Opinion
3202.
Decided March 23, 2004.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Brenda Soloff, J. on speedy trial motion; John Stackhouse, J. at jury trial and sentence), rendered May 18, 2001, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 4 to 8 years, unanimously affirmed.
Eli R. Koppel, for Respondent.
Jan Hoth, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Tom, J.P., Andrias, Ellerin, Gonzalez, JJ.
The court properly granted the People's reverse- Batson application ( Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79; People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, cert denied 498 U.S. 824). The record supports the court's finding of pretext. Such a finding, based primarily on the court's assessment of counsel's credibility, is entitled to great deference ( see People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, affd 500 U.S. 352, 356-357).
The court properly submitted to the jury the lesser offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, since there was a reasonable view of the evidence that defendant committed the lesser but not the greater crime ( see People v. Scarborough, 49 N.Y.2d 364). Under the circumstances of the case, the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant only possessed the portion of the drugs that an officer observed in defendant's physical possession.
The court properly denied defendant's speedy trial motion. The record supports the court's finding that the period during which defendant was incarcerated in Pennsylvania is excludable because the People exercised due diligence in securing his presence (CPL 30.30[e]). The People sufficiently established that the Pennsylvania authorities would not permit defendant to be extradited until at least January 2000, and that further efforts to extradite defendant would have been futile ( see People v. Gonzalez, 235 A.D.2d 366, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1093). We note that while the People made no showing of their efforts to secure defendant's presence from January 2000 to March 23, 2000, when he signed the waiver of extradition, that 82-day period is not dispositive.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.