Opinion
D074293
10-11-2019
In re D.N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. D.N., Defendant and Appellant.
Stephane Quinn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. J241100) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Yvonne E. Campos and Aaron H. Katz, Judges. Affirmed. Stephane Quinn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Minor D.N. appeals adjudication and disposition hearing orders sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, adjudging him a ward of the juvenile court, and placing him on formal probation, subject to certain terms and conditions. On appeal, D.N. contends: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the court's true findings on the petition's allegations that he committed three counts of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422); and (2) two of his probation conditions are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. We affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2018, D.N., then 15 years old, entered a toilet stall in a public restroom at his high school. It was about one week before his high school's spring break. Using a black "sharpie" marker, D.N. wrote the following on the stall's wall: "Don't come!!! Skool Shooting after Spring Break [smiley face] Blood kidz."
Jose, D.N.'s friend and classmate, saw D.N. writing on the stall's wall and asked him about the school shooting threat. After initially denying he wrote the threat, D.N. eventually admitted to Jose that he wrote it. Upset because of actual school shootings, Jose told D.N. that he was going to get in trouble for writing the threat. D.N. told Jose to "keep it on the down low," meaning that Jose should not tell anyone about it. D.N. and Jose left the restroom when the bell rang. Jose was not afraid that D.N. would carry out the threat.
Later that day, D.N. handed a black "sharpie" marker to his friend and classmate, Brendan, and stated, "Here. Take the Sharpie." Brendan took the marker and placed it in his bag. Brendan did not use the marker after he took it.
The following day, two students approached a vice principal at the high school and told him about a disturbing message written in the restroom. The students informed him that a photograph of the threat was already circulating on social media. The vice principal entered the restroom and saw the written threat. He then locked the restroom and called police. He took the threat seriously and was anxious and concerned that its author might carry out the threat. Police arrived and maintained a visible presence at the high school for the remainder of the school week.
The vice principal began an internal school investigation to ascertain who had written the threat. He reviewed surveillance camera recordings and questioned students who had used the restroom. He eventually questioned Jose, who told him that D.N. had written the threat. In a subsequent meeting with the vice principal, the school's principal, and one of its counselors, D.N. initially denied writing the threat, but ultimately admitted writing it and then wrote a statement admitting that act. After keeping D.N.'s black "sharpie" marker for two days, Brendan gave it to the vice principal.
D.N.'s written admission was entered into evidence at his adjudication hearing.
The high school's principal sent an email and a voicemail to the school's teachers informing them of the school shooting threat. C.Z., one of the teachers, received the email and voicemail. She was later shown a photograph of the written threat. She took the threat seriously and believed it would be carried out. She was traumatized by the threat and was frightened for her safety and the safety of her students. She was concerned that her high school could be the next "Parkland," referring to that recent school shooting. She called several people to make sure her children were taken care of and sent a text message to her older daughter asking her to take care of her younger daughter. She also began writing a letter to her younger daughter. Although she did not want to go to school the following day, she went to school because she does not take days off.
J.F., a 14-year-old student at the high school, learned about D.N.'s threat at school from a friend who sent him a photograph of a news warning about the shooting threat. He was told the wording of the threat was that students should not come to school before or after the break. He took the threat seriously and felt uncomfortable. He sent a text message to his mother telling her that he did not feel safe at school and asking to be picked up from school early. His father picked him up early from school. Although he attended school the following day, he remained fearful and stayed in the school office until the principal informed him the threat suspect had been apprehended.
A.S., an 18-year-old student at the high school, received a text message from a friend informing her about the school shooting threat. A.S. did not learn about the details of the threat until she arrived at school the following day. She was informed that the threat stated: "Don't come back after spring break." She was scared when she learned about the threat because there had been a lot of recent school shootings. She helped organize and spoke at a school walkout one week earlier to commemorate the victims of the Parkland school shooting. She took the threat seriously and found it "pretty terrifying to think about."
An amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed charging D.N. with three felony counts of making criminal threats (§ 422) and one misdemeanor count of vandalism causing damage of less than $400 (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(2)(A)). At a contested adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found the petition's allegations to be true, but declared the three section 422 offenses to be misdemeanors. At the disposition hearing, the court adjudged D.N. a ward of the court and placed him on formal probation, subject to certain terms and conditions, including a 150-day commitment to the Breaking Cycles program. D.N. timely filed a notice of appeal challenging the orders.
DISCUSSION
I
Section 422 Generally
Section 422 defines the offense of making a criminal threat, providing in pertinent part:
"(a) Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety, shall be punished by imprisonment
in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison."Section 422 generally targets those who try to instill fear in others. (People v. Mosley (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 313, 323.) In People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221 (Toledo), the California Supreme Court described the elements of a section 422 offense, stating:
"In order to prove a violation of section 422, the prosecution must establish all of the following: (1) that the defendant 'willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person,' (2) that the defendant made the threat 'with the specific intent that the statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out,' (3) that the threat--which may be 'made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device'--was 'on its face and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat,' (4) that the threat actually caused the person threatened 'to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety,' and (5) that the threatened person's fear was 'reasonabl[e]' under the circumstances." (Toledo, at pp. 227-228.)"[A]ll of the surrounding circumstances should be taken into account to determine if a threat falls within the proscription of section 422." (People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013 (Solis).)
II
Substantial Evidence to Support Court's Section 422 Findings
D.N. asserts there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's true findings on the three section 422 allegations against him.
A
"In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, . . . we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence--that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the [allegations true] beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] 'A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness's credibility.' " (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 59-60.)
B
First element. D.N. argues there is insufficient evidence to support true findings on the first element of the three section 422 allegations (i.e., that he made an actual threat to commit a crime that would result in death or great bodily injury). In particular, he argues that his graffiti did not constitute an actual threat. We disagree. As quoted above, D.N.'s writing stated: "Don't come!!! Skool Shooting after Spring Break [smiley face] Blood kidz." The court reasonably could infer from the language of D.N.'s writing that D.N. willfully made a threat to commit a school shooting that would result in bloodshed (i.e., a criminal act causing death or great bodily injury). Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support true findings on the first section 422 element.
C
Second element. D.N. argues there is insufficient evidence to support true findings on the second element of the three section 422 allegations (i.e., that he had the specific intent that his statement be taken as a threat). In particular, he argues that because he was a special education student functioning at a third-grade level academically, he lacked the specific intent to make a criminal threat at the time he wrote the statement on the restroom wall.
Addressing D.N.'s academic level, the court stated: "Third graders are absolutely old enough, smart enough, and savvy enough to figure out choices and consequences." It stated that D.N.'s academic level did not relieve him of responsibility for his act. We agree with the court's reasoning in the circumstances of this case. Although the record contained evidence of D.N.'s third-grade academic level, there was no expert testimony or other evidence showing D.N. was not capable of forming, or did not form, the specific intent to make a criminal threat. (Cf. People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 821, 824-828 [because defense expert witness testified that defendant had Asperger's syndrome, trial court erred by refusing his request for instruction that jury may consider evidence of his mental disorder in determining whether he had specific intent required for charged offenses].) On the contrary, the vice principal testified that when D.N. was interviewed at school, "he was able to understand what we were talking about" and "did not appear . . . to act confused . . . or unable to understand . . . the statements and his actions."
Furthermore, there was circumstantial evidence supporting the court's finding that D.N. had the specific intent to make a criminal threat. D.N.'s writing referred to a bloody school shooting that would happen after the high school's spring break and warned persons to not come to school. It is implicit within the language of that statement, which was written on the wall in a public restroom, that its author had the specific intent that his statement be taken as a threat to commit a crime that would result in death or great bodily injury (i.e., to instill fear that a school shooting would be carried out). (Cf. In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 639 (George T.) ["Following Columbine, Santee, and other notorious school shootings, there is a heightened sensitivity on school campuses to latent signs that a student may undertake to bring guns to school and embark on a shooting rampage."].) The court reasonably could infer from the fact D.N. wrote his statement in a public place that he specifically intended to instill fear of a school shooting in those persons who saw or heard about it. The evidence did not need to show that D.N. intended to actually carry out the threatened shooting. (People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 806 (Wilson).) Rather, the evidence must show that he intended the victims to receive and understand his threat. (Ibid.)
