Opinion
B325977
04-05-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARLON EDDISON, Defendant and Appellant.
Sarah M. Javaheri, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Marc A. Kohm and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BA501594 Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Affirmed.
Sarah M. Javaheri, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Marc A. Kohm and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EDMON, P. J.
After his motion to suppress evidence was denied, Marlon Eddison pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm. He now appeals, contending that law enforcement conducted an illegal search of his car and therefore evidence of the firearm should have been suppressed. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. The hearing on Eddison's motion to suppress evidence
Eddison was charged with possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and a three-year enhancement (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)). The information further alleged that Eddison had a prior conviction for the same offense.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Eddison moved to suppress evidence, including the gun, under section 1538.5. A magistrate considered the motion at the preliminary hearing, at which Officer Brayden Moore Macias testified. Officer Macias testified that at about 1:55 a.m. on August 18, 2021, he saw a car exceeding the speed limit in the area of Martin Luther King Junior Boulevard and Vermont Avenue. The officer and his partner conducted a traffic stop, and the speeding car pulled over to a bus stop where the curb was red. Eddison was driving the car, and his father was a passenger in it. Eddison gave his driver's license to Officer Macias, who then discovered that Eddison's license had been suspended. Officer Macias and his partner also verified that Eddison's father did not have a license, although the officer could not recall at the preliminary hearing how they verified that.
Officer Macias asked the men to exit the car. At some point he asked if firearms were in the car, and Eddison, after pausing, said no. The officer decided to impound the car and began an inventory search, which he testified he conducted "based off of our standard procedure." Officer Macias did not tell Eddison the car would be impounded because his policy is not to mention impound to avoid people trying to flee or fight. Officer Macias decided to impound the car because Eddison had been driving with a suspended license, there had been motor vehicle burglaries in the area, and the car was in an emergency lane. During the search, Officer Macias found a loaded firearm in the trunk.
Officer Macias did not let Eddison call anyone to get the car. He did not ask Eddison's father whether he had a driver's license or could drive the car. Rather, it appeared to Officer Macias, who had been an emergency medical technician, that Eddison's father had some kind of mental illness, which prompted the officer to ask if he had Alzheimer's. After Eddison was arrested, the officer drove Eddison's father home.
Based on this testimony, defense counsel argued that the impound was improper because the officer could have asked Eddison's father to drive the car home, the officer could have cited Eddison and released him, and there was no discussion whether the car could have been parked in a different location. Defense counsel further argued that the impound was a pretext to search for criminal activity because the officer immediately asked Eddison if he had weapons in the car.
The prosecutor responded that the officer, upon discovering that Eddison's license was suspended, had a right to impound the car. As to the community caretaking function of impounding the car, the officer believed that Eddison's father should not drive due to some kind of mental illness, and the car could not be left at a bus stop at a red curb in an area where vehicles had been broken into.
The magistrate denied the motion and held Eddison to answer.
II. The renewed motion to suppress
Eddison renewed his motion to suppress evidence in the trial court. At the hearing, Eddison's counsel argued that the transcript of the bodycam video and the video itself had been admitted into evidence. Counsel pointed out that during cross-examination of Officer Macias at the preliminary hearing, defense counsel said she would "proceed by playing" bodycam video of the incident, and "I will move to publish it to the court with a transcript." She had then moved to submit "the video transcript into evidence." Defense counsel argued that the preliminary hearing transcript contained a typographical error, that it should have stated that counsel moved to submit the video and transcript into evidence. Stated otherwise, the transcript was missing the word "and" between "video transcript."
The trial court responded that section 1538.5 limited it to reviewing the preliminary hearing transcript or evidence defendant could not have reasonably presented. Per its reading of the preliminary hearing transcript, only the transcript of the video was admitted into evidence and not the video itself. The trial court therefore refused to watch the bodycam video. The trial court then denied the motion to suppress, saying that even if it had reviewed the bodycam video, it still did not "see that as supportive of a basis to overturn the ruling made at the preliminary hearing."
