Opinion
E052080
08-18-2011
In re E.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. E.G., Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond M. DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia, Quisteen S. Shum, and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publicationor ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super.Ct.No. INJ017095)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Charles Everett Stafford, Jr., Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Raymond M. DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia, Quisteen S. Shum, and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true that defendant and appellant E.G. (Minor) had committed an assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, a knife, by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and that Minor had personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). Minor was thereafter continued a ward of the court and placed in a suitable group home. On appeal, Minor contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because the juvenile court misunderstood the law of self-defense; (2) the juvenile court erred in excluding evidence that the victim was required to attend anger management classes as a condition of his probation; and (3) the court's minute order should be corrected to accurately reflect the restitution fines imposed. We agree with the parties that the court's minute order should be amended. We reject Minor's remaining contentions.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 18, 2010, while 19-year-old Matthew Borders had a party at his parents' home in Palm Desert, Minor became involved in an altercation with someone at the party. The victim, Leroy Rosas, asked Minor what was going on and told Minor, "'We don't need any problems.'" Minor became angry at Rosas and shoved him. The two then began throwing punches and wrestling on the ground. After about a minute, the fight got broken up.
After Rosas and his friends told Minor to leave the party, Minor and his friends left the party and went toward Minor's home. After about 15 minutes, Minor returned to the party carrying a baseball bat. While standing in the front yard and holding the bat like he was ready to swing it, Minor called for Rosas to come out and fight. When Rosas walked out to the front yard, Minor told Rosas, "'Let's fight.'" Rosas told Minor "to just 'go home, like, it's over.'"
Meanwhile, Daniel Hill, a friend of Borders, took the bat away from Minor and threw it into a neighbor's yard. Apparently, Borders and Hill then said, "Okay. Fight one on one," and allowed Minor and Rosas to engage in a mutual combat. Rosas and Minor began to throw punches at each other and wrestle on the ground. As they wrestled, Rosas picked up Minor and threw him on the concrete face up. At one point, Rosas had Minor in a headlock while trying to punch him. One of Minor's friends tried to kick Rosas in the head, but someone pushed Minor's friend away and said, "One on one." While Rosas and Minor were both on their knees with their heads towards each other, Minor began punching Rosas in the side several times. Rosas gasped for air, grabbed on to Borders, and told Borders that Minor stabbed him. Minor then ran down the street.
Rosas sustained three stab wounds, one of which punctured his lung, and spent several days recovering in the hospital. Rosas stated that he had no training in martial arts, boxing, wrestling, or fighting.
Minor testified that Rosas instigated the first confrontation when Rosas repeatedly asked him if he was "'trying to get hard.'" When he asked Rosas numerous times what that meant, Rosas did not answer but instead punched him several times. Rosas continued attacking him and beating him up. Minor then stood up and walked out the front door to where his two friends were standing. He told his friends that Rosas was "trying to beat" him up and that they should leave the party. They were about to leave when people started coming out of the house, including Rosas and Borders; as Minor turned his head, Rosas began punching him. People then started shouting, "Fight, fight. Go one on one. Fight." Minor began punching back until Rosas slammed him head first into the concrete several times. While on the ground, Rosas punched and choked him. Minor claimed that he used his pocketknife to stab Rosas in the waist three times because he thought he would have brain damage or die if he did not stop Rosas. Minor then left and went to a friend's house where he threw the knife away because he was "really scared" and "almost in shock . . . ." Minor believed his life was in danger when he used the knife.
Minor denied having a baseball bat or calling Rosas to come out of the house to fight. He further claimed that after the fight he needed to wear a neck brace and had a big bump on the top of his head, jaw problems, facial scars, and headaches.
One of Minor's friends testified that as she was standing in the front yard, Rosas and other people rushed out of the house and followed Minor while chanting, "'Fight. Fight.'" She did not see Minor with a baseball bat but did see someone else with one. She saw Rosas throw Minor to the ground numerous times, and Minor's face hit the concrete driveway. She tried to pull Rosas away from Minor, but Rosas pushed her back. She was yelling at everyone to stop the fight and noticed that Minor was getting beat up severely. She did not know how the fight ended because she was distracted by people yelling at her.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Minor contends there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon because he was legally justified in stabbing Rosas as an act of self-defense. He further argues that even if a rational trier of fact could find him guilty, the juvenile court's misunderstanding of the law on self-defense deprived him of his right to a fair trial and to present a defense. We disagree.