Also, Jose testified that D.N. told him not to tell anyone about his writing on the restroom wall, supporting a reasonable inference by the court that D.N. was aware that his writing was wrong (i.e., threatening) and therefore tried to hide the fact that he wrote the threat. That inference is further supported by Brendan's testimony that D.N. handed him his black "sharpie" marker afterward in an apparent attempt to rid himself of evidence that tied him to making the threat. Accordingly, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the court's findings that D.N. made the school shooting threat with the specific intent that his statement be taken as a threat, even if he did not intend to actually carry it out. (§ 422, subd. (a); Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 228; Wilson, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.) To the extent D.N. argues there is evidence that would have supported contrary findings, he misconstrues and/or misapplies the substantial evidence standard of review.
D
Third element. D.N. argues there is insufficient evidence to support true findings on the third element of the three section 422 allegations (i.e., that his threat was, on its face and under the circumstances in which it was made, so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the persons threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat). (§ 422, subd. (a).) The four factors (i.e., unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific) "are not absolutely mandated, but must be sufficiently present in the threat and surrounding circumstances to convey gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution to the victim. The four qualities are simply the factors to be considered in determining whether a threat, considered together with its surrounding circumstances, conveys those impressions to the victim." (People v. Stanfield (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1157-1158 (Stanfield).)
The evidence shows that D.N.'s written threat was unconditional and immediate. There was no condition to the threatened shooting other than the inevitable passage of time (i.e., after spring break) and the threat was immediate (e.g., there was no delay before its effectiveness). Also, contrary to D.N.'s apparent assertion, the evidence shows his threat was unequivocal and specific. His writing implicitly, if not expressly, threatened a shooting at the high school after spring break, which shooting would cause bloodshed. Because both the nature of the threatened crime (i.e., a school shooting) and its time (i.e., after spring break) were specified in the threat, the threat was sufficiently unequivocal and specific for section 422 purposes. Contrary to D.N.'s apparent assertion, section 422 does not require a showing that his threat expressly stated he personally planned to kill students or teachers or that he wanted to hurt them. (Cf. People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 752 ["A threat is sufficiently specific where it threatens death or great bodily injury. A threat is not insufficient simply because it does 'not communicate a time or precise manner of execution . . . .' "].)
Neither In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132 (Ricky T.) nor George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th 620, cited by D.N., are factually apposite to this case or otherwise show the third element of a section 422 offense was not shown in this case. In Ricky T., a teacher accidentally hit a student with a door, prompting the student to curse and state to the teacher, "I'm going to get you." (Ricky T., at p. 1135.) The appellate court concluded those words did not constitute a section 422 criminal threat, but instead were a vague threat of retaliation without any immediate prospect of execution. (Id. at pp. 1137-1138.) In contrast, in this case D.N.'s written threat was not vague, but specifically warned his victims that there would be a school shooting after spring break. Therefore, Ricky T. is factually inapposite to this case.
In George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th 620, a student wrote a poem that he showed to a few of his classmates. (Id. at pp. 625-626.) The poem, entitled "Faces," stated in part: "I slap on my face of happiness but inside I am evil!! For I can be the next kid to bring guns to kill students at school. So parents watch your children cuz I'm BACK!!" (Id. at p. 625.) The Supreme Court concluded the poem was equivocal, described the protagonist's feelings, and did not actually threaten a school shooting. (Id. at pp. 635-636.) Accordingly, the court concluded the third element of a section 422 offense was not shown. (Id. at p. 638.) In contrast, in this case D.N.'s writing was not a creative expression and was not equivocal, but instead specifically threatened a school shooting after spring break. Therefore, George T. is factually inapposite to this case.