III. Eddison's plea
After the trial court denied his suppression motion, Eddison pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm and admitted the prior conviction for the same offense. The trial court sentenced him to one day in county jail, two years' formal probation, and community service.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
When a defendant challenges the legality of a warrantless search or seizure, the People must produce proof sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the search fell within an exception to the warrant requirement. (People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 939.) Where a magistrate rules on a suppression motion under section 1538.5, the magistrate sits as the fact finder with the power to judge credibility, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw inferences. (People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1244.) In reviewing a magistrate's ruling on a subsequent section 995 motion, the trial court acts as a reviewing court, drawing every legitimate inference in favor of the information, forbidden from substituting its judgment for the magistrate's on issues of credibility and weight of the evidence. (Shafrir, at p. 1244.) And when an appellate court reviews the trial court's ruling, we in effect disregard the trial court's ruling and directly review the magistrate's determination. (Ibid.) To determine whether the magistrate correctly denied the motion to suppress, we defer to the magistrate's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence, but exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at p. 1245.) We consider only arguments raised before the trial court, as we cannot reverse a trial court's decision for an error it did not commit concerning an issue not raised or argued before it. (People v. Hawkins (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 194, 203.)
II. Inventory search pursuant to impound exception to the Fourth Amendment
Eddison contends that law enforcement conducted an illegal search of his car and therefore evidence of the gun should have been suppressed. As we explain, we disagree.
In evaluating this issue, we note that even if the bodycam video was not admitted into evidence (an issue we do not decide), the magistrate watched the video.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. (See generally People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 829.) A warrantless search is presumed to be illegal. (People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761.) However, an exception to the warrant requirement is an inventory search conducted during impound of a vehicle. (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371 (Bertine)) This community caretaking function permits the impound of a vehicle where it poses a threat to safety or to the free flow of traffic, or where someone other than the defendant cannot move the car to a safe location. (Id. at p. 373; People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 791-792 (Torres)) When a car is impounded, law enforcement conducts an inventory search to protect an owner's property while it is in police custody "to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger." (Bertine, at p. 372.)
To prevent pretext searches (i.e., investigations without probable cause), inventory searches must be conducted "according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." (Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 375.) Mere statutory authorization to impound a vehicle is not determinative of a search's constitutionality. (People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 869.) Instead, the validity of an inventory search is based on the objective reasonableness of the impound decision and the impounding officer's subjective intent, namely, whether the search was motivated by an improper investigatory purpose. (Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 791.) We" 'focus on the purpose of the impound rather than the purpose of the inventory.'" (Lee, at p. 867.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the magistrate's finding that the inventory search of Eddison's car pursuant to impound was reasonable. The search occurred after Officer Macias discovered that Eddison's license was suspended. The officer thus testified that he based his decision to impound the car in part on Eddison's inability to drive legally. (See generally Veh. Code, § 14602.6 [authorizing impound of car where defendant arrested for driving with suspended license].) The officer further determined that Eddison's father could not drive the car because, based on the officer's experience as an emergency medical technician, he thought Eddison's father might have Alzheimer's. Moreover, the officers had already verified that Eddison's father did not have a driver's license. (See People v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 373 [where no person with valid license available to take control of car, officers may impound it].) Finally, the car was illegally parked at a bus stop, at a red curb, in an area where multiple vehicle thefts had occurred. (Compare People v. Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 758, 762-763 [impounding car legally parked at defendant's residence served no community caretaking function].) That Eddison's car was preventing the free flow of traffic further supported the reasonableness of the search. (See, e.g., Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 371.)
In challenging the reasonableness of the search, Eddison argues that Officer Macias could have let him call someone to get the car or just given him a citation and let him go. However, a law enforcement officer is not required to adopt the least intrusive measure in impounding a vehicle. (Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 374; People v. Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 761.) Eddison also asserts that the officers let him stop the car at a red curb, and they could have had him pull over at a different location to avoid impound. However, when the officers stopped Eddison for speeding, they had not yet decided to impound the car. That the car was at a red curb was not therefore immediately relevant when they initiated the stop. Nor do we agree that Officer Macias's failure to tell Eddison he was impounding the car shows that the search was pretextual. Rather, the officer gave a reasonable explanation for that omission, saying he does not tell arrestees about an impound to avoid possible resistance. The magistrate impliedly believed that testimony, and we may not reevaluate a credibility finding.
Next, citing People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119 (Williams), Eddison contends that the People failed to sustain its burden of proving the existence of the police department's inventory search policy and its specifics. Williams, however, concerns what a defendant must state in a motion to suppress evidence to preserve an issue for review. The court held that when bringing a motion under section 1538.5, a defendant "must specify the precise grounds for suppression of the evidence in question, and, where a warrantless search or seizure is the basis for the motion, this burden includes specifying the inadequacy of any justifications for the search or seizure." (Williams, at p. 130; see also id. at p. 135.) However, a defendant need not guess what justification the prosecution may offer and may wait for the prosecution to present one. The degree of appropriate specificity depends on the legal issue and the surrounding circumstances. (Ibid.) "Defendants need only be specific enough to give the prosecution and the court reasonable notice," but they cannot remain silent until appeal to raise issues the prosecution may have overlooked. (Id. at p. 131.) For example, a defendant who believes the police did not comply with a knock and notice requirement cannot simply bring a motion to suppress alleging a warrantless search but must raise the knock and notice requirement in the proceedings below and not for the first time on appeal. (Id. at p. 130.)
