Opinion
B320193
07-31-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES EASTLAND, Defendant and Appellant.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BA453067 Curtis B. Rappe, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EDMON, P. J.
James Eastland participated in an armed robbery of a marijuana dispensary during which his accomplice shot and killed Ovik Oganesyan. Eastland pleaded guilty to first degree murder and robbery. Thereafter, Eastland petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which limited accomplice liability for murder. After an evidentiary hearing under that section, the trial court denied Eastland's petition, finding that he was both a direct aider and abettor who had intent to kill and a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. As such, he was ineligible for relief. Eastland now appeals the trial court's order denying his petition. Because sufficient evidence supports that order, we affirm.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
BACKGROUND
I. Eastland's guilty plea
In 2017, Eastland was charged with Oganesyan's murder with a special circumstance allegation that it was committed in the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). He was also charged with two counts of second degree robbery. Eastland's accomplice, Kayshon Moody, was also charged with special circumstance murder and other crimes. Moody went to trial and a jury convicted him of, among other crimes, the special circumstance murder of Oganesyan with true findings on personal gun use allegations.
Judge Curtis Rappe also presided over Moody's trial.
Eastland did not go to trial and instead pleaded guilty to first degree murder and to one count of second degree robbery and admitted principal gun use allegations. In 2019, the trial court sentenced Eastland to 25 years to life for the murder and five years plus 10 years to life for the robbery.
Eastland also pleaded guilty to an unrelated second count of second degree robbery and admitted that he personally used a gun during it (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).
II. Eastland's section 1172.6 petition
In 2021, Eastland petitioned to vacate his murder conviction and for resentencing under section 1172.6, which was added to the Penal Code by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). As we later explain, Senate Bill 1437 limited accomplice liability for murder. The People opposed Eastland's petition on the ground he was a major participant in the crime who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The trial court appointed counsel for Eastland, issued an order to show cause, and held an evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, the defense stipulated to the admissibility of a recorded statement Eastland had given under oath at the time of his plea, the testimony at Moody's trial (including Eastland's testimony), and video surveillance of the crimes.
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor argued that Eastland's plea statement was more credible than his later testimony at Moody's trial, at which Eastland tried to distance himself from admissions he'd made in his plea statement.
A. Eastland's plea statement and video surveillance
In his plea statement given under oath, Eastland testified that he first met Moody about five months before Oganesyan's murder. Eastland was smoking at an apartment complex when Moody approached him and lifted his shirt to display a gun. At first, Moody told Eastland not to smoke there, but when Eastland said he was homeless, Moody agreed to let him hang out at the complex. The two men became friends and would often smoke marijuana together. They bought marijuana from dispensaries together 30 to 40 times.
In December 2016 or January 2017, Eastland and Moody first discussed robbing a dispensary. Moody said he knew of a dispensary that did not have a security guard and would be an "easy lick," meaning an easy robbery.
On January 17, 2017, Eastland spent the night at Moody's apartment. Sometime that night, unbeknownst to Eastland, Moody left and robbed a Chevron gas station and shot and killed its employee. Later, Eastland and Moody were watching the news when a report came on that a suspect was being sought in a gas station robbery. Moody asked Eastland what "sought" meant, and when Eastland said he didn't know, Moody looked it up on the computer. Eastland said he did not know that Moody was responsible for the Chevron gas station robbery and murder.
At trial, Eastland said he did not know that Moody robbed the Chevron gas station until after they robbed the Golden State dispensary.
The next day, January 18, 2017, Eastland and Moody robbed the Golden State Collective Marijuana Dispensary at about 11:30 a.m. The dispensary was on the second floor of a shopping complex with customers coming and going. That day, before going to the dispensary, the men went to Ralphs to buy bags. Eastland initially bought paper bags, but when Moody said they weren't what he wanted, Eastland bought plastic reusable bags. However, Eastland denied knowing why Moody wanted the bags.
