Opinion
2017–03883 Ind.No. 2841/15
09-18-2019
The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Emmanuel ELMORE, Appellant.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Jenin Younes of counsel), for appellant. John M. Ryan, Acting District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Roni C. Piplani, and Michelle M. Yong of counsel), for respondent.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Jenin Younes of counsel), for appellant.
John M. Ryan, Acting District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Roni C. Piplani, and Michelle M. Yong of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., JOSEPH J. MALTESE, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, at trial, the Supreme Court did not improperly curtail the scope of cross-examination of the lead detective. "The trial court has broad discretion in limiting cross-examination when questions are repetitive, irrelevant, only marginally relevant, or concern collateral issues" ( People v. Ahsan , 169 A.D.3d 815, 816, 92 N.Y.S.3d 662 ). "If the cross-examiner seeks to explore more than mere general credibility, as, for example, to establish bias or interest, the subject of the inquiry is not collateral" ( People v. Chin , 67 N.Y.2d 22, 28, 499 N.Y.S.2d 638, 490 N.E.2d 505 ). Here, defense counsel's arguments before the court demonstrate that her proposed line of questioning "was designed to attack [the detective's] general credibility, rather than an attempt to establish a specific motive to fabricate" ( People v. Williamson , 77 A.D.3d 1183, 1184, 909 N.Y.S.2d 817 ; see People v. Roberson , 276 A.D.2d 446, 446, 716 N.Y.S.2d 43 ; People v. Esposito , 225 A.D.2d 928, 931, 640 N.Y.S.2d 274 ) or "to establish the untruthfulness of his testimony with respect to the specific events of the crime charged" ( People v. Batista , 113 A.D.2d 890, 892, 493 N.Y.S.2d 608 ; see People v. Allen , 67 A.D.2d 558, 416 N.Y.S.2d 49, affd 50 N.Y.2d 898, 430 N.Y.S.2d 588, 408 N.E.2d 917 ). Under the circumstances of this case, the court providently exercised its discretion in precluding the proposed line of questioning.
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the Supreme Court should have admitted certain fingerprint evidence. The People's witness was qualified to render an expert opinion in the field of latent print examination and identification, as he demonstrated that he possessed the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge, or experience to render a reliable opinion in that field (see People v. Mazariego , 117 A.D.3d 1082, 986 N.Y.S.2d 235 ; People v. Washington , 108 A.D.3d 576, 968 N.Y.S.2d 184 ; People v. Menendez , 50 A.D.3d 1061, 856 N.Y.S.2d 647 ). "Any weakness in the fingerprint expert's testimony went to credibility and weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility" ( People v. Jackson , 125 A.D.3d 1002, 1004, 2 N.Y.S.3d 625 ; see People v. Fraser , 162 A.D.3d 480, 481, 78 N.Y.S.3d 92 ; People v. Garcia , 299 A.D.2d 493, 493, 749 N.Y.S.2d 882 ; People v. Wesley , 183 A.D.2d 75, 78, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197, affd 83 N.Y.2d 417, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97, 633 N.E.2d 451 ). The People also laid the proper foundation for the admission of the fingerprint evidence (see People v. Jackson , 25 A.D.3d 1012, 808 N.Y.S.2d 822 ).
The sentence imposed on the conviction of burglary in the second degree was not excessive (see People v. Suitte , 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
MASTRO, J.P., MALTESE, CONNOLLY and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.