ 52 Thus, while the evidence here did show the existence of a bond between Ms. H. and the minor children, particularly Nai. H., the existence of this bond did not outweigh the children's need for stability, permanency, and safety. This court has recognized that termination is in the best interest of the child where termination would provide the child with permanency and stability even where an "extraordinary bond" exists between the parent and child. In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶¶ 1, 16; see also In re Tyianna J., 2017 IL App (1st) 162306, ¶ 100 ("Even if a bond exists, *** termination may still be proper if it would result in stability and permanency for the child, a goal that is clearly a primary concern of the Juvenile Court Act.).
¶ 53 In addition, each of the foster parents testified that they would encourage future sibling communication and interaction should they be permitted to adopt their respective foster children. The trial court recognized that under Illinois law, the foster parents were not required to maintain these sibling relationships, but the court found each of the parents "very credible" on this subject. We defer to the trial court's credibility determinations because it is in a superior position to make such findings. In re A.F., 2012 IL App (2d) 111079, ¶ 40 (citing In re April C., 345 Ill.App.3d 872, 889 (2004)).
¶ 54 Finally, we do not find that a private guardianship in lieu of termination is appropriate in this case. Ms. H. does not specifically ask this court to remand to the trial court with directions to set the goal of a private guardianship, but insists that a private guardianship should not be ruled out where terminating parental rights would harm the minor's welfare. However, section 2-28(2)(E) of the Juvenile Court Act provides that: "The guardianship of the minor will be transferred to an individual or couple on a permanent basis provided that goals (A) through (D) have been deemed inappropriate and not in the child's best interests." 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2)(E) (West 2020). As referenced in this section, goal (D) is adoption, which the trial court found was appropriate, and in the children's best interests in this case. This court has recognized that "[a]doption is given preference over guardianship when the natural parent cannot give proper care because adoption better insures the child's stability and permanency in a safe, comfortable environment." In re Julieanna M., 2018 IL App (1st) 172972, ¶ 21. Accordingly, we find that the trial court's ruling terminating Ms. H.'s parental rights and appointing a guardian with the right to consent to their adoption was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 55 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 56 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 57 Affirmed.