Opinion
05-14-2024
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jason EDWARDS, Defendant–Appellant.
Caprice R. Jenerson, Office of The Appellate Defender, New York (Sean Nuttall of counsel), for Appellant. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Alex King of counsel), for respondent.
Caprice R. Jenerson, Office of The Appellate Defender, New York (Sean Nuttall of counsel), for Appellant.
Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Alex King of counsel), for respondent.
Singh, J.P., Moulton, Mendez, Rosado, Michael, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael J. Obus, J.), rendered March 7, 2016, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of attempted assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), and sentencing him to an aggregate term of five years, unanimously affirmed.
Defendant’s claim that the People’s Brady violation deprived him of his right to a fair trial is unpreserved because defendant received the only remedy he requested, admission of the belatedly disclosed police report at trial, which he ultimately elected not to pursue (see People v. Carusso, 94 A.D.3d 529, 531, 943 N.Y.S.2d 15 [1st Dept. 2012]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we reject it on the merits. Defendant was not prejudiced by the late disclosure where defense counsel, who was aware of the information in the report, was able to effectively cross-examine the People’s witness through use of other evidence consistent with the exculpatory material (see People v. Ward, 128 A.D.3d 485, 485, 8 N.Y.S.3d 333 [1st Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1012, 20 N.Y.S.3d 552, 42 N.E.3d 222 [2015]). Defendant’s contention that the report could have led to additional favorable evidence had it been timely disclosed is speculative. Thus, there was no "reasonable possibility that the result of the trial would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed" (People v. McGhee, 36 N.Y.3d 1063, 1065, 142 N.Y.S.3d 863, 166 N.E.3d 1041 [2021]).
The court properly denied youthful offender treatment. Since defendant was convicted of an armed felony, he was not eligible for youthful offender treatment in the absence of mitigating circumstances that "bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed" (CPL 720.10[3][i]). The record does not establish such mitigating circumstances, where defendant fired multiple shots at a person on a busy street. In any event, regardless of defendant’s eligibility, youthful offender treatment was not warranted.
Defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to his weapon possession convictions is unpreserved (see People v. Cabrera, 41 N.Y.3d 35, 207 N.Y.S.3d 18, 230 N.E.3d 1082 [2023]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find that on the present record, defendant has not established that he has standing to challenge Penal Law §§ 265.03(1)(b) or (3), or that the statutes are unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022) (see People v. Johnson, 225 A.D.3d 453, 206 N.Y.S.3d 584 [1st Dept. 2024]).