Moody then drove them to the Golden State dispensary. Eastland said he had never been there before and denied knowing that Moody wanted to rob the dispensary until they got there. Moody had Eastland back the car into a space in the back parking lot so that they could go straight out when leaving. Moody took out a gun, said he would go to the second floor dispensary and get everything, and drop it down to Eastland. But Moody changed his mind and told Eastland to come with him. Eastland agreed, knowing at that point that he was participating in a robbery. They discussed getting merchandise but did not really discuss the details. Eastland did not know the gun was loaded, and Moody did not tell Eastland that he was going to hurt anyone.
While going into the dispensary, Moody limped and carried a cane. Eastland wore a hat Moody had given him and pulled his hoody over the hat. Moody also wore a hat, hoody, and gloves. Moody carried the Ralphs bags, one of which contained a water bottle filled with gasoline. Eastland explained that Moody had previously filled the bottle with gasoline to set his girlfriend's computer on fire because he was mad at her. However, Eastland denied knowing how the bottle ended up in the Ralphs bag.
Once inside the dispensary, Eastland sat while Moody showed his identification and medical papers to the victim, Oganesyan. After waiting for about two minutes in the outer waiting area, Oganesyan buzzed Moody through the security door. Eastland remained seated, waiting for Moody to buzz him in. As shown on the video surveillance, Moody followed Oganesyan through into the inner area and shot Oganesyan in the back. Eastland said that when he heard the gunshots, he panicked and ran to the security door to see what was going on, figuring that Moody" 'did shoot this person.'" Eastland then figured," 'Look. If I'm in here, we're here to take this.'" He and Moody struggled to open the security door, so Moody shot out a glass partition window, and Eastland climbed through. When Moody told Eastland to get the bags, Eastland climbed back through the window to get them and then reentered the inner area. He did not remember stepping over Oganesyan's body but said he stepped around him. Eastland knew that Oganesyan was still alive and heard him ask for help and screaming. Although Eastland knew Oganesyan was "really injured," he did not think Oganesyan would die. Eastland put jars of marijuana in the Ralphs bags. On leaving, Eastland kicked out the security door to escape.
After leaving the dispensary, the men threw away their sweaters and the cash drawer they had taken from the dispensary. Eastland said his adrenaline was "really high" and it "felt good, kind of, to be able to have that much energy inside my body." He felt like he had power. When asked how Eastland trusted that Moody would not kill him, Eastland said, "If he did, he did."
Eastland and Moody then picked up Moody's baby and took her to a babysitter. While waiting for the babysitter, Eastland put the stolen marijuana into plastic baggies. At some point, they went to a store and bought new clothes and hats.
Later that night, Moody drove Eastland to a liquor store in Glendale and told him to rob it. Moody said he couldn't do it himself because he was a regular there and would be recognized. Moody gave Eastland the gun, and Eastland put on his hat and hoody. Inside the store, he pointed the gun at the cashier and racked the slide. The cashier gave Eastland about $300, and Eastland took swishers to wrap marijuana.
After leaving the liquor store, Moody told Eastland they were going to Las Vegas to enjoy themselves. Once there, they drove to Moody's friends' apartment, where Moody bragged about robbing the dispensary and made a joke about Eastland kicking the security door to get out, saying that Eastland" 'Incredible Hulked the door.'" Moody and his friends put the marijuana into small baggies to sell. Thereafter, Eastland, Moody, and one of his friends went to a sporting goods store where Moody bought a gun magazine and ammunition.
That evening, Moody and Eastland decided to go to a casino. However, they first stopped at a gas station, and Moody robbed it. After spending time at a casino, the men were driving to a motel when Moody rearended a car. Moody drove away, but the car he rearended followed them, so Moody rolled down the window and shot at the car. In doing so, Moody shot out his own back window.
The men spent the night at a motel before returning to Los Angeles, where they were arrested.
B. The trial court's ruling
The trial court made numerous evidentiary and credibility findings. As to Eastland, the trial court found his statements to be "incredibly self-serving," and every time he "speaks he changes his statement to make himself look better."
Turning to the crime, the trial court found that based on the high number of dispensaries-30 to 40-Eastland and Moody had gone to in the months leading up to the Golden State dispensary robbery, they were casing dispensaries, looking for one to rob. Further, given their movements inside the Golden State dispensary, they appeared to know its layout, raising the inference that they were familiar with the dispensary.
