Opinion
No. 2014-1047 S CR
05-23-2022
David A. Day, for appellant. Suffolk County Traffic Prosecutor's Office (Justin W. Smiloff of counsel), for respondent.
Unpublished Opinion
David A. Day, for appellant.
Suffolk County Traffic Prosecutor's Office (Justin W. Smiloff of counsel), for respondent.
PRESENT: TIMOTHY S. DRISCOLL, J.P., HELEN VOUTSINAS, BARRY E. WARHIT, JJ
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (Paul Senzer, J.H.O.), rendered April 17, 2014. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, convicted defendant of failing to stop at a stop sign, and imposed sentence. The appeal from the judgment of conviction brings up for review an order of that court (Allen S. Mathers, J.H.O.) dated March 27, 2014 denying defendant's motion to dismiss the simplified traffic information. By decision and order dated June 6, 2019, this court reversed the judgment of conviction, vacated the order dated March 27, 2014 denying defendant's motion to dismiss the simplified traffic information, and granted defendant's motion (People v Epakchi, 63 Misc.3d 161[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50913[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019]). On April 1, 2021, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and order of this court and remitted the matter to this court for further proceedings (People v Epakchi, 37 N.Y.3d 39 [2021]).
ORDERED that, upon remittitur from the Court of Appeals, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Defendant was charged in a simplified traffic information with failing to stop at a stop sign (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1172 [a]), and the District Court later granted defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the simplified traffic information on the ground that the People had failed to respond to defendant's request for the complaining officer's supporting deposition (see CPL 100.25, 100.40 [2]). Thereafter, the prosecution filed a new simplified traffic information charging defendant with the same traffic violation based upon the same incident and factual allegations. By written motion, defendant again moved to dismiss the simplified traffic information, which the District Court (Allen S. Mathers, J.H.O.) denied in an order dated March 27, 2014.
A nonjury trial was held, in which the ticketing police officer testified that he observed defendant's vehicle drive through an intersection at a speed of 35-40 miles per hour after failing to stop at a stop sign. Defendant testified that she brought her vehicle to a full stop for two seconds before continuing straight across the intersection. The District Court (Paul Senzer, J.H.O.) convicted defendant of the charged offense and sentenced her to pay a fine.
In a decision and order dated June 6, 2019, this court reversed the judgment of conviction and granted defendant's motion to dismiss the simplified traffic information (People v Epakchi, 63 Misc.3d 161[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50913[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019]). The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the Appellate Term's dismissal of the accusatory instrument lacked any legal basis. The Court of Appeals remitted the matter to this court for consideration of the remaining appellate point that has not been addressed, namely, whether the trial evidence was legally sufficient to support defendant's conviction (People v Epakchi, 37 N.Y.3d 39, 48 [2021]).
Evidence adduced at trial is legally sufficient to support a guilty verdict if it is "competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (CPL 70.10). In other words, trial evidence is legally sufficient if, when it and all reasonable inferences thereof are viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Gordon, 23 N.Y.3d 643, 649 [2014]; People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621 [1983]), "any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the fact finder" (People v Dubarry, 25 N.Y.3d 161, 178 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to support defendant's conviction of failing to stop at a stop sign. The officer observed defendant's vehicle traveling through an intersection at a speed of 35-40 miles per hour after failing to stop at a stop sign.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
DRISCOLL, J.P., VOUTSINAS and WARHIT, JJ., concur.