Opinion
2013-12-27
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Hillery M. DUPLEASIS, Defendant–Appellant.
The Legal Aid Bureau Of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Robert L. Kemp of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (David Panepinto of Counsel), for Respondent.
The Legal Aid Bureau Of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Robert L. Kemp of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (David Panepinto of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, SCONIERS AND VALENTINO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[3] ). On a prior appeal, we reversed the judgment convicting defendant of, inter alia, the instant crime and granted a new trial based on our conclusion that “Supreme Court failed to comply with CPL 310.30 during jury deliberations” (People v. Dupleasis, 79 A.D.3d 1777, 1778, 913 N.Y.S.2d 636). Defendant was retried on only one count of murder in the second degree, and now contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he was the individual who shot the victim or that the homicide took place during a robbery or a burglary. As defendant correctly concedes, he failed to preserve that contention for our review ( see People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919), and we conclude in any event that it lacks merit. The testimony of defendant's accomplice is legally sufficient to establish both facts ( see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672), and that testimony was not incredible as a matter of law ( see People v. Shedrick, 104 A.D.2d 263, 274, 482 N.Y.S.2d 939, affd. 66 N.Y.2d 1015, 499 N.Y.S.2d 388, 489 N.E.2d 1290, rearg. denied67 N.Y.2d 758, 500 N.Y.S.2d 1028, 490 N.E.2d 1234; see also People v. Santiago, 96 A.D.3d 1495, 1496, 946 N.Y.S.2d 383, mod. on other grounds22 N.Y.3d 900, 977 N.Y.S.2d 144, 999 N.E.2d 507). Moreover, the accomplice's testimony was sufficiently corroborated ( see generally People v. Reome, 15 N.Y.3d 188, 191–192, 906 N.Y.S.2d 788, 933 N.E.2d 186). “Although there is no direct evidence of defendant's intent to commit the robbery [or burglary], it is well settled that ‘[i]ntent may be inferred from conduct as well as the surrounding circumstances' ” (People v. DeNormand, 1 A.D.3d 1047, 1048, 767 N.Y.S.2d 380, lv. denied1 N.Y.3d 626, 777 N.Y.S.2d 25, 808 N.E.2d 1284, quoting People v. Steinberg, 79 N.Y.2d 673, 682, 584 N.Y.S.2d 770, 595 N.E.2d 845; see People v. Kyler, 280 A.D.2d 346, 347–348, 720 N.Y.S.2d 480, lv. denied96 N.Y.2d 802, 726 N.Y.S.2d 380, 750 N.E.2d 82). Inasmuch as the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction, we reject defendant's contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's failure to move for a trial order of dismissal on more specific grounds. “It is well settled that [a] defendant is not denied effective assistance of trial counsel [where defense] counsel does not make a motion or argument that has little or no chance of success” (People v. Wilson, 104 A.D.3d 1231, 1232, 960 N.Y.S.2d 817, lv. denied21 N.Y.3d 1011, 971 N.Y.S.2d 263, 993 N.E.2d 1287, reconsideration denied21 N.Y.3d 1078, 974 N.Y.S.2d 327, 997 N.E.2d 152 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Webb, 60 A.D.3d 1291, 1292, 875 N.Y.S.2d 665, lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 930, 884 N.Y.S.2d 711, 912 N.E.2d 1092).
Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury ( see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we reject defendant's further contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence ( see generally Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Although an acquittal would not have been unreasonable, it cannot be said that the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded ( see generally id.).
“By failing to object to the court's ultimate Sandoval ruling, defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention ... that the ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion ... In any event, the court's Sandoval ruling did not constitute a clear abuse of discretion warranting reversal ... The prior convictions in question were relevant to the credibility of defendant” (People v. Tolliver, 93 A.D.3d 1150, 1151–1152, 940 N.Y.S.2d 398, lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 968, 950 N.Y.S.2d 120, 973 N.E.2d 218 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Williams, 101 A.D.3d 1730, 1732, 957 N.Y.S.2d 548, lv. denied21 N.Y.3d 1021, 971 N.Y.S.2d 503, 994 N.E.2d 399). In our view, “the court's ruling was a considered decision [that] took into account all relevant factors and further struck a proper balance between the probative value of the[ ] convictions on defendant's credibility and the possible prejudice to him” (People v. Poole, 79 A.D.3d 1685, 1686, 917 N.Y.S.2d 775, lv. denied16 N.Y.3d 862, 923 N.Y.S.2d 424, 947 N.E.2d 1203 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
Finally, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe but, as we noted in the prior appeal, “in view of the date on which the crimes were committed, the court erred in imposing the DNA databank fee” (Dupleasis, 79 A.D.3d at 1778, 913 N.Y.S.2d 636; see People v. Cooper, 77 A.D.3d 1417, 1419, 908 N.Y.S.2d 483, lv. denied16 N.Y.3d 742, 917 N.Y.S.2d 624, 942 N.E.2d 1049). We therefore modify the judgment accordingly.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice and on the law by vacating the DNA databank fee and as modified the judgment is affirmed.