"In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses sufficient evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — supporting the decision, and not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury [or trier of fact] reasonably could deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.]" (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638-639.) "'The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088.)
"'To justify an act of self-defense for [an assault charge under section 245], the defendant [here Minor] must have an honest [i.e., actual] and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064.) The threat of bodily injury must be imminent, and any right of self-defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable under the circumstances. (Id. at p. 1065.) "'"[T]he peril must appear to the defendant as immediate and present and not prospective or even in the near future. An imminent peril is one that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt with."'" (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 783.) "[T]he right of self-defense does not extend beyond the time of real or apparent danger . . . . " (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 966.) "[O]nly that force which is necessary to repel an attack may be used in self-defense; force which exceeds the necessity is not justified. [Citation.]" (People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 380, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 92.) Similarly, the use of excessive force destroys the justification of self-defense. (People v. Hardin (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 625, 629-630.) When the defendant uses force which is excessive to the threatened harm, the third element of self-defense is wanting and the use of force is not excused. (Ibid.)
The test of reasonableness is objective; it is determined from the point of view of a reasonable person in the defendant's position. (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082-1083.) "[A] jury must consider what 'would appear to be necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation and with similar knowledge . . . .'" (Ibid.) "'[A] defendant is entitled to have a jury [or trier of fact] take into consideration all the elements in the case which might be expected to operate on [the defendant's] mind . . . .' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) Accordingly, evidence that the victim had threatened the defendant is admissible to support a claim of self-defense. (People v. Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1065.)
Where the defendant has produced evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he acted in self-defense, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. (People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963; People v. Lee (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1429.) "The accused has no burden of proof or persuasion, even as to his defenses." (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1214-1215, italics omitted.)
Additionally, a person who wrongfully attacks another or who voluntarily engages in a fight, and is met by a counterattack, has no privilege to stand his ground and defend. (People v. Hecker (1895) 109 Cal. 451, 462.) However, there are situations in which an original aggressor may claim self-defense. The rule was set forth over 100 years ago in Hecker, at pages 463-464. It has been summarized as follows: "If the original aggressor or participant in an unlawful fight does attempt to withdraw, and so informs the opponent, and is nevertheless pursued and attacked, he or she may have the usual right of self-defense to this new attack. But both conditions -- withdrawal and notification -- must appear: 'In order for an assailant to justify the killing of his adversary he must not only endeavor to really and in good faith withdraw from the combat, but he must make known his intentions to his adversary.'" (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d. ed. 2000) Defenses § 75, p. 409, citing People v. Button (1895) 106 C. 628, 632 and Hecker, at pp. 463, 465.) Thus, if Minor was either an original aggressor or a mutual combatant, under the rule stated in Hecker, he could only claim self-defense if he withdrew and notified Rosas of his intent to withdraw.
However, Hecker also sets forth an exception to the requirement of withdrawal and notification for an aggressor to claim self-defense. "Where the original aggressor is not guilty of a deadly attack, but of a simple assault or trespass, the victim has no right to use deadly or other excessive force [citation]. If [t]he victim uses such force, the aggressor's right of self-defense arises . . . ." (1 Witkin & Epstein, supra, § 75, p. 410.) "Thus, the risk of effective communication of withdrawal is only on the original aggressor whose attack is deadly or otherwise felonious." (Ibid.) "Ordinarily, the original aggressor must first attempt to withdraw. 'If, however, the counter assault be so sudden and perilous that no opportunity be given to decline or to make known to his adversary his willingness to decline the strife, if he cannot retreat with safety, then as the greater wrong of the deadly assault is upon his opponent, he would be justified in slaying, forthwith, in self-defense.'" (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court discussed this exception in People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 871-872, which was overruled on other grounds in People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 363-366. The defendant in Crandell argued it was error to give CALJIC No. 5.54 describing an aggressor's duty to withdraw before engaging in self-defense because the instruction was inapplicable under the evidence presented in that case. He also contended the instruction was erroneous because it failed to distinguish between deadly and nondeadly force. (Crandell, at p. 871.) The court agreed.
The court explained, "An aggressor who uses deadly force must 'not only endeavor to really and in good faith withdraw from the combat, but he must make known his intentions to his adversary.' [Citation.] An aggressor using nondeadly force, on the other hand, who meets with deadly force in response, is not required to communicate an intent to withdraw and is required to retreat only if circumstances permit. [Citations.] [¶] The challenged instruction describes the steps which must be taken before 'a person who was originally an assailant' may employ force in self-defense. The original assailant must 'really and in good faith endeavor to decline further combat and fairly and clearly inform his adversary of his desire for peace and that he has abandoned the contest.' The instruction is correct if the original aggressor employs deadly force but erroneous as applied to a situation where deadly force is employed in response to a simple assault." (People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 871-872.)
