Opinion
H043668
11-07-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DALLAS WAYNE FINLEY, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1508768)
This case is before us for the second time after the California Supreme Court granted review, deferred briefing, and transferred the matter back to this court with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.). In our earlier opinion, we rejected defendant Dallas Wayne Finley's arguments that the electronics search condition that was imposed as a term of his mandatory supervision was unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad and affirmed the judgment. We hereby vacate our previous decision and, having reconsidered it, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are omitted because they are not included in the record on appeal. --------
On April 19, 2016, a complaint was filed alleging that defendant possessed methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1) and that he had been previously convicted of the same offense (Pen. Code, § 1203.073, former subd. (b)(8)). The complaint also alleged that defendant had two prior convictions for possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)). Defendant pleaded no contest to count 1 and admitted the truth of the prior conviction allegations.
On June 7, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to three years in the county jail, one of which was to be spent in custody, and the other two to be spent on mandatory supervision. At sentencing, the trial court imposed the following modified condition of mandatory supervision: "[Defendant] shall provide all passwords to any cellular telephones and computers within his custody or control and shall submit to search at any time without a warrant by any peace officer limited to programs used for interpersonal communications, photos, e-mail, text, and social media."
Defense counsel objected to the condition on the grounds that there was no relationship between the condition and defendant's offense and on the grounds that it was constitutionally overbroad. Defense counsel stated: "First of all, regarding the facts of this specific case, [defendant's] home was searched under a search warrant in May of 2014. It is true that methamphetamine was found, and he has pled guilty or no contest. He pled no contest to being in possession with the intent to sell. [¶] At the time of the result of the search, there was no indication that any electronic devices were found, let alone that any electronic devices were being used for transactions related to narcotics."
The trial court overruled defendant's objection and stated that the condition was appropriate because the case involved the sale of drugs and the condition was limited in scope to "interpersonal communication, photos, e-mail, text, and social media, that's designed to limit it to prevent future criminality . . . ."
DISCUSSION
On June 7, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to three years in the county jail, one of which was to be spent in custody, and the other two to be spent on mandatory supervision. It has been more than three years since defendant was sentenced. Thus, based on the record before us, defendant is no longer under mandatory supervision and is no longer subject to the electronics search condition that he challenges on appeal.
We requested supplemental briefing from the parties on whether defendant's term of mandatory supervision has ended, and if so, whether its expiration rendered this appeal moot. The Attorney General filed a supplemental brief arguing that the appeal is moot because defendant's term of mandatory supervision has expired. Defendant filed a supplemental brief acknowledging that he is in receipt of the Attorney General's supplemental brief and conceding that he has "nothing to add to the [Attorney General's] analysis of the issue."
We agree with the parties that the appeal is moot. " '[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.' " (People v. Herrera (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1198.) Defendant's sole arguments on appeal are limited to the reasonableness and constitutionality of the electronics search condition. As a result, his appeal has been mooted by the termination of his mandatory supervision because we would be unable to grant him any effective relief on appeal. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, fn. 5; People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 408, fn. 8; In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 611.)
Moreover, although we retain the discretion to consider the merits of a moot appeal, we decline to do so here. The validity of electronics search conditions has already been addressed by the California Supreme Court in Ricardo P. There, the California Supreme Court concluded that the electronics search condition imposed in that case was not reasonably related to future criminality and was therefore invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1128.) The Ricardo P. court expressly stated that it was not "categorically invalidat[ing] electronics search conditions" (ibid.) and noted that "[i]n certain cases, the probationer's offense or personal history may provide . . . a sufficient factual basis from which [the trial court] can determine that an electronics search condition is a proportional means of deterring the probationer from future criminality." (Id. at pp. 1128-1129.) Thus, an analysis of the validity of defendant's condition requires a fact-based inquiry into the circumstances of his particular offense and does not present a question of continuing public importance. (See People v. Alsafar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 880, 883 [reviewing court may exercise discretion to consider moot issue if question is of continuing public importance and is capable of repetition, yet evading review].)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
/s/_________
Premo, Acting P.J.
WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Elia, J. /s/_________
Mihara, J.