Opinion
2016–06738 Ind. No. 2856/14
09-30-2020
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Marcell DOCKERY, appellant.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Benjamin S. Litman and Sean Nuttall of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Camille O'Hara Gillespie of counsel), for respondent.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Benjamin S. Litman and Sean Nuttall of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Camille O'Hara Gillespie of counsel), for respondent.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, JEFFREY A. COHEN, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Danny K. Chun, J.), rendered June 14, 2016, convicting him of murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and arson in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Prior to the commencement of trial, the People moved to preclude expert testimony on the issue of false confessions and the defendant moved for permission to present such expert testimony at trial. The Supreme Court granted the People's motion and denied the defendant's motion. The defendant's contention that he was denied his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present a defense by the Supreme Court's preclusion of expert testimony on the issue of false confessions is unpreserved for appellate review, as he did not raise this argument in opposition to the People's motion or in support of his motion (see CPL 470.05[2] ). In any event, the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated. In addition, to the extent the defendant claims evidentiary error, the contention is without merit. The court providently exercised its discretion in precluding expert testimony on false confessions because the defendant failed to establish that his proffered expert testimony was relevant to the specific circumstances of this case (see People v. Bedessie, 19 N.Y.3d 147, 947 N.Y.S.2d 357, 970 N.E.2d 380 ; People v. Iqbal, 147 A.D.3d 782, 782–783, 45 N.Y.S.3d 580 ; People v. Lippe, 145 A.D.3d 1035, 1036, 44 N.Y.S.3d 199 ; People v. Kaye, 137 A.D.3d 938, 940, 26 N.Y.S.3d 593 ; People v. Roman, 125 A.D.3d 515, 515, 5 N.Y.S.3d 5 ; People v. Joubert, 125 A.D.3d 686, 686, 999 N.Y.S.2d 552 ; People v. Rosario, 100 A.D.3d 660, 661, 953 N.Y.S.2d 299 ; cf. People v. Days, 131 A.D.3d 972, 977–981, 15 N.Y.S.3d 823 ).
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 491–492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
CHAMBERS, J.P., ROMAN, COHEN and DUFFY, JJ., concur.