Opinion
July 2, 1970
Judgment rendered May 9, 1969, herein appealed from, reversed on the law and in the interests of justice, the judgment vacated and a new trial directed. In our view the cross-examination of defendant with respect to other crimes of which defendant was neither charged nor convicted, exceeded the bounds of propriety and was highly prejudicial. The rule is well settled that a defendant who elects to testify may be cross-examined concerning any immoral, vicious or criminal act bearing on his credibility ( People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73), and the prosecutor is not precluded from further interrogation by a negative reply, provided the questions have some basis in fact and are asked in good faith ( People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198). When the question of good faith with respect to certain questions was raised initially, scant consideration was given to the issue. Subsequently, after summation by both sides, at the request of defendant, the prosecutor set forth at some length what he asserted was the good faith basis for the questions. It is not clear whether certain of the details were fully within the knowledge of the prosecutor at the time of the interrogation but, even so, that would not here be determinative. The conclusion is well-nigh inescapable that the phrasing of the questions with respect to the other crimes had as their basic purpose the raising of an inference that defendant was of a criminal disposition and likely to have committed the crime for which he stood charged. This is not permissible ( People v. Goldstein, 295 N.Y. 61; see People v. McKinney, 24 N.Y.2d 180). By the content of the questions directed to defendant the prosecutor, in effect, elected to give unsworn testimony with respect to the alleged facts and circumstances surrounding such crimes. Such questions and the evidence contained therein was hardly directly probative of the crime charged and was clearly prejudicial. In view of this determination for a new trial we do not reach the other questions raised by defendant.
Concur — Stevens, P.J., Eager and Nunez, JJ.; McGivern and McNally, JJ., dissent in the following memorandum by McNally, J.: I would affirm the judgment of conviction. Cross-examination of the defendant was well within the bounds set out in People v. Alamo ( 23 N.Y.2d 630). The Assistant District Attorney presented to the trial court fully and fairly the basis for his cross-examination of the defendant relative to the Marcus and Ferrusa incidents. The trial court found and the record fully substantiates the cross-examination was conducted upon a good-faith factual basis. I am aware that the Court of Appeals will not review a criminal case where the Appellate Division reverses and in the interest of justice directs a new trial. ( People v. Campbell, 25 N.Y.2d 784; People v. Rossi, 11 N.Y.2d 787, 788; People v. Mendola, 2 N.Y.2d 270, 274; People v. Redmond, 225 N.Y. 206, 208; Cohen and Karger, Powers of the Court of Appeals [rev. ed.], p. 754.) I have grave doubts as to the reversal here in the interest of justice. It would seem to me the reversal in the instant case is one on law. I find no basis in the record for a reversal in the interest of justice and the majority in my opinion based the reversal solely on the alleged improper cross-examination.