Opinion
F086562
05-22-2024
In re D.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. D.J., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Jyoti Malik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Amanda D. Cary and Hannah Janigian Chavez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County Nos. 23CEJ600112-1, 23CEJ600112-1A, Alvin M. Harrell III, Judge.
Jyoti Malik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Amanda D. Cary and Hannah Janigian Chavez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
Minor D.J. contends on appeal that the juvenile court (1) abused its discretion by sentencing minor to a secured youth treatment facility (SYTF) and (2) erred by applying minor's custody credits against the baseline term, rather than the maximum exposure term, in violation of equal protection. The People disagree. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On August 1, 2022, a juvenile wardship petition was filed in Kings County pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 602. It alleged minor committed carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); count 1); assault likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2); second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 3); receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); count 4); and driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 5).
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
On March 29, 2023, a first amended juvenile wardship petition was filed in Kings County pursuant to section 602, alleging that 11 days prior to the commission of the offenses alleged in the original juvenile wardship petition, minor committed attempted murder (Pen. Code, § 664/187, subd. (a); count 1); assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 2); possession of a firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610; count 3); and possession of ammunition by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29650; count 4). As to count 1, it was further alleged minor discharged a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (c)). As to count 2, it was further alleged minor personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a)) and caused great bodily injury to A.M. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)).
The first amended petition mistakenly states the offenses alleged therein occurred on August 5, 2022. However, the offenses alleged in the first amended petition actually occurred on July 17, 2022.
On March 29, 2023, minor admitted the allegations of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)) and carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)). He also admitted the firearm enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (c)) from the first amended juvenile petition. The remaining allegations were dismissed.
On March 30, 2023, the case was transferred to Fresno County, minor's county of residence.
On June 27, 2023, the prosecution dismissed the carjacking count from the original juvenile wardship petition. The juvenile court adjudged minor a ward of the court and committed him to SYTF for a baseline term of four years. Minor was given a credit of 334 days against the maximum period of confinement of 27 years.
On July 12, 2023, minor timely appealed the disposition order.
The facts of the underlying offense are taken from the probation report.
July 17, 2022-Attempted Murder
On July 17, 2022, A.M. was walking from his house to a friend's house when a group of guys, including minor and another juvenile, E.P., approached him. They" 'checked him,'" and asked whether he was affiliated with a gang, stating," 'Hey cuz what you bang?'" A.M. told them," 'I [don't] do any of that sh[**] man I'm just trying to go to my f[***]ing friend's.'" One of the subjects then stated," 'You must be a mutt.' " A.M. again stated he did not "bang." Another subject then accused A.M. of being a" 'Norteno'" gang member.
"Mutt" is a derogatory term used to refer to Bulldog gang members.
When A.M. saw one of the subjects kept reaching down toward his waistband, he "knew what was going to happen," and began to run towards his house. Minor and E.P. began to chase him. When he got to the curb of the street, both minor and E.P. shot at him, striking him in the leg and hand. He tried to continue running but could not because his leg was "swinging" because his femur was broken. He believed they targeted him that evening because he was wearing a burgundy shirt and a black Cardinals hat. Sixteen spent shell casings along with intact bullet projectiles were found at the scene, and A.M.'s uncle, who was in A.M.'s house at the time of the shooting, heard 10 to 15 gunshots shortly after A.M. left the residence.
Video surveillance recorded the incident, and minor was identified by police from the video.
July 28, 2022-Carjacking
On the evening of July 28, 2022, D.C. was in the driver's seat of his car parked outside his friend D.'s residence, waiting for her to come out. Minor and another juvenile, M.F., approached him, asking," 'Where's [D.]?'" Minor and M.F. then opened his driver's side door, forcefully removing him from the car, and began punching and kicking him all over his body and face at least 20 times. He tried to cover his face and body to protect himself but was unable to. Minor and M.F. began to go through his pockets and forcefully remove items against his will. He eventually got up and tried to fight them off. D.C. was in fear for his life and began running from them, but minor and M.F. got into his car and began to chase him with it as he ran. Police officers responded to a call about the fight and found D.C. walking down a street. He appeared injured and limping with wrinkly and dirty clothes and several fresh, bleeding cuts and scrapes on his face and swollen lips. He told the officers he had just been "jumped" by two men who stole his car and complained of a severe headache and dizziness. He was transported to the hospital.