The Court of Appeal addressed a similar issue in People v. Quach (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 300-303 in the context of CALJIC No. 5.56, which instructs jurors regarding the availability of self-defense to participants in mutual combat. The Quach court observed that the instructions given in that case did not contain any mention of the rule that "'[w]here the original aggressor is not guilty of a deadly attack, but of a simple assault or trespass, the victim has no right to use deadly or other excessive force. . . . If the victim uses such force, the aggressor's right of self-defense arises[] . . .' [citation], or its corollary, 'If, however, the counter assault be so sudden and perilous that no opportunity be given to decline or to make known to his adversary his willingness to decline the strife, if he cannot retreat with safety, then as the greater wrong of the deadly assault is upon his opponent, he would be justified in slaying, forthwith, in self-defense.' [Citation.]" (Quach, at pp. 301-302.)
The Quach court concluded that CALJIC No. 5.56 did not instruct the jury regarding the exception to the withdrawal and notification rule and that by giving that instruction, the trial court failed to give the jury a correct statement of the law. (People v. Quach, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 302-303.) The court observed that some trial courts addressed this omission in CALJIC No. 5.56 by modifying the standard instruction and adding language that discussed the exception to the rule requiring withdrawal and notification. (Quach, at pp. 302-303, citing People v. Sawyer (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 75, fn. 2 [approving instruction that withdrawal and notification requirements apply "'unless the attack is so sudden and perilous that [the aggressor] cannot withdraw'"]and People v. Gleghorn (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 196, 201 [approving similar instruction].) Those instructions provided, "'Where a person seeks or induces a quarrel which leads to the necessity in his own defense of using force against his adversary, the right to stand his ground and thus defend himself is not immediately available to him, but, instead he must first decline to carry on the affray, must honestly endeavor to escape from it, and must fairly and clearly inform his adversary of his desire for peace and of his abandonment of the contest unless the attack is so sudden and perilous that he cannot withdraw. . . .'" (Quach, at p. 302, italics omitted.)
"Issues arising out of self-defense, including whether the circumstances would cause a reasonable person to perceive the necessity of defense, whether the defendant actually acted out of defense of himself, and whether the force used was excessive, are normally questions of fact for the trier of fact to resolve." (People v. Clark, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 378.) "[W]here the evidence is uncontroverted and establishes all of the elements for a finding of self-defense," it may be found as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 379.) However, where the evidence tends to show a situation in which the use of force may not be justified, or where the evidence is uncontroverted but reasonable persons could differ on whether the resort to force was justified or whether the force resorted to was excessive, the self-defense issue is a question of fact for the trier of fact. (Ibid.)
With the above principles in mind, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we find that Minor was not legally justified in stabbing Rosas as an act of self-defense. As the juvenile court noted, instead of leaving the party immediately after the initial confrontation with Rosas and staying away, Minor returned to the party to engage Rosas in a second fight. While holding a baseball bat with both hands as if ready to swing, Minor yelled for Rosas to come outside and fight. Even after the bat was removed from Minor's hands and despite Rosas's telling Minor to go home, Minor stayed to fight Rosas. Minor began to punch Rosas; however, Rosas ducked and grabbed Minor's legs. The two of them fell to the ground as they continued to fight. They wrestled on the ground and punched each other. During the fight, Rosas also picked up Minor and threw him on to the ground. At one point, Rosas had Minor in a headlock as he tried to punch Minor. Minor then reached into his pocket, pulled out a knife, and stabbed Rosas in the waist three times. The fact that Rosas might have gained the upper hand in the fight did not justify Minor using a deadly weapon to counterattack. At no time did Rosas counter Minor's initial assault with the use of deadly force or a deadly weapon. Rosas fought only with his hands. Substantial evidence points to the fact that this was a case in which Minor was the initial aggressor who began the fight and then escalated it by pulling out a knife and stabbing Rosas. The court was not required to accept Minor's version of events, nor are we.
We also reject Minor's claim that the juvenile court misunderstood the law of self-defense. There is no evidence in the record to support this contention. Absent proof to the contrary, we presume the trial court knew "and applied the correct statutory and case law in the exercise of its official duties. [Citations.]" (People v. Mack (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1032.)] There is simply nothing in the record from which we could conclude the juvenile court misunderstood or misapplied the law of self-defense. Further, even if the juvenile court misunderstood the law of self-defense, there are no grounds for a reversal. Ample evidence supports the conclusion that Minor was not legally justified in stabbing Rosas as an act of self-defense.
