Opinion
11-02-2016
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Maurice J. ECHOLS, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Steven R. Bernhard of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Nancy Fitzpatrick Talcott, and Deborah E. Wassel of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Steven R. Bernhard of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Nancy Fitzpatrick Talcott, and Deborah E. Wassel of counsel), for respondent.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lasak, J.), rendered August 14, 2013, convicting him of murder in the first degree (two counts), murder in the second degree (three counts), attempted robbery in the first degree (two counts), attempted robbery in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the convictions of murder in the second degree, vacating the sentences imposed thereon, and dismissing those counts of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence regarding the corroboration of the accomplice testimony is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ; cf. People v. Parks, 67 A.D.3d 931, 932, 889 N.Y.S.2d 620 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that the accomplice's testimony was sufficiently corroborated (see CPL 60.22[1] ; People v. Reome, 15 N.Y.3d 188, 194, 906 N.Y.S.2d 788, 933 N.E.2d 186 ; People v. Sudhan, 83 A.D.3d 874, 874, 920 N.Y.S.2d 678 ), and was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ).
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d at 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ; People v. Pelosi, 128 A.D.3d 733, 734, 6 N.Y.S.3d 493 ).
As the People correctly concede, however, the convictions of murder in the second degree and the sentences imposed thereon must be vacated, and those counts of the indictment dismissed, because those charges are inclusory concurrent counts of the convictions of murder in the first degree (see People v. Jin Cheng Lin, 105 A.D.3d 761, 763, 963 N.Y.S.2d 131, affd. 26 N.Y.3d 701, 27 N.Y.S.3d 439, 47 N.E.3d 718 ; People v. Villafane, 48 A.D.3d 712, 713, 852 N.Y.S.2d 301 ).