The officers went to the scene of the incident and found D. and her mother. D. confirmed she and D.C. were friends and that he had been waiting outside her residence for her in his car. She told them that when she came out of the residence, he and his car were gone and she could not reach him by phone. She and her mother stated they were unaware of anyone having issues with D.C.
In the hospital, officers interviewed D.C. He was extremely lethargic, had difficulty speaking, and was in extreme pain. He stated that when minor and M.F. assaulted him, he tried to defend himself while being continuously stomped and kicked, but lost consciousness at some point. He said that once he was able to get up, he tried to run away from minor and M.F. but became dizzy and fell. He said they chased him and started to punch and kick him again but he was able to get up and run away as they got into his car and drove off.
Police located D.C.'s stolen car on July 29, 2022, occupied by minor, M.F., and E.P. Minor had blood splatter on his shoes, and D.C. identified minor and M.F. as the suspects who had assaulted him.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that minor be committed to SYTF. The People disagree. We agree with the People.
A. Background
Prior to the shooting and carjacking offenses, minor had no criminal history.
Probation Report
The probation report recommended minor be committed to SYTF because of the danger he posed to public safety. The report stated minor admitted the attempted murder and carjacking offenses. It described both offenses as violent incidents in which the victims were seriously injured, and concluded that, accordingly, minor should be committed to SYTF because he is a danger to the community. It also summarized his failing grades and overall poor performance at school, including two suspensions for fighting and throwing another student in a trashcan and failure to attend regularly since 2022, active gang membership, marijuana and alcohol use, and history of childhood trauma, including that minor's father was incarcerated for most of minor's life and had little contact with him, that minor was physically abused, that several of minor's close family members had died in recent years, and that minor had been sent to live with an aunt in 2022 because of disagreements he had with his mother. The report also summarized the programs available at SYTF that would be appropriate for minor. It stated, "In determining an appropriate recommendation, [the probation] officer considered the circumstances of the offense, the minor's gang membership, school performance, … reported history of trauma, and safety of the community and the victims. The minor admitted to two very serious and violent offenses, in which both victims were seriously injured. One victim was shot in his hand and leg, which resulted in a broken leg and the other victim was forcefully removed from his car and kicked and punched at least 20 times all over his body, resulting in several cuts and scrapes to his face and his lips were swollen. The minor's actions demonstrate he is a danger to the community and [the probation] officer believes a commitment to [SYTF] would be the most appropriate recommendation in this matter. The SYTF would provide the … minor access to services specifically designed to meet his needs, in a structured environment, which include, but is not limited to, ongoing educational programs, probation supervision, counseling and mental health services, and a mentoring program that will assist him in transitioning back into the community upon his release from SYTF.…"
Minor's Disposition Brief
On May 19, 2023, minor filed a disposition brief arguing he could not be committed to SYTF because he did not meet the criteria of section 875.
He first argued he did not qualify for SYTF commitment pursuant to section 875, subdivision (a) because his most recent adjudicated offense was not a section 707, subdivision (b) offense. He contended only the attempted murder offense (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187) with a Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (c) enhancement qualified as a section 707, subdivision (b) offense. He argued the carjacking offense (Pen. Code, § 215) is not a Penal Code section 707, subdivision (b) offense because he was not armed with a deadly or dangerous weapon when he committed that offense.
He further argued the attempted murder offense (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187) was not his most recent adjudicated offense because he committed the carjacking offense nearly two weeks after the attempted murder offense. He contended the language "most recent adjudicated offense" from section 875, subdivision (a) refers to the date the offense was committed, not the date on which the offense was adjudicated by the juvenile court.
