Opinion
Docket No. CR-006815-21QN
11-22-2023
The People of the State of New York, v. Drayton, Defendant.
For the People: Melinda Katz, District Attorney (by Alyssa Glasshagel & John Margolies) For Ms. Drayton: The Legal Aid Society (by Benjamin P.D. Mejia)
Unpublished Opinion
For the People: Melinda Katz, District Attorney (by Alyssa Glasshagel & John Margolies)
For Ms. Drayton: The Legal Aid Society (by Benjamin P.D. Mejia)
Wanda L. Licitra, J.
On October 11, 2023, this court conducted a Huntley / Mapp / Dunaway /V.T.L. § 1194 hearing. The following now constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
At the hearing, the People called one witness, Cedric Raymondo. The court credits his testimony in full. Cedric Raymondo is an NYPD police officer who works at the 76th Precinct. He previously worked at the 105th Precinct. He has worked for the NYPD for six years, and he has made about twenty arrests in his career. Two arrests have been for DWI, though he has been involved in over thirty DWI-related investigations. The police have trained Officer Raymondo on how to identify people under the influence of alcohol. They taught him to look at a person's mannerisms, how they speak, their balance, and whether their eyes are bloodshot.
On March 30, 2021, Officer Raymondo was on patrol in the 105th Precinct. He was working with his partner, Officer Ralph Remy. They were in a marked patrol vehicle, and both were in uniform. At approximately 11:50 p.m., the officers received a 311 call stating that there was a black Toyota double parked in front of someone's house and that someone was asleep in the vehicle.
The officers responded to the location, which was on 147th Avenue in Rosedale, Queens. When they arrived, the officers got out of the car and saw the double-parked black Toyota. They did not activate their lights or sirens. After exiting their vehicle, they approached the Toyota and noticed that a woman was sleeping inside. No one else was in the vehicle. Officer Raymondo observed that the car was on. He then knocked on the window and the woman woke up. He asked, "Are you all right?" The woman responded that she was "fine" and was "going home." The woman inside the Toyota was Ms. Drayton.
Officer Raymondo then turned back to leave, and the two officers walked away to their police car. As they were getting back into their car, they heard a crash. They saw that the black Toyota had driven off and sideswiped a car about a half-block away on the right-hand side. The officers got back in their vehicle and drove up behind the Toyota and got out.
When the officers approached the Toyota again, they observed Ms. Drayton "still, " like she was sleeping. Officer Raymondo opened Ms. Drayton's car door to see if she was all right. The airbags were not deployed, and there was damage to the right side of the Toyota. Ms. Drayton started speaking, but Officer Raymondo could not understand what she was saying because her speech was slurred. He then called for an ambulance for her safety.
The ambulance arrived and Officer Raymondo had two EMS personnel speak to Ms. Drayton. The EMS personnel spoke to Ms. Drayton and asked if she was okay, whether she was a diabetic or having any medical emergencies. She said she was not. EMS then brought Ms. Drayton to the ambulance to check her out. Officer Raymondo observed EMS escort her to the ambulance by her left arm, and he saw that she was unsteady on her feet. She was crossing her feet and did not have any balance.
At the ambulance, EMS was speaking with Ms. Drayton and taking her vitals. Once they finished doing her vitals, an EMS worker walked over to Officer Raymondo and told him that Ms. Drayton had been drinking. He signaled this with his hands, by putting a right-hand thumb to his mouth and making a drinking mannerism.
Because of what EMS said, Officer Raymondo called for two other police officers to arrive. Officer Raymondo told his partner what the EMS worker had said, and they both went to speak with the EMS worker again. Officer Raymondo observed the EMS worker say to Ms. Drayton, "I'm not trying to make fun of you, but you look tipsy. Have you been drinking?" Ms. Drayton then responded, "Yes, a few beers." At this time, Ms. Drayton was sitting inside the ambulance and Officer Raymondo was right outside the ambulance door, less than a few feet away. She was not handcuffed when making these statements. Officer Raymondo did not ask Ms. Drayton any questions at that point. However, after she admitted to drinking, Officer Remy placed handcuffs on her in the ambulance. This was around 1:04 a.m.
Throughout this encounter, Officer Raymondo did not observe an odor of alcohol on Ms. Drayton's breath. He also noted that she had a normal face; that her clothes were orderly; and that she was cooperative. He also observed that her eyes were apparently normal. Officer Raymondo did not recover any alcohol bottles from Ms. Drayton's car.
Ms. Drayton was then taken to Franklin Hospital. At the hospital, Officer Spedaleri of the NYPD Highway Unit joined. He requested that Ms. Drayton consent to a blood test. This was at around 2:30 a.m. Ms. Drayton verbally consented to the test. A registered nurse, Raymond Parhami, drew the blood. It was vouchered under 4000806494. Officer Spedaleri also administered a breath test, which was at around 2:50 a.m.