While reviewing video surveillance of the robbery and murder, the trial court noted that the entire incident lasted about four minutes, with half of it consumed by Moody waiting to be buzzed in. Just 15 seconds elapsed from when Moody was buzzed in to when he shot Oganesyan. And once Moody was buzzed in, events happened fast, "like they planned it all out." The short duration of the crime showed that this was a "well-planned" and "precision" operation that "went like clockwork." This was not "a plan to where Moody was going to hold [the victim] at bay and Eastland was going to tie him up or" restrain him. "This was one where he was killed right away, within seconds, and then they went on to do their robbery, grabbing the marijuana and cash and so forth and leaving." They needed to act quickly because it was the busiest time of day.
Important to the trial court was that Eastland rushed toward the shots and not away from them, suggesting that the plan was to kill Oganesyan immediately, grab the marijuana and cash, and leave. By rushing toward the shots instead of away from them, Eastland knew that the shooter was Moody and not Oganesyan. The court reasoned that had it been the victim who shot, then Eastland would have run out of the dispensary, away from the danger. Instead, once shots were fired, he did not think," 'what do I do?' "
Next, the trial court found that Eastland knew Moody was dangerous. When they first met, Moody displayed a gun. Also, the night before the Golden State dispensary robbery, Eastland saw Moody look up a robbery on the Internet, so the trial court said it did not know "why he would be looking up a robbery if he didn't think he pulled it off, and so forth." Then, while at Golden State dispensary, Eastland assumed that Moody was shooting. Finally, Eastland made comments suggesting that he knew Moody was dangerous; for example, Eastland said he did not trust Moody, and he was not worried that Moody would shoot him because" 'if he did, he did.' "
The trial court also repeatedly noted that Eastland displayed indifference to Oganesyan, who was moaning and yelling for help the entire time. Eastland did not help Oganesyan and was oblivious to anything but getting the marijuana. In the trial court's words, Eastland was "really cold about this whole thing."
Further, the trial court observed that Eastland's conduct after the murder showed that he was a willing participant in everything that happened before. Eastland stayed with Moody, committed another robbery with Moody, bought ammunition with him, and went to Las Vegas with Moody where Moody robbed another gas station and shot at a car.
The trial court therefore found that Eastland was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
The trial court also found that Eastland was a direct aider and abettor who shared Moody's intent to kill. Because we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Eastland was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life, we do not address whether there was sufficient evidence he was also a direct aider and abettor.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill 1437 and standard of review
Senate Bill 1437 took effect on January 1, 2019. In short, Senate Bill 1437 and subsequent amendments limited accomplice liability for murder and attempted murder under the felonymurder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates those crimes. (See generally People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843.) As relevant here, Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a participant in the perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for felony murder only if the person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and abettor; or (3) the person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Gentile, at p. 842.)
Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1172.6, which created a procedure whereby persons convicted of murder or attempted murder under a now-invalid theory may petition for vacation of their convictions and resentencing. (See also People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 120 [§ 1172.6 applies to defendants who pleaded guilty to murder].) A defendant is eligible for relief under section 1172.6 if: the defendant (1) was charged with murder or attempted murder under a now invalid theory, (2) was convicted of murder or attempted murder, and (3) could no longer be convicted of those crimes due to changes to the law effectuated by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the trial court shall issue an order to show cause (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder" under the law as amended by Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)). The parties may offer new or additional evidence at the evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.) A "finding that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder" is insufficient to meet this required showing. (Ibid.) The trial court sits as an independent factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the defendant is guilty of murder under a valid theory of murder. (People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)
On appeal, we review the trial court's findings after an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 591.) Under that standard of review, we"' "examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence-that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt." '" (Clements, at p. 298.) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022.)
II. Sufficiency of the evidence Eastland was a major participant in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life
Eastland contends that the trial court erred by denying his section 1172.6 petition because there was insufficient evidence that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. We disagree.
