Opinion
17040362
03-15-2018
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff v. Teasha FIELDS, Defendant
People were represented by ADA Taylor Piscionere, Esq., on behalf of Anthony Scarpino, Westchester County District Attorney. defendant was represented by Ron Stokes, Esq.
People were represented by ADA Taylor Piscionere, Esq., on behalf of Anthony Scarpino, Westchester County District Attorney.
defendant was represented by Ron Stokes, Esq.
Bonnie L. Orden, J.Defendant, Teasha Fields, moves this Court, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 220.60 (3), to permit her to withdraw her plea of guilty to Petit Larceny (PL § 155.25). The defendant claims that: she pleaded guilty solely to gain her release from incarceration since she was unable to post bail; she regrets her decision because as a certified substance abuse counselor, a misdemeanor conviction will preclude recertification; and she is innocent. The People oppose the motion and assert that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the Court file, the recording of defendant's plea allocution, the recording of defendant's nighttime arraignment, Defendant's Notice of Motion and Affirmation in Support, and the People's Affirmation and Memorandum of Law in Opposition.
The record is unclear as to why a court stenographer was unavailable on the date of the plea.
Of the three arguments presented by defendant, the first prong of defendant's argument appears to be a case of first impression considering the breadth of a recent ruling in the Dutchess County Supreme Court in People ex rel. Desgranges v. Anderson, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 28036, 59 Misc.3d 238, 72 N.Y.S.3d 328 (Sup. Ct., Dutchess County 2018). In People ex. rel. Desgranges , the defendant, who was incarcerated for three (3) months on a Petit Larceny (PL § 155.25) charge, brought an Article 7 writ of habeas corpus before the Appellate Division Second Department based on his claim that he was incarcerated due to his inability to post bail. The Appellate Division referred the matter to Judge Rosa of the Dutchess County Supreme Court, for oral arguments and a decision. Since the defendant in Desgranges pleaded guilty and was released from jail the very morning of the hearing, the Court did not rule on the writ, but issued a declaratory judgment.
In a sweeping ruling, the Desgranges Court declared that the failure of an arraignment court to inquire about the defendant's ability to pay the sum of bail set is a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the US Constitution and the NY Constitution. In the instant case, the defendant did not bring a writ, but is challenging her guilty plea by asserting that she took the plea solely because she wanted to end her continued incarceration due to her inability to make bail. In light of the Desgranges decision, this Court must not only look at the voluntariness of defendant's plea of guilty at the time the plea was taken, but also look at the defendant's arraignment to determine whether the defendant's constitutional rights were violated such that the defendant felt impelled to plead guilty to secure her release from jail. If a constitutional violation occurred, must this Court grant the defendant's motion to withdraw her plea of guilty?For the reasons articulated hereunder, the relief sought is denied.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 11, 2017, at approximately 3:40 P.M., Fields entered a Shop Rite located at 955 South Central Avenue, Scarsdale, New York, took one box of Allegra, two boxes of Nexium, and placed these items in her handbag. Defendant then exited the store without paying for the items and was subsequently arrested by the Greenburgh Police. Upon inspection, it was found that defendant lined her handbag with aluminum foil in order to bypass security sensors. The police also found a bag of cocaine on her person and the defendant was charged with Petit Larceny (PL § 155.25); Criminal Possession of an Anti–Security Item (PL § 170.47); and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree (PL § 220.03). Defendant was arraigned the same day and bail was set by the Court in the amount of $10,000.00 bond/$1,500.00 cash.
One week later, on April 18, 2017, Fields, who remained incarcerated, pleaded guilty to Petit Larceny (PL § 155.25) in full satisfaction of the docket, with the advice of her assigned counsel, Mark Fitzmaurice, Esq. Before the plea and allocution began, defense counsel stated on the record that he discussed with Fields that if she pleaded guilty to the "A" Misdemeanor of Petit Larceny, she would lose her NY State Chemical and Substance Abuse Treatment (CASAT) license, which she procured under an alternative to incarceration program. Counsel indicated on the record that his client was thinking over the offer and he was unsure of the defendant's ultimate decision. Fields immediately responded to that statement by stating that she wanted to take the plea. The Court also inquired, before the allocution began, as to whether Fields was sure she wanted to take the plea in light of the representations about the loss of her license. The defendant reaffirmed to the Court that she wanted to take the plea. No bail application was made before the plea and allocution.
