Opinion
C087898
12-03-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTOINE LEE EDMOND, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. STKCRFE20180010164 )
Defendant Antoine Lee Edmond appeals the trial court's order committing him to the Department of State Hospitals for inpatient competency restoration treatment. (Pen. Code, § 1370.) He contends the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting expert testimony concerning case-specific hearsay in violation of the rule articulated in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). Accordingly, defendant requests reversal of the commitment order and remand for a new placement hearing.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We find any error in the admission of case-specific hearsay in violation of Sanchez was harmless and will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
The People's August 15, 2018 complaint charged defendant with two counts of felony arson of property. (§ 451, subd. (d); counts 1-2.) Defendant had been found incompetent to stand trial in other suspended proceedings, and the parties submitted the issue of his competency in this proceeding based upon the previous determination. The court took judicial notice of three other court files, suspended proceedings, and found him incompetent "based on the doctors' reports." Given that the new case involved felony charges, the court requested a new placement report. The report was prepared, and the matter set for a placement hearing.
These reports do not appear in the record on appeal.
At the placement hearing, Jessica Wieland, community program director for San Joaquin County, offered the following testimony without a hearsay objection. Wieland was familiar with defendant through her review of agency records, her contacts with him at Behavioral Health Services, and her personal court meeting with him on one occasion. In formulating her placement recommendations, Wieland considers the competency evaluation, speaks with the case manager/treatment team, reviews treatment notes, speaks with correctional health, reviews likelihood of reoffense assessments, and considers the nature of the current charges and prior history of the individual.
Defendant was subject to outpatient competency training for a December 2017 arson charge, which began in February 2018. This competency training occurred weekly, but defendant only attended seven times in approximately eight months. During this same period, defendant reoffended with additional arson charges. Arson reoffense is relevant to community safety.
Wieland personally spoke with defendant at the courthouse within three months of her testimony and in response to defendant's attorney's request. She found defendant irritable, frustrated, and without an understanding as to why he had to be at court given his belief that he had not done anything wrong. He was not medication compliant.
Consistent with her placement report, Wieland recommended that defendant "receive treatment in the Department State Hospitals or other facility deemed appropriate." She opined he was a danger to the community and himself.
The placement report stated in pertinent part: "Due to the dangerous nature of the repeated arson allegations, his current mental health symptoms, Mr. Edmond presents as a danger to himself and to the community if treated in the outpatient setting. Therefore, Mr. Edmond will require inpatient treatment and competency training at this time. [¶] Recommendation: It is respectfully recommended Mr. Antoine Edmond be remanded for Inpatient treatment with the California Department of State Hospitals for care, treatment and restoration to competence at any facility deemed appropriate by the State Department of Hospitals." While the initial competency report by Dr. Chellsen is not in the record on appeal, the placement report reflects a review of that report and defendant's diagnosis of "Schizophrenia paranoid type, in partial unstable remission."
Wieland also testified to case-specific details concerning conversations with various professionals familiar with defendant, which were objected to by defendant on hearsay grounds under Sanchez, but overruled by the court because it was a civil, not criminal, case, and the expert could rely on the opinions of defendant's caretakers. For example, Wieland described her conversation with defendant's case manager, who told her that defendant was neither medication nor treatment compliant, was becoming increasingly resistant and not responding to team efforts to engage him, that he had been dismissed from board and care facilities because of his anger and irritability issues, and had "jumped out of a moving car when transporting him." While this information solidified her opinion that inpatient care was needed, she had formed that opinion prior to speaking with his case manager.
The trial court also took judicial notice of four of defendant's court case files, which reflected defendant's referral to mental health in January with outpatient competency training continuing through August until a bench warrant was issued for nonappearance. The People rested, and defendant elected not to present any independent evidence at the hearing.
At least three of these files are not in the record on appeal.
Thereafter, the People argued an inpatient commitment was required because of the failed attempts at outpatient competency training and defendant's increasing danger to the community based upon his new law violations (including two arsons). Defendant countered he was not charged with the type of arson that mandated inpatient treatment and that other less restrictive alternatives that could address his substance abuse should be tried first.
Prior to making its ruling, the court reviewed Dr. Chellsen's competency report, which the court stated contained information relayed to Chellsen by defendant concerning his diagnosis of Schizophrenia, paranoid type including that defendant had been communicating with aliens and had an outstanding warrant for petty theft in Walgreens where "they made the candy appear on me. And they burned my feet with a computer screen." Defendant also reported that he had been incarcerated approximately 40 times and received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits.