Contrary to D.N.'s assertion, there is also substantial evidence to support true findings that his written threat conveyed an "immediate prospect of execution" to its victims as required by the third element of a section 422 offense. (§ 422, subd. (a); Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 228.) To the extent he argues that his writing was vague as to the time of the threatened shooting and therefore did not show he threatened an immediate school shooting, he misconstrues the phrase "immediate prospect of execution" of the threat. People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1538 (Melhado) stated: "[W]e understand the word 'immediate' [in the phrase "immediate prospect of execution"] to mean that degree of seriousness and imminence which is understood by the victim to be attached to the future prospect of the threat being carried out . . . ." In Wilson, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th 789, the court stated that section 422's phrase, "immediate prospect of execution," has "an entirely different meaning with a change in word order than the 'prospect of immediate execution' . . . ." (Id. at p. 818.) Wilson further stated: "There is no evidence the phrase [i.e., 'immediate prospect of execution'] was intended to place a limited timeline on when a specific and unconditional threat would be executed." (Id. at p. 816.) Therefore, contrary to D.N.'s apparent assertion, section 422 does not require a prospect of immediate execution of the threatened shooting, but rather only an immediate prospect of execution of the threatened shooting, whether imminent or in the future.
In Wilson, a prisoner threatened a correctional officer that he would find and "blast" the officer after the prisoner's release on parole in 10 months. (Wilson, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 798, 816.) Wilson concluded there was substantial evidence to support the prisoner's section 422 conviction, including a finding that he conveyed to the officer an immediate prospect of execution of his threat. (Id. at pp. 814, 819; cf. People v. Gaut (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1432 [incarcerated defendant conveyed immediate prospect of execution of threat by telling victim he would be released in a few days].) Like the court in Wilson, we conclude that in this case D.N.'s written threat of a school shooting after spring break conveyed to his victims an immediate prospect of its execution, even though the threatened shooting would occur only in the future (i.e., after spring break). Section 422 does not require that a statement threaten immediate execution. Rather, section 422 requires that there be an immediate prospect of execution of the threat. (§ 422, subd. (a); Melhado, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1538; Wilson, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 816, 818.) Based on our review of the record in this case, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the court's true findings that D.N.'s written threat conveyed to his victims an immediate prospect of a threatened school shooting. Therefore, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support true findings on the third section 422 element.
E
Fourth and fifth elements. D.N. argues there is insufficient evidence to support true findings on the fourth and fifth elements of the three section 422 allegations (i.e., the threat actually caused the victims to be in sustained fear for their safety and that the victims' fear was reasonable under the circumstances). (Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 228.) "Sustained fear" under section 422 means fear "that extends beyond what is momentary, fleeting, or transitory." (People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156 (Allen).) Sustained fear need not last a long period of time. (Cf. People v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1349 [one minute]; Allen, at p. 1156 [15 minutes].) "[T]he threatening statement does not have to be the sole cause of the victim's fear," but may be considered in the context of its surrounding circumstances. (Solis, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1012-1013.)
Contrary to D.N.'s assertion, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the court's true findings on section 422's fourth element that his written threat caused his three victims to suffer sustained fear for their safety. C.Z. received the principal's email and voicemail regarding the school shooting threat and was later shown a photograph of the written threat. She testified that she took the threat seriously, believed it would be carried out, and was frightened for her safety. She was concerned that her high school could be the next "Parkland" school shooting. She called several people to make sure her children were taken care of, asked her older daughter to take care of her younger daughter, and began writing a letter to her younger daughter. That evidence supports a finding that C.Z. actually suffered sustained fear because of D.N.'s threat and that her fear was reasonable. Contrary to D.N.'s assertion, the fact that C.Z. reluctantly went to school the following day did not disprove that she actually and reasonably suffered sustained fear as a result of his threat. In particular, we conclude that a victim, such as C.Z., can reasonably suffer sustained fear even though the threatened shooting would not occur until a certain time period in the future (e.g., after spring break).