A. What it means to be a major participant who acts with reckless indifference to human life
What it means to be a major participant in a crime who acts with reckless indifference to human life has its genesis in two United States Supreme Court cases: Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137. Enmund held that the death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed on an armed robbery getaway driver who was a minor participant in the crime, was not present when the murder was committed, and had no intent to kill. (Enmund, at pp. 798, 801.)
In contrast, Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at page 139, did not preclude imposing the death penalty for two defendants, brothers, who had helped their father and his cellmate-both convicted murderers-escape from prison. The defendants gave them guns, and the group later kidnapped a family of four. The defendants then stood by while their father debated whether to kill the family and proceeded to shoot the family, including a toddler and a teenager. (Id. at pp. 139-141.) The court held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposing the death penalty on a nonkiller who lacked the intent to kill, but whose "participation [in the crime] is major and whose mental state is one of reckless indifference to the value of human life." (Id. at p. 152; see also id. at pp. 157-158.)
Years later, in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), our Supreme Court addressed Enmund and Tison and substantially clarified the "major participant" and "reckless indifference to human life" requirements. Banks, at page 794, considered "under what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill may qualify as a major participant." The court listed various factors that should be considered in making that determination: "What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?" (Id. at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
The court then turned its attention to "reckless indifference to human life" in Clark. Reckless indifference to human life is" 'implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.'" (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 616.) It "encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions." (Id. at p. 617.) Recklessness has both a subjective and an objective component. (Ibid.) Subjectively, the defendant must consciously disregard risks known to him. Objectively, recklessness is determined by "what 'a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation,'" that is, whether defendant's conduct" 'involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor's situation would observe.'" (Ibid.)
Clark listed factors to consider when determining whether reckless indifference existed: "Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What was the defendant's knowledge of his or her confederate's propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the felony?" (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 [summarizing Clark factors].)
Here, Eastland argues that "irrespective" of whether he was a major participant in the robbery, there was insufficient evidence he acted with reckless indifference to human life. We therefore next focus on the reckless indifference to human life prong of the inquiry.
B. Reckless indifference to human life
The first factor relevant to whether Eastland acted with reckless indifference to human life is whether he knew weapons would be used during the felony. This factor weighs against Eastland because he admitted knowing that Moody was armed. While his mere knowledge that Moody was armed with a gun is insufficient by itself to establish reckless indifference to human life it nonetheless weighs in favor of it. (See, e.g., Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) Moreover, not only did Moody have a gun, the men had another weapon, a water bottle filled with gasoline. The trial court did not credit Eastland's testimony that he had no idea how that bottle got into the Ralphs bags he had bought. The presence of that bottle raised the reasonable inference that the men were prepared to set the dispensary on fire, which could have caused damage and injury beyond just the dispensary.
Next, Eastland was in the dispensary when Moody shot Oganesyan, but Eastland argues he nonetheless did not have an opportunity to restrain his accomplice. (Compare In re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 51, 53 [petitioner had time to observe and react before murder because he heard killer threaten to shoot clerk and count to five before doing so]; with In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679 [quickness of shooting suggested defendant lacked control over accomplices' actions]; People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 560 [same]; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 989 [defendant lacked meaningful opportunity to intervene when he and shooter were on opposite sides of victim's car, and attempted carjacking was quickly executed]; In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 452 [defendant present during robbery but not" 'close enough'" to restrain shooter].) Eastland thus points out that he was still in the dispensary's outer waiting area when Moody shot Oganesyan in the secured inner area. However, the trial court found that leaving Oganesyan unharmed was never part of the plan. Rather, the plan was to shoot him, take the marijuana and money, and leave. (Compare People v. Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 126 [no evidence defendant was part of preconceived plan to beat victim with fatal instrument].) The trial court thus noted that when shots were fired, Eastland ran toward the shooting rather than away from it. The shots thus signaled that Oganesyan was disabled and that Eastland could enter the inner area to grab the marijuana, which is exactly what he did. Also, the men did not bring anything like rope to restrain Oganesyan, which further showed that they planned to shoot him.