Additionally, even if Minor were not the aggressor in the fight, and even considering his asserted physical condition, substantial evidence supports the court's rejection of his self-defense claim. "To justify an act of self defense . . . , the defendant must have an honest and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him." (People v. Goins (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 511, 516.) Further, "any right of self-defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable under the circumstances." (People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 966.) CALJIC No. 5.31 provides that "[a]n assault with the fists does not justify the person being assaulted in using a deadly weapon in self-defense unless that person believes and a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would believe that the assault is likely to inflict great bodily injury upon [him][her]." Although the test of reasonableness is an objective one, "[it] is determined from the point of view of a reasonable person in [Minor's] position. The [trier of fact] must consider all the facts and circumstances it might '"expect[ ] to operate on [Minor's] mind . . . ." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1065.)
Here, substantial evidence exists from which the court could conclude that it was unreasonable for Minor to react to the fight by stabbing Rosas repeatedly with his knife. First, Minor's actions related to the second altercation were inconsistent with someone who, because of physical frailty, was afraid he was going to be seriously injured or killed if he did not use his knife to protect himself. He reacted aggressively after Rosas told Minor they did not need any problems. Following the initial confrontation, Minor left the party and returned about 15 minutes later with a baseball bat in his hand and called out to Rosas to come outside and fight. Minor did not attempt to seek help or defuse the situation as it escalated. He did not show his knife or warn Rosas before using it on him.
Moreover, as previously discussed, there is substantial evidence that Minor was the initial aggressor. Finally, his actions following the attack are inconsistent with his defense that he only used the knife to protect himself from an unprovoked attack that made him fearful for his life. He fled the scene, went to a friend's house, and threw away the knife. The juvenile court did not err in rejecting Minor's claim that, because of his asserted physical frailty and Rosas having obtained the upper hand, it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that he needed to use his knife to defend himself from imminent and serious bodily injury or death.
Accordingly, based on our review of the record here, we find that the juvenile court's true finding is supported by substantial evidence.
B. Exclusion of Evidence
Minor also complains that the juvenile court prejudicially erred and violated his right to a fair trial and to present his defense by excluding evidence of Rosas's propensity toward violence. We disagree.
1. Additional factual background
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Rosas twice whether he had received "anger-management training." Rosas replied in the negative both times. Later, defense counsel repeatedly asked Rosas if he had had or was supposed to have had anger management training. The prosecutor objected each time as "asked and answered" and based on "relevance." The juvenile court sustained the objections. After defense counsel again sought to ask the same question, the court asked to see both counsel. Defense counsel explained, "I'm trying to impeach the witness who claims that he hasn't had any anger-management training. I was going to have him read, to refresh his memory, the terms of probation. He is on probation in a criminal case, and one of the requirements is that he must take anger management." In response to the court's question, defense counsel acknowledged that he had not provided any of the documents to the prosecutor. The prosecutor objected on grounds of improper impeachment and late discovery.
The court sustained the objection, finding it to be "improper impeachment on a collateral issue that's unrelated to this case . . . ." The court explained, "You are not allowed to go through with it because it's collateral impeachment. There's been no offer of proof to show that anything related to probation or the circumstances of that incident are involved in this case. [¶] The problem that you have, [defense counsel], in this case is there was a fight, initially, in the backyard. Your client left, was gone for at least 15 to 20 minutes, then he came back with a baseball bat and called the other guy out. He precipitated what transpired in the second incident. If he had just left and gone home, we would not be here, but he came back 15 to 20 minutes later with a baseball bat and called this guy out. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . So what you're trying to do is impeach an individual on a collateral matter that is not relevant to the factual circumstances of this case, at all. . . . You are not allowed to ask any further questions on whether or not he has gone to anger management . . . . It's not relevant to the case."
Defense counsel responded that he was attempting to impeach Rosas because Rosas had lied. The court asserted, "It's improper impeachment because it's improper impeachment on a collateral issue. Whether he lied or he didn't lie makes no difference on a collateral issue. He did not lie on a material fact related to the factual circumstances of the case. You're trying to impeach him on a collateral issue that's not relevant. The Court will not allow that. The objection is sustained. You are not allowed to go into it any further." Minor argues the court's ruling was prejudicially erroneous.
