Opinion
2005-794 SCR.
Decided July 18, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (Toni A. Bean, J.), rendered May 11, 2005. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of harassment in the second degree.
Judgment of conviction affirmed.
PRESENT: RUDOLPH, P.J., ANGIOLILLO and LIPPMAN, JJ.
Contrary to defendant's contentions, the trial court's limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination of the People's witnesses did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. It is well established that the scope and extent of cross-examination lies within the sound discretion of the court ( People v. Sorge, 301 NY 198; People v. Gerace, 172 AD2d 688, lv denied 78 NY2d 1076). In the case at bar, there was no significant curtailment of cross-examination. Defense counsel had previously been permitted to impeach the credibility of complainant by eliciting the inconsistent testimony ( see People v. Crosby, 176 AD2d 266, lv denied 79 NY2d 826). Similarly, the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it refused to allow defendant's witness to testify regarding an alleged threatening statement she heard complainant make to defendant on the day before the incident. Said statement had previously been elicited through the testimony of defendant ( see People v. Crosby, 176 AD2d 266, supra).
It is well settled that the People are required to turn over to defense counsel statements of any prosecutorial witness that relate to the subject matter of said witness' testimony. Here, defense counsel called for production of the notes of an unnamed police officer taken during a conversation with complainant at the scene of the incident. However, complainant, under cross-examination, simply testified that the officer wrote the report up as a criminal trespass. Defense counsel further called for the production of a sworn statement made by complainant at the precinct sometime between the 17th of March and the 20th of April.
The People, however, indicated that they had previously provided defense counsel with all Rosario ( People v. Rosario, 9 NY2d 286) material. In view of the foregoing and since the accusatory instrument was sworn to by complainant before a police officer during the time period referred to by defense counsel, it appears that the sworn statement in issue was in fact the accusatory instrument. Thus, under the circumstances, it cannot be said that defense counsel articulated a factual basis for his claim that the People improperly denied the existence of statements of the complainant which related to the subject matter of his testimony ( see People v. Rodriguez, 270 AD2d 505, lv denied 95 NY2d 802; see also People v. Poole, 48 NY2d 144). Moreover, even if the statement did exist, there was no showing of a reasonable possibility that the nondisclosure materially contributed to the result of the trial ( see CPL 240.75; see also People v. Sorbello, 285 AD2d 88, lv denied 97 NY2d 658). In addition, the testimony of the witnesses presented by the People was sufficient to establish each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
Rudolph, P.J., Angiolillo and Lippman, JJ., concur.