J.F. learned about D.N.'s threat from a friend who sent him a photograph of a news warning about it and was told the wording of the threat was that students should not come to school before or after the break. He testified that he took the threat seriously and felt uncomfortable. He told his mother that he did not feel safe at school and asked to be picked up from school early. His father picked him up early from school. Although he attended school the following day, he remained fearful and stayed in the school office until the principal informed him the threat suspect had been apprehended. That evidence supports a finding J.F. actually suffered sustained fear because of D.N.'s threat and that his fear was reasonable.
A.S. initially received a text message from a friend informing her of D.N.'s school shooting threat and then learned about its details when she arrived at school the following day. She was informed that the threat stated: "Don't come back after spring break." She testified that she was scared when she learned about the threat because there had been a lot of recent school shootings (e.g., the Parkland school shooting). She testified that she took the threat seriously and found it "pretty terrifying to think about." That evidence supports a finding A.S. actually suffered sustained fear because of D.N.'s threat and that her fear was reasonable.
Contrary to D.N.'s assertion, all three victims were informed that his threatened school shooting would not (in C.Z. and A.S.'s cases), or may not (in J.F.'s case), occur until after spring break and therefore actually and reasonably suffered sustained fear because of his threat. The fact that one or more of the victims initially may have understood the threatened school shooting was imminent does not disprove that they suffered sustained fear after learning of its timing (i.e., after spring break). Furthermore, D.N. does not cite any evidence in the record to support his assertion that the victims' anxiety "quickly dissipated" once they learned the details of his threat. Considering the victims' testimony and the surrounding circumstances, including media coverage of, and the victims' admitted awareness of, the Parkland school shooting (of which the court took judicial notice) that occurred one month before D.N.'s threat, the court reasonably found all three victims actually and reasonably suffered sustained fear due to his threat. (Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 228; Allen, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156; Solis, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1012-1013; cf. Commonwealth v. Milo M. (Mass. 2001) 740 N.E.2d 967, 973-974 ["given the recent highly publicized, school-related shootings by students" of which the court took judicial notice, victim's fear from threat was "quite reasonable and justifiable"].) Therefore, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the court's true findings on the fourth and fifth elements of the three section 422 allegations.
F
Under a separate heading in his opening brief, D.N. expands on his argument above that the fear suffered by J.F. and A.S. was not caused by his threat, but instead was caused by incomplete characterizations of his threat as communicated to them by their friends. In particular, he argues that because J.F. and A.S. never viewed the actual threat that he wrote on the restroom wall or a photograph thereof, they did not suffer fear because of his threat, but instead suffered fear because of mischaracterizations of his threat that were conveyed to them (i.e., that there was a threat of an imminent school shooting). He also argues there is insufficient evidence showing that he specifically intended his threat to be conveyed to J.F. and A.S. and cause them fear.
As D.N. acknowledges, section 422 does not require a threat to be personally communicated to a victim by its maker. (In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 861.) "The kind of threat contemplated by section 422 may as readily be conveyed by the threatener through a third party as personally to the intended victim." (In re David L. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1655, 1659 (David L.).) "Where the threat is conveyed through a third party intermediary, the specific intent element of the statute is implicated. Thus, if the threatener intended the threat to be taken seriously by the victim, he must necessarily have intended it to be conveyed." (Ibid.)
Contrary to D.N.'s apparent assertion, section 422 does not require victims to directly see or hear a threat for them to be intended victims of the threat or to suffer fear because of the threat. Because, as discussed above, a third party can convey the threat to a victim, that third party communication of the threat can actually and reasonably cause a victim fear provided the substance of the threat is conveyed to the victim by the third party. (Cf. Stanfield, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158 [§ 422 focuses on effect of threat on victim and not its precise words].) Furthermore, contrary to D.N.'s assertion, the record shows, as discussed above, that although J.F. and A.S. were not initially told the details of his threat, they later learned of its details, including the nature of the threat (i.e., a school shooting) and its timing (i.e., after spring break), and they testified that they were afraid for their safety on learning of those details. Accordingly, the court reasonably found all three victims suffered fear caused by D.N.'s threat and not by any mischaracterizations of that threat.