Minor next argued that, pursuant to section 875, subdivision (b), the goals of juvenile law of rehabilitation and public safety could be met by less restrictive suitable alternatives than SYTF commitment, in light of his lack of prior criminal record, age, lack of brain development, trauma, immaturity, and low intellectual abilities. He argued global positioning system (GPS) release, a general Juvenile Justice Center (JJC) commitment, a 180-day substance abuse unit (SAU) commitment, or a 365-day New Horizons Program (NHP) commitment were all less restrictive suitable alternatives to SYTF commitment, and listed programming available at NHP, including "counseling and interventions to focus on decision making and anger management among other areas, dual enrollment for an opportunity for participants to complete high school and enroll in Community College, a welding focus and certificate, a horticulture focus and certificate, an opportunity to engage with the services offered by the Boys and Girls Club, and more." His brief included a forensic evaluation by a psychologist discussing minor's deficits in intellectual development, trauma, age, and lack of prior criminal history.
Prosecution's Disposition Brief
The prosecution filed an opposing disposition brief on May 23, 2023, arguing minor was eligible for SYTF pursuant to section 875, subdivision (a) based on the attempted murder offense (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187). The prosecution contended the attempted murder offense qualified as a section 707, subdivision (b) offense because it was adjudicated on the same date as the carjacking offense and section 875, subdivision (a)(2) clarifies that "adjudication" refers to the "most recent offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated" in section 875, subdivision (a)(1), which is the date the offense was adjudicated, not the date the offense was committed.
The prosecution's brief did not address the suitability of less restrictive alternative dispositions.
Disposition Hearing
At the June 27, 2023 disposition hearing, the juvenile court agreed with defendant's position that the most recent adjudicated offense was the carjacking, which was not a section 707, subdivision (b) offense, but stated the prosecution could request the carjacking offense be dismissed, thus making the attempted murder offense, which is a section 707, subdivision (b) offense, the most recent adjudicated offense. The prosecution agreed and the carjacking offense was dismissed.
The juvenile court then listed the less restrictive alternative dispositions presented by defense counsel's disposition brief, and discussed the danger minor posed to public safety, in light of the severe, violent, random and unsolicited nature of both the attempted murder and carjacking offenses, stating:
"I have to make a finding that a less restrictive alternative would be ineffective or inappropriate. Specifically, as [defense counsel] points out, there are a number of options, including [GPS] release, general JJC commitment, 180-day SAU commitment, and 365-day [NHP]. I just don't know if those would be appropriate for someone who engaged in the behavior that was exhibited here. I'm cognizant of the forensic evaluation that analyzed the minor's offense in relation to his age, lack of brain development, early exposure to trauma, immaturity, [and] low average intellectual abilities.
"But this is the situation where the minor walks up to another young man, asks him in the vernacular, what do you claim, what do you bang, whatever the case may be. The response from the victim is, I don't gang bang, I'm on my way to my friend's house. The response from … minor and his co-part, something to the effect, he must be a Bulldog, in which they proceed to shoot him."
The juvenile court continued:
"I can't imagine. I didn't grow up with a silver spoon in my mouth. I lived in places called Sin Town, and the Islands. The Island was not called Islands because of the tropical breezes and the coconut juice, it's because people who lived there acted like savages, it was very violent. Yet, I didn't go around shooting people, or gang banging, and all of that. I don't believe that just because you were in a certain environment that you are automatically predispos[ed] to engage in unsolicited violence.
"I know you shot the young man in the leg. You can still kill someone by shooting them in the leg, you hit a certain artery they bleed out and die within minutes. I can't imagine having a broken femur, what that feels like, and for this young man to get shot twice, it just doesn't make sense to me. Can you help it make sense to me, sir? I don't get it."
Minor replied, "I thought it was bad decisions that happened too quickly following my cousin [E.P.]'s footsteps."
The juvenile court then stated:
"[W]hen I was down over on American Avenue where the Court is there, I was there for maybe [two] years and in [two] years we lost eight or nine young men. I'm not talking about GPS where they at, I'm talking folks went into the ground, behind silliness, behind stupidity. One individual he was a robber and I let him out thinking I was doing something to help him restart his life and try to get on the right track. As soon as he got out, same night he got out, he went out with his buddies, robbed somebody, the person they robbed, the victim, followed him, shot him, and killed him, and his buddies left him in the street to die.