Applying this standard to the facts before it, Williams found that the defendant, who had sought to suppress evidence of narcotics found in closed containers in his car, had adequately preserved the issue of whether the police had a policy governing inventory searches of closed containers. The defendant's moving papers asserted that the police had no such policy governing inventory searches, thereby anticipating the prosecution's justification for the warrantless search. (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 124.) This was sufficient to put the prosecution on notice that it had to prove the existence of a policy governing searches of closed containers. (Id. at p. 137.)
Eddison gave no such similar notice to the prosecution here. Instead, Eddison's moving papers merely stated that the search and seizure were warrantless. Then, at the hearing before the magistrate, Officer Macias testified on direct examination that he "conducted the inventory based off of our standard procedure." Defense counsel did not then cross-examine the officer about that procedure or make any argument in closing about it. Eddison therefore cannot now complain that Officer Macias never filled out an inventory form. There is simply no evidence whether the standard procedure the officer referred to required such a form and, if it did, whether he filled one out.The defense failed to raise the issue below.
In his subsequent renewed written motion to suppress evidence filed in the trial court, Eddison asserted that no evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing that Officer Macias filled out an inventory form, and the bodycam video did not show he had.
We otherwise do not agree that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving that Officer Macias acted pursuant to department policy. Officer Macias testified that he conducted the search "based off of our standard procedure." True, he did not further elaborate. But he was not asked to. The cases Eddison cites, People v. Wallace (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 82 and Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th 775, do not establish that this testimony was insufficient to establish the existence of a policy, where, as here, the defendant raised no argument in the proceedings before the magistrate about departmental policies.
In People v. Wallace, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at page 86, an officer stopped the defendant for having" 'false tabs'" on his vehicle. Upon hearing over a police broadcast that the defendant had been stopped, a second officer, Officer Ambrose, went to the traffic stop because he knew that the defendant was wanted for a domestic violence incident. After arresting the defendant, Officer Ambrose found a baton in the car. Although Officer Ambrose testified at the suppression hearing about the police department's standard search policy, he did not testify he was complying with it when he searched the defendant's vehicle. (Id. at p. 92.) Instead, he admitted he was at the traffic stop for reasons having nothing to do with the car. (Ibid.) He also did not testify that he and his partner decided to have the defendant's vehicle towed or arrange for it to be towed, and he admitted he did not fill out an inventory form required per policy, thereby "suggesting that no policy-compliant inventory search was ever completed." (Ibid.) The court concluded there was insufficient evidence the officer conducted an inventory search according to standardized policies.
In Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at page 780, the officer pulled over the defendant for making an unsafe lane change and failing to signal. The defendant then confessed he did not have a valid driver's license. Although the car was parked in a public lot, the officer decided to impound the car, searched it, and found methamphetamine. At a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, the officer admitted that narcotics officers asked him to develop a reason to stop the defendant and that he used the inventory search to look for narcotics. (Id. at p. 781.) Further, there was no standardized policy about impounding vehicles of unlicensed drivers. Despite there being other evidence that the officer had a nonpretextual ground to impound the defendant's car, he failed to offer any community caretaking function served by impounding the car. (Id. at p. 790.) Accordingly, the evidence should have been suppressed.
This case is distinguishable from Wallace and Torres. In those cases, the searching officers admitted they searched the cars for reasons having nothing to do with impounding them for community caretaking functions. But here there was no evidence Officer Macias stopped Eddison for any reason other than for the traffic violation, and Eddison does not contend otherwise. Officer Macias also testified about the multiple community caretaking functions served by impounding Eddison's car, in contrast to at least the officer in Torres. While Eddison questions that testimony, pointing out that Officer Macias asked Eddison whether he had a gun very soon after the stop, we may not reweigh the evidence.
We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence supported the magistrate's findings and therefore, exercising our independent judgment, the search and seizure of evidence from Eddison's car was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Because we so conclude, Eddison's other issue on appeal, whether the trial court subsequently erred in refusing to consider the bodycam video at the hearing on the renewed suppression motion, is moot. We disagree that this is an issue capable of evading review and decline to reach it.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: EGERTON, J., ADAMS, J.