J.F. was told that the threat warned students not to come to school before or after spring break.
Furthermore, the court reasonably found D.N. specifically intended that his threat be conveyed to students and teachers at his high school. Based on D.N.'s act of writing his threat of a school shooting on a public restroom wall at the school, the court reasonably could infer that D.N. intended his threat to be seen by persons at the school and then communicated to others by third party intermediaries. (Cf. David L., supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1659.) Alternatively stated, because the court found that D.N. intended his threat to be taken seriously, it reasonably could further find that "he must . . . have intended it to be conveyed [to others]." (Ibid.) Given the prevalence of cell phones and social media today, the court also could reasonably infer that D.N. knew his written threat would be widely disseminated among the school's community members and therefore he specifically intended it to be conveyed to the entire school community, including the instant three victims. (Cf. Wynar v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2013) 728 F.3d 1062, 1072 [threat of school shooting effectively threatened entire student body].) Accordingly, there is substantial evidence to support the court's true findings that D.N. specifically intended that his threat be conveyed to J.F. and A.S. and cause them fear.
III
D.N.'s Probation Conditions
D.N. contends two of his probation conditions are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
A
At D.N.'s disposition hearing, the court adjudged him a ward of the court and placed him on formal probation, subject to certain terms and conditions. On appeal, he challenges two of those conditions:
(1) "The minor shall not knowingly have negative direct or indirect contact with [C.Z., J.F., and A.S.], which includes not harassing, annoying, molesting, threatening, injuring, intimidating, attacking, battering, assaulting, stalking, impersonating . . . , destroying the personal property of, unlawfully taking the personal property of, disturbing the peace of, or blocking the movements of [C.Z., J.F. and A.S.] or his or her family;" andD.N. did not object to those probation conditions at the hearing.
(2) "The minor shall not knowingly possess spray paint cans, colored markers, glue sticks, pens, etching tools, aerosol cans, or other paraphernalia used for graffiti purposes."
B
"The purposes of juvenile wardship proceedings are twofold: to treat and rehabilitate the delinquent minor, and to protect the public from criminal conduct." (In re Jose C. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 534, 555.) To accomplish those purposes, a juvenile court may order a ward to probation. (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118.) A juvenile court has wide discretion to impose appropriate probation conditions and may impose any reasonable condition that is fitting and proper toward the goal of doing justice and reforming and rehabilitating the ward. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 (Sheena K.).) A probation condition is unconstitutionally vague if it is not sufficiently precise in the circumstances of the case for the ward or any ordinary person to understand what conduct is prohibited and to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (In re Byron B. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1018 (Byron B.); People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 630 (Lopez); People v. Barajas (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 748, 755 (Barajas).) A probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad "if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct." (People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 750 (Freitas).) The question to be determined in an overbreadth challenge "is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the [ward's] constitutional rights--bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement." (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.) We review de novo constitutional challenges to probation conditions. (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.) If a probation condition is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, we may modify it to make it comply with the law. (Sheena K., at p. 888.)
"Challenges to probation conditions ordinarily must be raised in the trial court; if they are not, appellate review of those conditions will be deemed forfeited. [Citation.] However, a defendant who did not object to a probation condition at sentencing may raise a challenge to that condition on appeal if the defendant's appellate claim 'amount[s] to a "facial challenge" ' (italics added), i.e., a challenge that the 'phrasing or language . . . is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,' and the determination whether the condition is constitutionally defective 'does not require scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but instead requires the review of abstract and generalized legal concepts--a task that is well suited to the role of an appellate court.' [Citation.]" (In re J.S. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 402, 407-408 (J.S.), quoting Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 885.)
C
Because D.N. did not object below to the imposition of the two probation conditions that he now challenges for the first time on appeal, he forfeited any "as-applied" constitutional challenges to those conditions. (J.S., supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 407-408; Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 885.) Accordingly, we consider only his facial challenges to those probation conditions to the extent they are pure matters of law that are not dependent on our review of the record in this case. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 235; J.S, at pp. 407-408; Sheena K., at p. 885.)