"Other people didn't listen to me about staying out of gang stuff, they were killed in gang violence. Nine-eight to nine young men and that really disturbed me. And I'm looking at you seeing the same thing about to happen and I don't want to see that happen. Or I see you later on down here coming to the adult court, and that's happened a number of times where I see people down there and say, hey, please don't come to adult court because adult court is about punishment, not about rehabilitation, not about trying to save people, it's about punishment. It's serious business. But I see that for you, sir, if you continue to exercise the poor judgment that you have done in the past.…"
Defense counsel then argued that, aside from the severity of the offense, the other criteria under section 875, subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E), including minor's age, developmental maturity, and mental and emotional health, showed a less restrictive means would be a suitable option for minor, rather than SYTF. He also pointed out that minor had no prior juvenile delinquency history, had family support and had been on good behavior in custody. He argued that, while SYTF has "a lot of great programming … so does" NHP's one-year program.
The prosecution noted the goal was to rehabilitate minor but argued that rehabilitation did not necessarily mean choosing the easiest option for minor. It stated:
"I think what often happens is a disservice to these minors to understand that they can engage in that type of activity and receive what is in essence a slap on the wrist. It sets them up, especially when they're at this cusp of reaching maturity, that they're going to now think that they can engage in carjacking and shooting somebody because they didn't like the color of the clothes he was wearing and receive a year, and that is not what is going to happen."
"Now it's just too often that we're setting these individuals up for failure. We've had quite a few failures going back to [the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)], coming back, and either be homicide victims, or homicide defendants, or being killed. We had one three weeks ago, I think within 36 hours of release from DJJ."
Defense counsel responded, arguing for commitment of minor to NHP:
"[A]s the Court is aware, considering other minors or other individuals instances or other examples would be inappropriate for treating [minor's] case individually and his situation individually.
"I certainly don't think [NHP] would be the easiest possible thing to happen to [minor]. The code section talks about least restrictive alternative, I think there is a difference between that and easiest possible sentence.…"
The juvenile court then committed minor to SYTF, finding the less restrictive alternative dispositions unsuitable based on the danger minor posed to the public, demonstrated by the nature of his offenses, both random, violent attacks on members of the public, stating:
"[Minor], the Court, in looking at what has transpired is just extremely concerned. The facts surrounding the attempted murder are just appalling to where a person cannot walk down the street, minding their own business, to only be confronted by two individuals with firearms, shoot at him numerous times. He apparently suffered gunshots to his hand and his legs.
"And then if that's not bad, we also have the carjacking, which has been dismissed reserving right to comment and restitution. Where you all, you and a coparticipant, pulled the driver out of the seat of his grandmother's vehicle, and you and the coparticipant stomped and kicked the victim numerous times in the face until he was able to escape on foot.
"I don't know if you were watching those video games, or some type of movies, or whatever it is, this is not the way you should be behaving. It's just-I don't get it. I did mention, or I read, where you were affiliated with a criminal street gang. The probation report says that you claim Huron Gangster Crew, apparently a Crip set, you go by the moniker tray 3X, smoking marijuana three to four times a week. I just don't believe that anything but [SYTF] would be appropriate.
"The [SYTF] will provide you with access to services specifically designed to meet your needs in a structured environment, which include but are not limited to ongoing educational programs, probation supervision, counseling, mental health services.
"You need mental health services because something is not right. If you are doing what you are doing, and victimizing people the way you are doing, something is not right and you need to be evaluated. The Court is going to find that that is the appropriate setting for you to address this disposition. [¶] … [¶]
"[T]he Court has considered local less restrictive programs as forms of custody and are fully satisfied that they're inappropriate dispositions at this time. The minor can benefit from the various programs provided by [SYTF]. The mental and physical qualification of the minor are such as to render it probable that the minor will benefit from the programming, educational and other treatment provided by the [SYTF]."
B. Law
In recent years, the Legislature has overhauled juvenile wardship law by closing the DJJ and transferring jurisdiction over youthful offenders to counties, with the stated purpose of ensuring minors are closer to their families and communities and receive age-appropriate treatment. (§ 736.5; Sen. Bill No. 823 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1; In re T.O. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 252, 262-263; In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 907.)