Pursuant to the proposed negotiated sentence between the People and Fields, and with the consent of the Court, the defendant was promised a sentence of two-years' probation pending receipt of a Pre–Sentence Investigation Report (PSI) to be conducted by the Probation Department (Probation). During a very detailed allocution, defendant admitted her guilt, indicated that she had sufficient time to speak with her attorney, twice denied that she had been threatened, coerced, or in any way forced to plead guilty, and that her plea was voluntary. Defendant signed, indicated she understood, and discussed with her attorney a waiver of rights to appeal form and a misdemeanor conviction waiver of rights form, both of which were also signed by defense counsel and the Assistant District Attorney. In all regards, the plea and allocution appeared textbook perfect. Following the plea and allocution, defense counsel inquired of the Court as to whether Fields could be released on her own recognizance (ROR). The Court stated "I was going to ask you about that." The People had no objection to ROR and the defendant was released and told to report to Probation so that the PSI would be completed prior to sentencing on July 25, 2017.
On June 5, 2017, as instructed, the defendant reported to Probation and was interviewed. According to the PSI, at the time of her interview, defendant admitted stealing Nexium, but denied stealing Allegra. She indicated that she had recently relapsed by using drugs and alcohol and was "out with friends stealing during the day" (PSI at 9). According to the PSI, defendant only briefly discussed "some" of her extensive prior contacts with the criminal justice system, but did not want to go into detail. She indicated that she has previously lived with various boyfriends, one of whom was murdered in a gang-related incident, and that her federal weapons conviction was a result of trying to sell a weapon in order to raise bail money for a different boyfriend so that he could be released from jail. When the probation officer advised Fields that home visits would be conducted as a condition of her probation, the interview significantly changed. Specifically, Fields indicated that she did not want her mother, with whom she now lives, to be informed of this arrest. She became "visibly upset" (PSI at p 7). Fields indicated that her mother is financially supporting her (PSI at p 8) since she has been unemployed since 2015 (PSI at 8). Fields indicated to the probation officer that "she was going to speak with another attorney," and asked the probation officer if she could get "a different sentence" (PSI at 7). The probation officer indicated that defendant was free to speak to whomever she wanted.
On July 25, 2017, the anticipated date of sentence, Fields failed to appear in Court and defense counsel represented to the Court that Fields did not remember the adjourned date and asked for a few days' adjournment to secure her appearance in court. The case was adjourned to July 28, 2017, at which time Fields appeared and indicated to the Court that she wanted to hire private counsel. Fields requested several adjournments between July 28, 2017 and October 3, 2017 to obtain private counsel, but ultimately Ron Stokes, Esq. was appointed as assigned counsel and Mark Fitzmaurice, Esq. was relieved. On October 30, 2017, defendant's new counsel filed the instant Motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea. On December 15, 2017, the People filed their Affirmation in Opposition and a Memorandum of Law. Sometime after January 1, 2018, this matter was re-assigned to the undersigned, as the justice who took the plea was no longer sitting with the Town Court.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Involuntary Plea/Duress due to the Inability to Post Bail
It is well established that at any time before the imposition of a sentence, the court in its sound discretion may permit a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty to the entire indictment or to part of the indictment to withdraw such plea (see CPL § 220.60 [3 ]; People v. Alexander , 97 N.Y.2d 482, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 769 N.E.2d 802 [2002] ; see also People v. Brown, 14 N.Y.3d 113, 897 N.Y.S.2d 674, 924 N.E.2d 782 [2010] ; People v. Elmendorf , 45 A.D.3d 858, 850, 845 N.Y.S.2d 743, lv denied, 10 N.Y.3d 810, 857 N.Y.S.2d 44, 886 N.E.2d 809 [2007] ). While CPL Article 220 deals with indictments, the salient question concerning the validity of any criminal