2. Analysis
A trial court's exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 will not be overturned on appeal absent the showing of an abuse of that discretion. (People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 895; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 817.) "As a general proposition, the ordinary rules of evidence do not infringe on a defendant's right to present a defense." (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 945, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) "'While cross-examination to test the credibility of a prosecution witness is to be given wide latitude, its control is within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's exclusion of collateral matter offered for impeachment purposes has been consistently upheld.'" (People v. Redmond (1981) 29 Cal.3d 904, 913; see also People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1266, fn. 15 [disallowing impeachment of prosecution witness on collateral matter did not restrict defendant's right to confrontation and cross-examination]; People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 625 [trial court did not abuse discretion by excluding impeachment on collateral matter].)
A trial court has discretion to exclude impeachment evidence if it is collateral, irrelevant, cumulative, confusing, or misleading. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 412.) Evidence "having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact" is relevant. (Evid. Code, § 210; see also People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 337.) "A collateral matter has been defined as 'one that has no relevancy to prove or disprove any issue in the action.' [Citation.]" (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9.) However, "[a] matter collateral to an issue in the action may nevertheless be relevant to the credibility of a witness who presents evidence on an issue . . . ." (Ibid.)
Even if the juvenile court erroneously excluded the impeachment evidence to attack Rosas's credibility, Minor suffered no prejudice. The purported error would only require reversal of the judgment if it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 9-10.) In this context, a miscarriage of justice occurs when this court is able to say, absent the erroneously exclusion of the evidence, that it is reasonably probable the trier of fact would have reached a result more favorable to Minor. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Minor has the burden of demonstrating that there would have been a significantly different impression of the witness's credibility had the proposed impeachment been permitted. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 207.) Minor cannot demonstrate such a showing. Defense counsel vigorously cross-examined Rosas regarding the circumstances surrounding the charged offense. Inquiry into the matter of whether or not Rosas was required to take anger management classes as a condition of his probation was not reasonably likely to have produced a significantly different impression of Rosas's credibility. (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 780-781, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.) Additionally, as noted, ante, there was overwhelming evidence to show that Minor was not legally justified in stabbing Rosas with a knife three times. Whether or not Rosas lied about having attended anger management classes as a condition of his probation would not have changed the outcome of this case.
With respect to Minor's constitutional claim, the issue has been waived, as it was not raised in the lower court. (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1035.) Even if it had been raised, this contention is without merit. Minor's constitutional right to present a defense was not violated by the exclusion of evidence of marginal probative value. (See People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 545; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 945.) "[N]ot every restriction on a defendant's desired method of cross-examination is a constitutional violation." (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 372.)
Even if we were to find constitutional error, it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Improperly denying a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness on matters reflecting on the witness's credibility is subject to the harmless error standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705]. "'[U]nless the defendant can show that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced "a significantly different impression of [the witnesses'] credibility" [citation], the trial court's exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment.' [Citation.]" (People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 372.)
The prejudicial effect of improperly restricting cross-examination is calculated by weighing a multitude of factors, including the cumulative nature of the lost information, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, the degree of evidence corroborating the witness, and the overall strength of the prosecution case. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 684 [106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674].) On this record, precluding cross-examination regarding Rosas's anger management classes would not require reversal.
C. Correction of Minute Order
Finally, Minor argues, and the People correctly concede, that the court's minute order should be corrected to remove a reference to Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (b). The court's minute order states: "Pay a total fine of $200.00, which includes a fine/fee and penalty assessment pursuant to 11357(b) HS, payable to the Courts as directed by the Enhanced Collections Division[.]" We agree with the parties that reference to Health and Safety Code section 11357 is in error. Health and Safety Code section 11357 applies in situations where a defendant is found guilty of marijuana possession. Subdivision (b) of that section reads, "Except as authorized by law, every person who possesses not more than 28.5 grams of marijuana, other than concentrated cannabis, is guilty of an infraction punishable by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100)." Here, Minor was neither charged with nor found guilty of marijuana possession.
At the time of the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court stated, "Pay a total fine of -- we'll change this one to 200; Number 10 will change to 200, which includes fines and fees payable to the Court Financial Collection Division. That's restitution on this matter -- state restitution fines." Accordingly, the court's October 14, 2010, minute order should be corrected to remove reference to Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (b); the imposition of the $200 restitution fine, however, remains intact.
III
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's minute order dated October 14, 2010, is modified to remove reference to Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (b). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI
J.
We concur: HOLLENHORST
Acting P.J.
CODRINGTON
J.