Opinion
2000-05062
Argued May 13, 2002.
June 10, 2002.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Roman, J.), rendered April 14, 2000, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Rotker, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statement to law enforcement authorities.
Andrew C. Fine, New York, N.Y. (Deepa Rajan of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N Y (John M. Castellano of counsel; Jennifer Hagan on the brief), for respondent.
Before: ANITA R. FLORIO, J.P., CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court properly denied his Batson challenge (see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79) to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of a black prospective juror. The prosecutor offered sufficient race-neutral reasons for her decision to exercise a peremptory challenge against the subject juror (see People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101; People v. Phillip, 279 A.D.2d 537; People v. Bodine, 283 A.D.2d 979; People v. McCargo, 226 A.D.2d 480). The burden then shifted to the defendant to prove that the peremptory challenge was used in a racially-discriminatory manner (see People v. Payne, 88 N.Y.2d 172; People v. Lall, 293 A.D.2d 689 [2d Dept, Apr. 22, 2002]; People v. White, 289 A.D.2d 270). The defendant failed to sustain this burden by demonstrating that the explanations given by the prosecutor were pretextual (see People v. Payne, supra; People v. Lall, supra; People v. Coleman, 287 A.D.2d 648, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 728; People v. McCargo, supra).
The hearing court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the signed statement he gave to police. Although the hearing court found that the arrest of the defendant was not supported by probable cause, the statement was made approximately 12 hours after the defendant's arrest, after Miranda warnings were given to him twice (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436), and after a separately arrested accomplice had implicated him in the robbery. Under these circumstances, the hearing court properly found that the defendant's statement was sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the illegal arrest to be admissible (see People v. McCloud, 247 A.D.2d 409; People v. Hodge, 184 A.D.2d 730; People v. Green, 182 A.D.2d 704; People v. Jones, 151 A.D.2d 695; People v. Williams, 115 A.D.2d 627).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
FLORIO, J.P., O'BRIEN, KRAUSMAN and LUCIANO, JJ., concur.