plea is whether it was entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently ( People v. Fiumefreddo , 82 N.Y.2d 536, 605 N.Y.S.2d 671, 626 N.E.2d 646 [1993] ; People v. Frederick , 45 N.Y.2d 520, 526, 410 N.Y.S.2d 555, 382 N.E.2d 1332 [1978] ; People v. De Jesus , 199 A.D.2d 529, 606 N.Y.S.2d 255 [2d Dept. 1993] ). "A defendant will not be heard to challenge his guilty plea when the minutes of the plea are unequivocal" and refute his reason for withdrawal of the plea ( People v. Frederick, at 526, 410 N.Y.S.2d 555, 382 N.E.2d 1332 ); see also People v. Moissett , 76 N.Y.2d 909, 910, 563 N.Y.S.2d 43, 564 N.E.2d 653 [1990] ; People v. Harris , 61 N.Y.2d 9, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61, 459 N.E.2d 170 [1983] ). A defendant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to advance his claims although the claims will rarely require an evidentiary hearing and the Court is entitled to rely on the record of the plea proceedings to determine voluntariness (see People v. Ramos , 63 N.Y.2d 640, 479 N.Y.S.2d 510, 468 N.E.2d 692 [1984] ; People v. Tinsley , 35 N.Y.2d 926, 927, 365 N.Y.S.2d 161, 324 N.E.2d 544 [1974] ; People v. Palmer , 29 A.D.3d 606, 815 N.Y.S.2d 129 [2d Dept. 2006] ; People v. Morabito , 253 A.D.2d 830, 677 N.Y.S.2d 511 [2d Dept. 1998] ). The limited circumstances upon which a guilty plea may be vacated is well established and include the lack of voluntariness ( People v. Seeber , 4 N.Y.3d 780, 793 N.Y.S.2d 826, 826 N.E.2d 797 [2005] ); new evidence tending to prove innocence ( People v. Lewis , 13 A.D.3d 810, 788 N.Y.S.2d 181 [3d Dept. 2004] ); and ineffective assistance of counsel ( People v. Cepeda , 29 A.D.3d 491, 816 N.Y.S.2d 437 [1st Dept. 2006] ). A determination of whether the defendant has entered the plea voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently is left to the trial court's sound discretion ( People v. Nixon , 21 N.Y.2d 338, 355, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659, 234 N.E.2d 687 [1967] ).
A defendant may agree to waive certain constitutional rights during a plea agreement however not every constitutional right is forfeited ( People v. Taylor , 65 N.Y.2d 1, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755 [1985] ). As noted in People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 825 N.E.2d 1081 [2005] and its progeny, ( People v. Hill , 9 N.Y.3d 189, 849 N.Y.S.2d 13, 879 N.E.2d 152 [2007], cert denied 553 U.S. 1048, 128 S.Ct. 2430, 171 L.Ed.2d 257 [2008] ; People v. Van Deusen , 7 N.Y.3d 744, 819 N.Y.S.2d 854, 853 N.E.2d 223 [2006] ), when a defendant's due process rights are violated, the plea cannot be said to be voluntary and vacatur of the plea is required. The Court of Appeals has opined that "due process requires that the record must be clear that the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant " ( People v. Ford , 86 N.Y.2d 397 at 403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265 [1995] ) (emphasis added). The Desgranges Court ( People ex rel. Desgranges v. Anderson, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 28036, 59 Misc.3d 238, 72 N.Y.S.3d 328 [Sup. Ct., Dutchess County 2018] ) ordered that "when imposing bail the court must consider the individual's ability to pay ..." and referred to the seminal US Supreme Court decision in Bearden v. Georgia , 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983) which held that states are prohibited from discriminating against indigent defendants solely because of their inability to pay. Fearing that it would take until 2019 to revise NY State's bail laws under Criminal Procedure Law Article 510, the Desgranges Court reasoned that "[i]n the interim, thousands of individuals will be in a similar situation as the petitioner was at his arraignment" and cited statistics throughout NY State of the thousands of pre-trial detainees incarcerated while awaiting arraignment or trial. Of significance, the Court stated that it "is not ruling upon whether it was appropriate for [the Town Court Judge] to set bail ... but only as to the propriety of the failure to consider whether [the defendant] had the ability to pay the sum of bail set" Desgranges, at 7, 72 N.Y.S.3d 328. In ruling that this failure alone constitutes a violation of a defendant's equal protection and due process rights, the question is: Does this constitutional failure make the plea involuntary if the defendant is claiming that she took the plea so that she could go free due to her inability to make bail.