A juvenile court may order commitment to SYTF if each of the following criteria pursuant to section 875 is met: "(1) The juvenile is adjudicated and found to be a ward of the court based on an offense listed in subdivision (b) of [s]ection 707 that was committed when the juvenile was 14 years of age or older. [¶] (2) The adjudication described in paragraph (1) is the most recent offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated. [¶] (3) The court has made a finding on the record that a less restrictive, alternative disposition for the ward is unsuitable.…" (§ 875, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
In making the determination that a less restrictive, alternative disposition is unsuitable, the juvenile court must consider all relevant and material evidence, including the recommendations of counsel, the probation department, and any other agency or individual designated by the court to advise on the appropriate disposition, and it must base its determination on several additional criteria: (A) The severity of the most recent offense or offenses; (B) The ward's previous delinquent history; (C) "Whether the programming, treatment, and education offered and provided in [SYTF] is appropriate to meet the treatment and security needs of the ward"; (D) Whether a less restrictive disposition would meet the goals of rehabilitation and public safety; and (E) The ward's age, maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and disabilities or special needs. (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
We review the juvenile court's placement decision for an abuse of discretion. (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154 (Nicole H.).) The juvenile court abuses its discretion" '" 'when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.'" '" (Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1, 5 (Carlos J.).) We will not disturb the juvenile court's findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. (In re Khalid B. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288.)" '" 'In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law,'" '" which includes public safety as well as the rehabilitation of the juvenile offender. (Carlos J., at p. 5, quoting In re Calvin S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 522, 527-528; § 202.)
C. Analysis
Here, there is substantial evidence on the record to support the juvenile court's finding that minor be committed to SYTF and that less restrictive alternative dispositions are unsuitable based on the danger minor poses to public safety, pursuant to section 875, subdivision (a)(3)(D).
Minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to SYTF and finding less restrictive alternative dispositions unsuitable, based on the severity of minor's offenses.
However, the record shows the juvenile court properly considered the relevant evidence and required criteria, including the probation report, which expressly recommended minor be committed to SYTF based on the danger he posed to the public, in committing minor to SYTF and finding less restrictive alternative dispositions unsuitable. The court's statement further shows it found less restrictive alternative dispositions unsuitable based on the danger he posed to the public, rather than solely on the severity of his offenses. While the court noted the violence and severity of minor's offenses, it did so in the context of noting the danger those severe offenses posed to the public, as both were random, unsolicited attacks, making less restrictive alternative dispositions unsuitable.
Pursuant to section 875, subdivision (a)(3)(D), when finding less restrictive alternative dispositions unsuitable, a court must determine whether a less restrictive disposition would meet the goals of rehabilitation and public safety. (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(D).) This is consistent with the dual purposes of juvenile court law: to both rehabilitate the minor and provide for public safety. (§ 202, subds. (a), (b), (d); See Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614-615; In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395-1396; see also Nicole H., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1154-1155; Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 5-6; In re Calvin S., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 527-528.)
Further, courts are not necessarily required to attempt a less restrictive placement before ordering a more restrictive one. (See In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.) However, a more restrictive commitment may be upheld only upon a showing of probable benefit to the minor and ineffectiveness or inappropriateness of less restrictive alternatives. (In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 433.)
Here, there is sufficient evidence on the record to support the juvenile court's finding of the inappropriateness of less restrictive alternative dispositions to SYTF, based on the danger minor poses to public safety pursuant to section 875, subdivision (a)(3)(D).
First, the probation report noted it considered the various factors of section 875, subdivision (a) but expressly recommended minor be committed to SYTF based on the danger he poses to public safety, stating, "In determining an appropriate recommendation, [the probation] officer considered the circumstances of the offense, the minor's gang membership, school performance, … reported history of trauma, and the safety of the community and the victims. The minor admitted to two very serious and violent offenses, in which both victims were seriously injured. One victim was shot in his hand and leg, which resulted in a broken leg and the other victim was forcefully removed from his car and kicked and punched at least 20 times all over his body, resulting in several cuts and scrapes to his face and his lips were swollen. The minor's actions demonstrate he is a danger to the community and [the probation] officer believes a commitment to [SYTF] would be the most appropriate recommendation in this matter." (Italics added.)
