Opinion
2d Juv. No. B230713 Super. Ct. No. J1241275
10-25-2011
In re Edgar. N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edgar. N., Defendant and Appellant.
Laini Millar Meinick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant. Kamala D. Harris., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and James Wiliam Bilderback II, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Santa Barbara County)
Edgar N. appeals from a judgment continuing him as a ward of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) The court found true allegations that appellant had committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5) and had threatened to commit a crime that would result in death or great bodily injury. (§ 422.) The court ordered that appellant be confined in juvenile hall for 120 days with no early release. It awarded him 117 days of predisposition credit.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Appellant contends that the adjudication for robbery must be reversed because the evidence is insufficient to show that the taking of the victim's property was accomplished by means of fear. In addition, appellant contends that he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial on the robbery charge. We affirm.
Facts
At the jurisdictional hearing, Hunter B. testified as follows: while sitting at his desk during a high school class, he was texting on his cell phone. Appellant, who was sitting two desks away, said to Hunter B., "Let me have your phone." Hunter B. refused, but appellant persisted in demanding the phone. After Hunter B. continued to refuse, appellant said, "Let me have your phone or I'm gonna stab you."
Appellant walked to an empty desk in front of Hunter B. and sat down. Hunter B. "got scared" and stood up. Appellant said "he was just kidding," so Hunter B. sat down again. Appellant "kept asking to see" the cell phone, but he did not threaten to stab Hunter B. Hunter B. finally relented and handed the cell phone to appellant.
Later during class, Hunter B. repeatedly asked appellant to return the cell phone, but appellant refused. When the class ended, Hunter B. again asked for the cell phone. Appellant replied, "Let's go for a walk." Appellant's reply made Hunter B. feel "scared." Hunter B. followed appellant while at the same time requesting the return of his cell phone, but he eventually "just left 'cause it probably wasn't a good idea that [he] went and followed [appellant]." When Hunter B. was following appellant, he was "scared."
On the same day that the incident occurred, Hunter B. prepared a written statement that he gave to the school principal. Hunter B. wrote that, after appellant had said he was just kidding when he threatened to stab Hunter B., Hunter B. became "convinced" that appellant was in fact kidding. Hunter B. further wrote: "[Appellant] asked to see my phone nicely. So I showed it to him and he wouldn't give it back." "[Appellant] then said after class that if I told anyone, I would die." At the jurisdictional hearing Hunter B. testified that the facts alleged in his written statement were true, and the statement was received in evidence.
At the time of the incident, appellant was 16 years old.
Standard of Review
On a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in adult criminal cases, we view the recordin " ' "the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence - that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value - from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]" ' [Citation.] . . . '[W]e presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence.' [Citation.]" (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 806.) All conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the judgment. (People v. Neely (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 787, 793.) "[I]t is not within our province to reweigh the evidence or redetermine issues of credibility. [Citation.]" (People v. Martinez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 400, 412.) The same standard of review applies to a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in juvenile cases. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.)
Substantial Evidence Supports the Fear Element of Robbery
Section 211 defines "robbery" as "the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." There is no evidence that appellant used force against Hunter B. Appellant contends that, based on Hunter B.'s written statement, the evidence is insufficient to show that the initial taking of the cell phone was accomplished by means of fear. Hunter B. wrote that he had handed over the cell phone after appellant "asked to see [the] phone nicely" and after appellant "convinced" him that the stabbing threat had been made in jest.
We need not decide whether the evidence is sufficient to show that the initial taking of the cell phone was accomplished by means of fear. Assuming, for purposes of discussion, that Hunter B. voluntarily gave his cell phone to appellant, the evidence is still sufficient to establish the fear element of robbery because a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant retained the cell phone by means of fear.
"The taking element of robbery itself has two necessary elements, gaining possession of the victim's property and asporting or carrying away the loot. [Citation.]" (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165.) " 'In order to support a robbery conviction, the taking, either the gaining possession or the carrying away, must be accomplished by force or fear. [Citation.]' " (People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 257.) Thus, "a robbery can be accomplished even if the property was peacefully or duplicitously acquired, if force or fear was used to carry it away." (Id., at p. 256.) In People v. Flynn (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 766, 772, the court held: "[T]he willful use of fear to retain property immediately after it has been taken from the owner constitutes robbery. So long as the perpetrator uses the victim's fear to accomplish the retention of the property, it makes no difference whether the fear is generated by the perpetrator's specific words or actions designed to frighten, or by the circumstances surrounding the taking itself."
Hunter B. testified that he was "scared" when, after class ended, he was following appellant in an attempt to retrieve his cell phone. Appellant contends that Hunter B.'s fear was unreasonable: "[T]here are no specific words or actions that [appellant] used to cause the fear that [H]unter testified he felt. [Appellant] said nothing, Hunter followed him voluntarily, before abandoning the effort to get his phone back because he felt scared." Appellant omits to mention that Hunter B. declared in his written statement that appellant had "said after class that if I told anyone, I would die." This threat, together with appellant's earlier threat to stab Hunter B. if he refused to hand over the cell phone, constitutes sufficient evidence of "the willful use of fear to retain property immediately after it has been taken from the owner." (People v. Flynn, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.)
Appellant Did Not Have the Right to a Jury Trial
Appellant maintains that the juvenile court erroneously denied his request for a jury trial. Appellant argues that he had a constitutional right to a jury trial on the robbery charge because "his record of violating Penal Code section 211 . . . will stigmatize him for life and could be used to enhance substantially an adult sentence." Appellant notes that a juvenile adjudication for robbery qualifies as a "strike" under California's "Three Strikes" law. (§§ 1170.12, subd. (b)(3); 667, subd. (d)(3).) Accordingly, appellant asserts, "if [he] is convicted of any one felony in an adult criminal proceeding, this adjudication in juvenile court will expose him to the doubling of his sentence . . . ."
Pursuant to People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007, appellant was not entitled to a jury trial merely because a juvenile adjudication for robbery would qualify as a strike in an adult criminal proceeding. In Nguyen our state Supreme Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had determined "that juvenile adjudications of criminality are constitutionally fair and reliable even though the Constitution does not require jury trials in juvenile proceedings." (Id., at p. 1024.) The Nguyen court agreed with the United States Supreme Court "that the absence of jury trials from juvenile proceedings does not significantly undermine the fairness or accuracy of juvenile factfinding." (Id., at p. 1025, fn. omitted.) The Nguyen court therefore held "that the absence of a constitutional or statutory right to jury trial under the juvenile law does not . . . preclude the use of a prior juvenile adjudication of criminal misconduct to enhance the maximum sentence for a subsequent adult felony offense by the same person." (Id., at p. 1028.)
Here, the juvenile court aptly remarked: "[I]f the fact that there was no jury trial does not impact the use of a juvenile adjudication as a prior strike, which is what the [Nguyen] case says, . . . how can the reverse be true?" In other words, if a juvenile adjudication constitutionally qualifies as a strike in adult criminal proceedings despite the absence of a jury trial, it follows that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial merely because a juvenile adjudication may later qualify as a strike. (See In re Myresheia W. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 734, 741 [court "decline[d] to add the requirement of jury trial in juvenile adjudications simply as a result of the fact that if a minor commits certain crimes as an adult, the juvenile adjudications, in limited situations, may result in additional punishment for the now adult offender"].)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P.J. We concur:
COFFEE, J.
PERREN, J.
Thomas R. Adams, Jr. , Judge Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
Laini Millar Meinick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and James Wiliam Bilderback II, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.