On March 8, 2018, a press release was issued by the District Attorney (DA) of Dutchess County announcing that the DA's office is not appealing the Desgranges decision. DA Grady, in essence, indicated that although there was no affirmative inquiry from the arraignment Court as to what bail the defendant could make, since the Judge set cash bail at the same amount that defense counsel requested, the arraignment Judge did , ipso facto , consider the defendant's ability to post bail, and was therefore in compliance with CPL § 510.30(2) (a) (ii), which requires that the Court consider an individual's financial resources. The DA stated that in his office's opinion, all that the Judge declared is that "a judge should consider a defendant's ‘ability to pay’ when setting bail." However, the Desgranges ruling was quite specific. "[T]he failure of a court imposing bail as a condition of pretrial detention to consider an individual's ability to pay that bail, as occurred in this case , is a violation of the due process and equal protection under the United States and New York State Constitution." (Desgranges at 9, 72 N.Y.S.3d 328 ) (emphasis added). If defense counsel's recommendation of cash bail constituted a sufficient inquiry by the arraignment court into the defendant's financial resources, why would the Desgranges Court feel compelled to rule that since it would take until 2019 to revise the current bail laws in NY State, a declaratory judgment had to be issued in order to protect thousands of NY pre-trial detainees? If the recommendation by defense counsel would have been sufficient to comply with CPL § 510.00 et seq. , why would the Desgranges Court rule that the failure to consider that defendant's ability to pay was a constitutional violation? The Desgranges holding made no reference whatsoever to the factors the DA spoke of in his press release, i.e., that bail was set at the amount that defense counsel recommended. Hence, the DA's press release that reasons that the bail set was "consistent with [the Judge's] decision, appears incongruent with the ruling in Desgranges . More clarity on this issue is needed.
Fields argues that at the time of the entry of the plea, she had not been handling incarceration well, had not been sleeping or eating, and was in considerable distress. As a result, defendant alleges that she pleaded guilty in order to gain her release from jail and she entered the plea due to her concern that failure to do so would result in her continued incarceration because she was unable to post bail. The People argue that it would not be in the interest of judicial efficiency if the Court allowed an incarcerated defendant to withdraw her plea of guilty anytime the negotiated plea results in release. In light of the scope of the declaratory judgment in Desgranges , a first in NY State of its kind, the undersigned undertook a review of defendant's arraignment proceeding.
This court (Gordon–Oliver, J.) did inquire of the defendant the amount of bail that she could afford. Defendant's counsel indicated that she had $80.00 in her pocket and she had no other resources. Still, bail was set at $10,000 bond with a $1,500.00 cash alternative. Further, defendant's assertion that she pleaded guilty under duress is belied by the plea record. Here, defense counsel made no bail application before Fields took the plea.
Because of the specific facts in the case at bar, this Court does not have to determine what the consequence of Desgranges would be in a CPL 220 motion if the arraignment court failed to inquire about the defendant's ability to post bail; however, this issue must undoubtedly be addressed.
The Court in People ex rel. Desgranges v. Anderson, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 28036, 59 Misc.3d 238, 72 N.Y.S.3d 328 (Sup. Ct., Dutchess County 2018) found this factor to be largely irrelevant.
The only issue on the table before the plea was taken was the loss of her CASAT license. And, the only issue that concerned Fields during her Probation interview was that her mother would find out about this arrest if home visits were conducted. A reasonable interpretation is that while Field's mother, who was employed and supporting the defendant, might have assisted the defendant in raising $500.00 to meet the likely requirements of an unsecured bond—the defendant affirmatively chose not to contact her. Further, the defendant's claim that she only pleaded guilty to secure her release is also put into question by the fact that Fields additionally challenges the plea because of a collateral consequence, a decision she now regrets, to be discussed more fully as set forth below.
In Bearden , the Court acknowledged that indigence was a flexible term, yet defined an indigent defendant as someone "who through no fault of his own is unable to pay" (Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670, 103 S.Ct. 2064 ).
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Of significance to this Court is the fact that Fields is no stranger to the criminal justice system. Her current offense represents her eighteenth (18th) arrest in her lengthy criminal history. Defendant has at least sixteen prior state court convictions from 1994 up to and including 2016, spanning numerous counties within four (4) different states. Fields' state court convictions are separate from her weapons sales federal conviction in the Eastern District of New York. She has used 13 aliases, 4 social security numbers, 5 dates of birth, and multiple addresses within various states. Twice, defendant was placed on probation, once for supervised release following incarceration due to her federal conviction, and another time for a crime in New York County. Fields was arrested on warrants following her violations of the aforementioned probations. Separately, she was twice rearrested on bench warrants. Defendant has previously pleaded guilty, has pleaded not guilty and gone to trial, has been sentenced to definite terms of incarceration, and has had split sentences where she was initially incarcerated and upon release put on probation and/or supervised release. In sum, Fields is not a novice to criminal court procedures.Based on the facts before the Court, defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea based on involuntariness and/or duress due to her inability to post bail is denied.
II. Collateral Consequences/Loss of CASAT license
Defendant further argues that as a certified substance abuse counselor under the New York State Chemical and Substance Abuse Treatment program, a misdemeanor conviction would prevent a renewal of her certification and she may not be able to return to work in her "chosen field" (Def's aff at 3).The People argue and the plea record confirms that when the defendant took the plea, it was conveyed to defendant multiple times that she would lose her license by pleading to an "A" Misdemeanor.