Afterwards, Officer Raymondo read Ms. Drayton her Miranda warnings. She then waived her rights. The officer read Ms. Drayton a series of questions, which she answered.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
At a Mapp / Dunaway hearing, the People have the initial burden of going forward with facts that establish, prima facie, that each police action was lawful under constitutional search-and-seizure law. (See, e.g., People v. Harris, 192 A.D.3d 151, 157-58 [2d Dep't 2020]). If the People meet their burden of production, the burden then shifts to the defense to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a police action was unlawful. (See, e.g., id.).
The People here establish the legality of the police actions under constitutional search-and-seizure law. The defense has not shown that any of those actions was unlawful.
Officer Raymondo was justified in approaching in approaching Ms. Drayton's vehicle upon observing that it was double parked. (People v. Calizaire, 65 Misc.3d 137 [A], at *1 [App. Term, 1st Dep't 2019] ["The police had, at least, an objective credible reason to approach defendant's stationary vehicle and ask for basic identification information, since the vehicle was double-parked, which constituted a traffic infraction."]). The officer could also knock on the window. (People v. Louis, 73 Misc.3d 1209 [A], at *3 [Just. Ct., Monroe County 2021] ["The officer at that point was justified in his level one action of knocking on the passenger side window to get the attention of the driver."]). Officer Raymondo then left and did not seize the vehicle or driver.
Upon observing that Ms. Drayton then crashed the vehicle, the officer was justified in approaching the vehicle again. (People v. Caisaguano, 78 Misc.3d 1215 [A], at *4 [Crim. Ct., Queens County 2023] [noting that an apparent accident is an "objective, credible" reason for police to approach and request information]). Upon observing that Ms. Drayton was apparently unconscious at the wheel, "it was objectively reasonable for the police to open the door." (See People v. Urbina, 78 Misc.3d 1209 [A], at *5 [Crim. Ct., Queens County 2023]). Although such an intrusion was not justifiable under De Bour, (see id. at *4 [explaining why in similar circumstances]), Officer Raymondo testified that he opened the door to ascertain whether Ms. Drayton was okay. Police are permitted to take such an action for the purpose of attending to a possible emergency or providing aid. (See id. at *5; see generally Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 [2006]; People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173 [1976]).
After observing the accident and noting that Ms. Drayton's speech was slurred and that she did not have any balance, and after both EMS and Ms. Drayton relayed that she had been drinking alcohol, the officer had probable cause to arrest her for violating V.T.L. § 1192. (See, e.g., People v. Kowalski, 291 A.D.2d 669 [3d Dep't 2002]). These observations established reasonable cause to believe that Ms. Drayton was impaired, and that the impairment was because she had consumed alcohol.
Next, at a Huntley hearing, the People bear the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a statement they intend to introduce at trial, for which they served notice under C.P.L. § 710.30, was voluntarily made. (See People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72 [1965]).
The People do not intend to introduce Ms. Drayton's statements to EMS workers at the scene of the arrest in their case in chief. The court agrees that such statements must be precluded from their case in chief as the People did not notice those statements.
There are two voluntariness doctrines. (See People v. Dale, 207 A.D.3d 651, 651 [2d Dep't 2022]). The first is a traditional totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, grounded in the constitutional guarantees of due process and the privilege against self-incrimination. (Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 [2000]; see also People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 37-38 [1977]). The roots of that test "developed in the common law, as the courts of England and then the United States recognized that coerced confessions are inherently untrustworthy." (Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433). "It is basic that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system[, ] a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and not by coercion to prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth." (Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d at 37). Accordingly, the People bear the heavy burden of proving voluntariness "beyond a reasonable doubt" before an accused person's alleged statement can be "submitted to the trial jury." (Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d at 78).
The second doctrine of voluntariness concerns the Miranda rule. (Dale, 207 A.D.3d at 651). That rule is a modern "prophylactic" invented by the U.S. Supreme Court to address "the advent of modern custodial police interrogation[s]." (See generally Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435-38). Such an interrogation-which was not common before late-twentieth century policing-"exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty, " "trades on the weakness of individuals, " and "blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements." (Id. at 435). These problems "heighten[] the risk that an individual will not be accorded his privilege... not to be compelled to incriminate himself." (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). As a result, though the rule is a prophylactic invented by judges, there, too, the People "have the burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, " that the accused "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived [their] Miranda rights." (Dale, 207 A.D.3d at 651).
The People here establish that the statements for which they have served notice were voluntarily made and were made only upon Ms. Drayton's knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. The defense makes no specific argument otherwise.
Finally, at a "V.T.L. § 1194 hearing, " the People bear the burden to show that a chemical test was properly administered under V.T.L. § 1194. Here, the defense has moved to suppress the blood test administered to Ms. Drayton at Franklin Hospital. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 requires that blood be drawn by only particular categories of persons. (V.T.L. § 1194[4][a][1]). A registered nurse is one category of such persons, and the People establish that Ms. Drayton's blood was drawn by such a nurse. Ms. Drayton also voluntarily consented to this test; in the alternative, it was within the implied consent window, (see V.T.L. § 1194[2][a]).
Accordingly, the motions to suppress are denied.
The foregoing constitutes the order and decision of the court.