Opinion
11-10-2016
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Tiffany J. ERNST, Defendant-appellant.
David P. Elkovitch, Auburn, for Defendant–Appellant. Jon E. Budelmann, District Attorney, Auburn (Brian T. Leeds Of Counsel), for Respondent.
David P. Elkovitch, Auburn, for Defendant–Appellant.
Jon E. Budelmann, District Attorney, Auburn (Brian T. Leeds Of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND CURRAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:On appeal from a judgment convicting her upon her plea of guilty of burglary in the third degree (Penal Law § 140.20 ) and petit larceny (§ 155.25), defendant contends that County Court abused its discretion in summarily denying her motion to withdraw her plea at sentencing and “should have inquired further” into her grounds for the motion. Defendant sought to withdraw her plea on the basis that it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. Specifically, defendant contends that she was “confused” at the time of the plea and that the court was aware of her unspecified “mental health issues.” We reject defendant's contentions. When first presented with the motion, “the court afforded defendant the requisite ‘reasonable opportunity to present [her] contentions' ” and explain the basis of the motion (People v. Lindsay, 134 A.D.3d 1452, 1452, 21 N.Y.S.3d 656, lv. denied 27 N.Y.3d 967, 36 N.Y.S.3d 628, 56 N.E.3d 908, quoting People v. Tinsley, 35 N.Y.2d 926, 927, 365 N.Y.S.2d 161, 324 N.E.2d 544 ; see People v. Manor, 121 A.D.3d 1581, 1582, 993 N.Y.S.2d 424, affd. 27 N.Y.3d 1012, 35 N.Y.S.3d 272, 54 N.E.3d 1143 ). We conclude that, on this record, nothing more was required before the court decided the motion.
It is well settled that “[p]ermission to withdraw a guilty plea rests solely within the court's discretion ..., and refusal to permit withdrawal does not constitute an abuse of that discretion unless there is some evidence of innocence, fraud, or mistake in inducing the plea” (People v.
Watkins, 107 A.D.3d 1416, 1416, 966 N.Y.S.2d 637, lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 959, 977 N.Y.S.2d 190, 999 N.E.2d 555 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPL 220.60[3] ; People v. Anderson, 63 A.D.3d 1617, 1618, 879 N.Y.S.2d 784, lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 858, 891 N.Y.S.2d 692, 920 N.E.2d 97 ). Here, defendant's conclusory claims concerning her mental health issues are “ ‘unsupported by any medical proof, ... [and do] not raise a sufficient question of fact regarding the voluntariness of [her] plea so as to require an evidentiary hearing’ ” (People v. Russell, 79 A.D.3d 1530, 1531, 913 N.Y.S.2d 427 ; see People v. McNair [Appeal No. 1], 186 A.D.2d 1089, 1089, 590 N.Y.S.2d 789, lv. denied 80 N.Y.2d 1028, 592 N.Y.S.2d 678, 607 N.E.2d 825 ). Even if one were to credit defendant's self-reports that she suffered from some mental health issues in the past, we note that it is well settled that “[a] history of prior mental illness or treatment does not itself call into question [a] defendant's competence” (People v. Taylor, 13 A.D.3d 1168, 1169, 787 N.Y.S.2d 539, lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 836, 796 N.Y.S.2d 591, 829 N.E.2d 684 ; see People v. Young, 66 A.D.3d 1445, 1446, 885 N.Y.S.2d 860, lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 912, 895 N.Y.S.2d 326, 922 N.E.2d 915 ). As for defendant's state of mind at the time of the plea, there is nothing in the record to support defendant's assertion that her alleged mental health issues undermined her“ ‘ability to understand the terms and consequences of [her] guilty plea’ ” (People v. Tracy, 125 A.D.3d 1517, 1518, 3 N.Y.S.3d 256, lv. denied 27 N.Y.3d 1008, 38 N.Y.S.3d 117, 59 N.E.3d 1229 ), or otherwise “so stripped [her] of orientation or cognition that [s]he lacked the capacity to plead guilty” (People v. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d 482, 486, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 769 N.E.2d 802 ; see People v. Wolf, 88 A.D.3d 1266, 1267, 930 N.Y.S.2d 382, lv. denied 18 N.Y.3d 863, 938 N.Y.S.2d 871, 962 N.E.2d 296 ; Young, 66 A.D.3d at 1446, 885 N.Y.S.2d 860 ). We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse or improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea.Although defendant further contends that her plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered because “it [was] obvious that [she] was totally confused” at the time of the plea, that contention lacks merit. During the plea colloquy, defendant stated that she was “confused” during a discussion whether she would be eligible for a diversion program. After a lengthy discussion with the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel concerning her ineligibility for that diversion program, defendant proceeded with the colloquy with no further indication of any confusion (see People v. Ellett, 245 A.D.2d 952, 953, 667 N.Y.S.2d 137, lv. denied 91 N.Y.2d 925, 670 N.Y.S.2d 407, 693 N.E.2d 754 ). We thus conclude that the court “fulfilled its duty to inquire further” (People v. Swarts, 64 A.D.3d 801, 802, 882 N.Y.S.2d 736 ; see People v. Leonard, 25 A.D.3d 925, 925–926, 808 N.Y.S.2d 810, lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 850, 816 N.Y.S.2d 756, 849 N.E.2d 979 ), and the subsequent “ ‘protestations [of defendant] as to [her] ... [continued] confusion ... ring hollow’ in light of [her] admissions during the plea colloquy” (People v. McNally, 59 A.D.3d 959, 960, 872 N.Y.S.2d 324, lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 819, 881 N.Y.S.2d 26, 908 N.E.2d 934, quoting Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 486, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 769 N.E.2d 802 ; see People v. Hayes, 39 A.D.3d 1173, 1175, 834 N.Y.S.2d 784, lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 923, 844 N.Y.S.2d 178, 875 N.E.2d 897 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.