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court noted it considered the probation report, the other factors required pursuant to section 875, subdivision (a), and that it found based on these factors that SYTF would provide appropriate rehabilitation for minor and that less restrictive alternatives were unsuitable. Although the court's statement is somewhat convoluted, it found less restrictive alternative dispositions unsuitable based on public safety, using the violent, random and unsolicited nature of minor's offenses, two random attacks on members of the public, as examples of the danger he poses to the public, as it stated, "I have to make a finding that a less restrictive alternative would be ineffective or inappropriate. Specifically, as [defense counsel] points out, there are a number of options, including [GPS] release, general JJC commitment, 180-day SAU commitment, and 365-day [NHP]. I just don't know if those would be appropriate for someone who engaged in the behavior that was exhibited here. I'm cognizant of the forensic evaluation that analyzed the minor's offense in relation to his age, lack of brain development, early exposure to trauma, immaturity, [and] low average intellectual abilities.
"But this is the situation where the minor walks up to another young man, asks him in the vernacular, what do you claim, what do you bang, whatever the case may be. The response from the victim is, I don't gang bang, I'm on my way to my friend's house. The response from … minor and his co-part, something to the effect, he must be a Bulldog, in which they proceed to shoot him. [¶] … [¶]
"[Minor], the Court, in looking at what has transpired is just extremely concerned. The facts surrounding the attempted murder are just appalling to where a person cannot walk down the street, minding their own business, to only be confronted by two individuals with firearms, shoot at him numerous times.…
"And then if that's not bad, we also have the carjacking, which has been dismissed reserving right to comment and restitution. Where you all, you and a coparticipant, pulled the driver out of the seat of his grandmother's vehicle, and you and the coparticipant stomped and kicked the victim numerous times in the face until he was able to escape on foot."
"I just don't believe that anything but [SYTF] would be appropriate." (Italics added.)
We do not read the juvenile court's statement as focusing solely on the severity of the offense, as minor argues. Rather, the court's statement demonstrates its finding that less restrictive alternative dispositions are inappropriate and unsuitable under section 875, subdivision (a)(3) to achieve the dual purposes of juvenile court law: to both rehabilitate minor and provide for public safety. (§ 202, subds. (a), (b), (d); see In re Charles G., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 614-615; In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1395-1396; see also Nicole H., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1154-1155; Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 5-6.)
Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by committing minor to SYTF and finding less restrictive alternative dispositions were unsuitable because the less restrictive alternative dispositions would not meet the goals of both rehabilitation and public safety.
II. CUSTODY CREDITS
Minor contends the juvenile court erred by applying his precommitment custody credits against his maximum exposure term, rather than his baseline custodial term, on four grounds: (1) because the Legislature intended SYTF commitments be "treated similarly, if not the same as DJJ commitments," we must apply the findings of In re Ernesto L. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 31, which held precommitment custody credits of a ward committed to the DJJ must be applied against the "maximum custodial term"; (2) the language of section 875 contradicts itself; (3) equal protection requires a minor committed to SYTF be provided the same protections afforded minors committed to the DJJ, because SYTF is the "functional equivalent" of the DJJ; and (4) the differing lengths of time cases may take violates equal protection if precommitment custody credits are applied to the maximum confinement term, rather than the baseline term. The People disagree. We agree with the People.
As stated above, the juvenile court stated it applied minor's precommitment custody credits against his "maximum confinement term." However, minor contends the "maximum confinement term" is essentially the same as the "maximum exposure term," and thus argues the court applied the credits against the maximum exposure term.
A. Background
Provisions relating to the now former DJJ were still in effect as of the date of minor's adjudication. (§ 736.5, subd. (e) ["The [D]J] … shall close on June 30, 2023."].) However, by the date of minor's disposition, the DJJ was replaced by SYTF. (§ 736.5, subds. (b)-(c) ["Beginning July 1, 2021, a ward shall not be committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, [D]J]" except for cases concerning criminal court transfers.].)