A court is under no obligation to inform the defendant of the collateral consequences of a plea, i.e., those which are "peculiar to the individual and generally result from the actions taken by agencies the court does not control" People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265 (1995). See also People v. Coppola, 18 Misc. 3d 1106(A), 856 N.Y.S.2d 25 (2007). In People v. Monk, 21 N.Y.3d 27, 966 N.Y.S.2d 739, 989 N.E.2d 1 (2013), the Court stated, "We have repeatedly held that a trial court ‘must advise a defendant of the direct consequences of [a] plea,’ but ‘has no obligation to explain to a defendant who plead guilty the possibility that collateral consequences may attach to their criminal convictions" ( People v. Catu , 4 N.Y.3d 242, 244, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 825 N.E.2d 1081 [2005], citing People v. Ford , 86 N.Y.2d 397, 403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265 [1995] ); see also People v. Gravino , 14 N.Y.3d 546, 553–554, 902 N.Y.S.2d 851, 928 N.E.2d 1048 [2010] ). The Court in Ford , held that the direct consequences of a plea were defined as those which have a "definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on defendant's punishment" ( People v. Ford, at 403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265 ) with the standard refined as "a term of imprisonment or probation, a term of post-release supervision, [and] a fine" ( People v. Harnett , 16 N.Y.3d 200, 203, 920 N.Y.S.2d 246, 945 N.E.2d 439 [2011] ).
Defendant is a licensed CASAT counselor in New York State and obtained her license through an alternative to incarceration program. According to the defendant, she had also been placed on court mandated substance abuse treatment in 2003, and maintained a period of sobriety from 2003 until she relapsed in 2016. Defendant indicated that she left her job due to a dispute in 2015, and has been unemployed since then. Defendant's claim that her plea "is a choice she regrets" (Def's aff at 3) does not constitute grounds to withdraw her plea. More aptly phrased, this aspect of defendant's claim is simply a case of "buyer's remorse."
This Court finds that defendant had thoroughly discussed the collateral consequence of losing her CASAT certification with defense counsel and affirmed to the Court that she was aware of those consequences, prior to taking the plea. As such defendant's motion on this ground is denied.
III. Defendant's Innocence Claim
A claim of "actual innocence," irrespective of whether the claim is supported by DNA evidence, may be raised pursuant to CPL § 440.10 (1) (h) (see People v. Hamilton , 115 A.D.3d 12, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97 [2d Dept. 2014] ). " ‘Actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency of evidence of guilt, and must be based upon reliable evidence which was not presented at the trial" ( Hamilton at 23, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97 ; see also People v. Griffin , 120 A.D.3d 1257, 991 N.Y.S.2d 896 [2d Dept. 2014] ). Many of the same principles involved in a CPL 440 motion are present when moving to withdraw a plea.
The defendant proclaims her innocence and asks the court to allow her to withdraw her plea and restore her to the status she enjoyed before the plea was entered. However, the People argue that the defendant unequivocally admitted her guilt at the plea allocution that was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.
A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea based on a subsequent unsupported claim of innocence where the guilty plea was voluntarily made with advice of counsel ( People v. Dixon , 29 N.Y.2d 55, 57, 323 N.Y.S.2d 825, 272 N.E.2d 329 [1971] ). In Dixon , the Court based its decision on the fact that the defendant not only accepted the plea, he admitted his participation, and his admission of guilt was not accompanied by any protestations of innocence. Additionally, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea requires an affidavit by defendant setting forth factual matters supporting his claims of innocence People v. Brundage , 83 A.D.2d 579, 441 N.Y.S.2d 120 [2d Dept. 1981] ). Here, defendant's affidavit provides no facts in support of the allegation that defendant is innocent. A mere conclusory statement such as a proclamation of innocence is woefully insufficient to warrant a hearing or for this Court to further explore defendant's claim of actual innocence.
Defendant admitted her guilt during the plea, and also admitted to the Probation Officer that she and her cohorts stole items on the day in question including 2 boxes of Nexium from Shoprite. Defendant also told the police that she had been using cocaine and had been drinking the day of the offense and admitted to Probation that she had relapsed. Similar to the defendant in Dixon , the defendant admitted her guilt regarding the charges brought against her. Accordingly, since defendant fails to provide any new facts to support her innocence, the defendant's motion on this ground is summarily denied.
Conclusion
For all the aforementioned reasons, the Motion to Vacate the plea is denied in all respects.