D
Raising a facial challenge to the "no negative contact" probation condition, D.N. argues that condition is unconstitutionally vague on its face. He argues the term "negative" contact is indefinite and fails to provide him with fair notice regarding what types of contact with the three victims are prohibited. He further argues the phrase "negative direct or indirect contact" is ambiguous and does not provide guidance to law enforcement, thereby allowing arbitrary enforcement of that condition. We disagree. Although the terms "negative" and "direct or indirect" describing the prohibited contact with the victims may be subject to interpretation in its application to a given set of specific facts, we must interpret probation conditions reasonably with common sense and give them such meaning as would a reasonable, objective reader. (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 606 (Bravo); In re Ramon M. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 665, 677 (Ramon M.); People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 383 (Olguin).) A probation condition is not unconstitutionally vague if it is reasonably specific and can be given a reasonable and practical construction or made reasonably certain by reference to other sources. (Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 630.)
D.N. apparently does not assert that this probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.
Here, reasonably construing the challenged terms in the context of the whole probation condition, we conclude that condition is not unconstitutionally vague. The probation condition prohibits D.M. from knowingly having "negative direct or indirect contact" with the three victims, which prohibited contact "includes not harassing, annoying, molesting, threatening, injuring, intimidating, attacking, battering, assaulting, stalking, impersonating . . . , destroying the personal property of, unlawfully taking the personal property of, disturbing the peace of, or blocking the movements of [each of those victims] or his or her family." By describing the specific types of contact prohibited by the probation condition, the court provided specificity and clarified any potential ambiguity in the phrase "negative direct or indirect contact." We further note that condition lists much of the specific conduct that may be prohibited by a Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5 restraining order. Because the probation condition, when read as a whole, provides sufficient specificity to the phrase "negative direct or indirect contact," it provides D.N. with fair notice of what is prohibited by that condition and avoids arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement and therefore is not unconstitutionally vague. (Byron B., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018; Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 630; Barajas, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 755; Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 606; Ramon M., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 677; Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 383.)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5, subdivision (a)(1) provides that in certain circumstances a juvenile court has jurisdiction to issue ex parte orders "enjoining any person from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls . . . , destroying the personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the child or any other child in the household."
E
Raising a facial challenge to the graffiti paraphernalia probation condition, D.N. argues that condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face because it effectively prohibits his use of all pens, including pens used for schoolwork and general daily use. We disagree. As discussed above, we must interpret probation conditions reasonably with common sense and give them such meaning as would a reasonable, objective reader. (Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 606; Ramon M., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 677; Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 383.) A probation condition is not unconstitutionally vague if it is reasonably specific and can be given a reasonable and practical construction or made reasonably certain by reference to other sources. (Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 630.) A probation condition is not unconstitutionally overbroad if it does not prohibit constitutionally protected conduct. (Freitas, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 750.) Here, reasonably construing the challenged terms in the context of the whole probation condition, we conclude that condition is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The probation condition prohibits D.N. from "knowingly possess[ing] spray paint cans, colored markers, glue sticks, pens, etching tools, aerosol cans, or other paraphernalia used for graffiti purposes." (Italics added.) Reasonably construing the language of that condition as a whole, we conclude that D.N. is prohibited from knowingly possessing only those pens that are used for graffiti purposes and not pens used for schoolwork or general personal use. Given that reasonable construction, the probation condition gives D.N. fair notice of what it prohibits and avoids arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement and therefore is not unconstitutionally vague. (Byron B., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018; Lopez, at p. 630; Barajas, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 755; Bravo, at p. 606; Ramon M., at p. 677; Olguin, at p. 383.) Likewise, given that construction, the probation condition does not prohibit constitutionally protected conduct and therefore is not unconstitutionally overbroad. (Freitas, at p. 750.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HALLER, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J. AARON, J.