To the trial court, the crime's short duration further supported its finding that shooting Oganesyan was planned. Although our Supreme Court observed that generally a greater opportunity for violence exists when victims are held at gunpoint or restrained for prolonged periods (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620), the trial court here drew a different conclusion from the crime's short duration. This crime lasted about four minutes from the time the men entered the dispensary to when they left it. The first two minutes were spent waiting for Oganesyan to check Moody's identification. Once Oganesyan buzzed Moody inside, Moody shot an unsuspecting Oganesyan in the back. When Moody could not then open the security door to let in Eastland, Moody shot out the glass window partition so that Eastland could jump through it. The men then grabbed the marijuana and money and left. The quickness and precision with which the crime occurred and that Moody shot Oganesyan in the back shows that the plan was to immediately disable Oganesyan by using lethal force.
There is no evidence Eastland did anything to minimize the risk of violence. Rather, the dispensary was in a shopping complex with multiple businesses and with many people coming and going, especially given the time of day, 11:30 a.m. (See, e.g., People v. Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1024 [bank robbery posed high risk of violence because it occurred during business hours with 20 people present and robbers were armed].) Moreover, they chose a dispensary that shared walls with another business, and bullets in fact went through the dispensary wall and into the break room of the business next door. And while the choice of a dispensary with no security guard could under other circumstances evidence an attempt to minimize the risk of violence, the circumstances here do not support that finding. Instead, the evidence showed that the men chose a dispensary without a security guard to minimize the risk of violence to themselves and to ensure that they could incapacitate the dispensary's sole employee quickly.
There was also evidence that Eastland knew Moody was dangerous. When they first met, Moody displayed a gun to scare Eastland. Eastland admitted he did not trust Moody, and accepted the risk that Moody might shoot him. And the night before they robbed the Golden State dispensary, Moody killed a gas station employee during a robbery. While Eastland denied knowing that Moody had committed those crimes, the trial court inferred the contrary from the evidence. That is, Eastland was staying at Moody's apartment the night Moody committed those crimes, but Eastland denied knowing that Moody left the apartment to commit them. And when they saw a news report about the robbery, Moody expressed an interest in the report and then searched the Internet for information about it.
Eastland's failure to aid Oganesyan shows reckless indifference to human life. (See, e.g., Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619; In re Parrish (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 539, 544 [reckless indifference shown by failure to pause to aid or comfort victim]; People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1, 10 [petitioner "displayed no interest in moderating violence or in aiding his bloody and suffering victim," and instead picked his pocket].) However, Eastland suggests that he reasonably could have believed that others would help Oganesyan because the crime occurred in a busy commercial building. (See, e.g., In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 452 [because others were with victim, defendant could have reasonably assumed help would arrive quickly].) But that is not what Eastland said. Instead, Eastland could offer no explanation for why he didn't help Oganesyan, who Eastland admitted was screaming and asking for help. Eastland said he was focused on getting the marijuana, so instead of aiding Oganesyan, Eastland stepped over him. Moreover, Eastland admitted that he felt powerful after the crime. He said nothing about remorse.
Finally, Eastland was 21 years old when he committed the crimes. Although youth was not a factor Clark cited as relevant to whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life, courts have subsequently considered it to be so. (See, e.g., In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 454 [hallmarks of youth-" 'immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences' "-germane to mental state].) While young, Eastland was not a juvenile when he committed his crimes. He also introduced no evidence or argument that his youth impacted his decisions or ability to comprehend the risk of the crimes he committed or that he succumbed to peer pressure. (Compare People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 975, 991 [15-year-old defendant" 'influenced by peer pressure'" and" 'afraid'" of consequences if he didn't aid shooter] with People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 489 [no evidence 23-year-old defendant was "swept up in circumstances beyond his" control that led to unintended death].) Instead, the evidence was that he and Moody were good friends, they planned to rob a dispensary, he knew Moody would shoot Oganesyan, and he continued on a crime spree with Moody.
Reviewing the totality of this evidence, it was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that Eastland planned with his accomplice to shoot Oganesyan to facilitate the robbery, making Eastland a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
DISPOSITION
The order denying James Eastland's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
We concur: EGERTON, J. ADAMS, J.