Based upon Wieland's opinion and a review of the court files, the trial court determined that attempts at outpatient treatment had been unsuccessful as defendant did not attend his competency training. Defendant "does better in a custody setting or an in-patient setting where he's . . . able to take his medications. [¶] So at this point I am going to find by [a] preponderance of the evidence that [an] in-patient placement would be appropriate for [defendant]. And that request is granted." Defendant timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court's admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. (People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 22-23.) We evaluate the harmlessness of any such error by asking "whether it is reasonably probable the appellant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error." (Conservatorship of K.W. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1274, 1286.)
DISCUSSION
A defendant is presumed competent until proven incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f).) Here, defendant does not challenge his incompetency finding. Rather, he challenges the trial court's placement decision, arguing that the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting expert testimony concerning case-specific hearsay in violation of Sanchez. Such order committing defendant "to a state hospital is appealable as a final judgment in a special proceeding." (People v. Christiana (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1045, citing People v. Fields (1965) 62 Cal.2d 538, 542, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Lameed (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 381, 396.)
Prior to any placement determination, section 1370, subd. (a)(2)(A) requires an evaluation by "the community program director or a designee to evaluate the defendant and . . . a written recommendation as to whether the defendant should be required to undergo outpatient treatment, or be committed to the State Department of State Hospitals or to any other treatment facility." Here, Wieland issued such a report and offered expert testimony at a placement hearing as described ante. After reviewing the initial competency evaluation of Dr. Chellsen and considering Wieland's opinion and the judicially noticed court files, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that inpatient treatment was needed and ordered defendant's commitment.
"Expert testimony may be premised on material that is not admitted into evidence so long as it is material of a type that is reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming their opinions. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).) 'So long as this threshold requirement of reliability is satisfied, even matter that is ordinarily inadmissible can form the proper basis for an expert's opinion testimony.' (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 618, disapproved in other respects in Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686, fn. 13.)" (Conservatorship of K.W., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1281.)
As the Supreme Court explained in Sanchez: "Any expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion, and may tell the jury in general terms that he did so. Because the jury must independently evaluate the probative value of an expert's testimony, Evidence Code section 802 properly allows an expert to relate generally the kind and source of the 'matter' upon which his opinion rests. . . . [However], [t]here is a distinction to be made between allowing an expert to describe the type or source of the matter relied upon as opposed to presenting, as fact, case-specific hearsay that does not otherwise fall under a statutory exception. [¶] What an expert cannot do is relate as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception." (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 685-686.)
Sanchez's clarification of the permissible bounds of hearsay-related expert testimony under Evidence Code sections 801 and 802 applies to civil proceedings. (See Conservatorship of K.W., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1282 [conservatorship proceedings]; People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 33-34 [applying Sanchez to expert testimony in civil nuisance suit].)
Thus, the trial court was correct in reasoning that Wieland was permitted to rely upon information from others (here, the case manager, competency trainer, and correctional staff) in formulating her opinion. Further, Wieland's general testimony concerning her review process prior to formulating her opinion was also permissible. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 685-686.) However, the court abused its discretion when it allowed Wieland to testify to case-specific hearsay statements made by other individuals concerning defendant without either finding them covered by a hearsay exception and/or the People offering independent evidence of them. This runs afoul of Sanchez's prohibition. (Id. at p. 686.)
Defendant argues this error was prejudicial because, as evidentiary error, it was "reasonably probable" that he would have received a more favorable result. He posits this is so because Wieland was the only witness at the proceeding and her opinion "was based upon improperly admitted case-specific hearsay evidence of which she had no independent knowledge." This argument ignores that Wieland could appropriately rely on that hearsay and generally describe the kind and sources of that material to the court. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 685-686.)
Further, we find an abundance of other evidence supporting the court's determination. Notably, defendant attended only seven weekly competency training sessions in approximately eight months of outpatient treatment and allegedly committed two new arson offenses during this time period, which made him a danger to community safety. He was difficult to engage, angry, irritable, and not compliant with his medication. He suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, which was not then controlled. As a result, he presented a danger to himself and the community, thus requiring inpatient treatment. Defendant presented no evidence countering this showing. Under these circumstances, we do not find it reasonably probable that defendant would have obtained an outcome more favorable had the trial court properly excluded the testimony concerning case-specific hearsay. (Conservatorship of K.W., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286.)
To the extent there may be any doubt that there is no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome based upon the presentation of this evidence, we also highlight that because Dr. Chellsen's competency report and the other judicially noticed court records relied upon are not on the record on appeal, we presume that they contain information further supporting the trial court's commitment order, requiring rejection of defendant's claim. (See, e.g., Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 136 [trial court's exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal where appellant fails to provide a record sufficient to determine whether the result would have been different in the absence of the alleged error].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
RAYE, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
HULL, J. /s/_________
DUARTE, J.