In minor's disposition hearing brief, he argued that if he were committed to SYTF, any precommitment custody credit he received should be applied to the baseline term, based on Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 31.
The prosecution opposed the argument, contending section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) expressly specified that where a ward is committed to SYTF, precommitment custody credits must be applied against the maximum term of confinement.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court committed minor to SYTF. It set his baseline term of commitment at four years and his maximum term of confinement at 27 years. It awarded minor 334 days of precommitment custody credit.
Defense counsel then argued against applying the credits against the maximum term of confinement, contending they should instead be applied against the baseline term. He argued applying them to the maximum term of confinement rendered the credits useless because they would not reduce the time minor spent in SYTF. He also argued that applying them to the maximum term of confinement would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The prosecution disagreed, arguing there was no basis for defense counsel's position since Ernesto L. applied only to wards committed to the DJJ under the previous statutory scheme for juvenile court law. The prosecution also argued that, if minor progressed in his SYTF programs, his baseline term could be reduced at future review hearings. He contended applying the credits to the baseline term would reduce minor's time at SYTF that was intended for his rehabilitation.
The juvenile court denied defense counsel's request and applied minor's precommitment custody credits against the maximum term of confinement but stated it would consider making adjustments at minor's six-month review hearing.
B. Law
Juvenile Justice Realignment-Closing of the DJJ and Opening of SYTFs
As stated above, the Legislature recently overhauled juvenile wardship law. "Until recently, the [D]J] was 'the state's most restrictive placement for its most severe juvenile offenders .…'" (In re M.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 435, 448 (M.B.).)" '[I]n 2020 the Legislature passed "juvenile justice realignment" through Senate Bill No. 823 (2019- 2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 337).'" (Ibid.) Beginning on July 1, 2021, the DJJ was closed and responsibility for all youth adjudged a ward of the court was shifted to county governments. (§ 736.5, subd. (a).)
Section 875: SYTF Commitments
Section 875, effective May 14, 2021, was also added as part of juvenile justice realignment. (Sen. Bill No. 92 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 18, § 12.) Under the new scheme, commencing July 1, 2021, "the court may order that a ward who is 14 years of age or older be committed to [SYTF]" if the ward meets certain criteria. (§ 875, subd. (a); In re J.P. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 74, 78.)
Under section 875, the juvenile court must also set a "baseline term of confinement" and a "maximum term of confinement." (§ 875, subds. (b), (c).)
Section 875, Subdivision (b): Baseline Term (SYTF)
Section 875, subdivision (b)(1) states the baseline term must be "based on the most serious recent offense for which the ward has been adjudicated" and "shall represent the time in custody necessary to meet the developmental and treatment needs of the ward and to prepare the ward for discharge to a period of probation supervision in the community." (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) Baseline terms must be consistent with the DJJ discharge consideration guidelines in sections 30807 through 30813 of title 9 of the California Code of Regulations. (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) The juvenile court can deviate from the DJJ discharge guidelines "plus or minus six months" in setting the baseline term. (§ 875, subds. (b)(1), (e)(1)(A), (f)(1).)
Section 875, Subdivision (c): Maximum Confinement Term (SYTF)
Section 875, subdivision (c) requires the juvenile court set the maximum confinement term for the ward "based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation." (§ 875, subd. (c)(1), italics added.)
Under section 875, subdivision (c)(1), the maximum confinement term is "the longest term of confinement in a facility that the ward may serve subject to" three limitations. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1).)
First, under section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(A), a ward committed to SYTF is not to be held in secure confinement beyond 23 years of age (or 25 years of age for more serious offenses) or two years from the date of commitment, whichever occurs later. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
Second, pursuant to section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(B), the maximum confinement term "shall not exceed the middle term of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense or offenses," with some exceptions where there are multiple counts or multiple petitions (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(B)). (Accord, § 726, subd. (d)(1), (3), (5) [this cap applies when a ward is placed in "physical confinement," which includes placement in SYTF under section 875].)
Section 875, Subdivision (c)(1)(C): Precommitment Custody Credits (SYTF)
Third, section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) expressly states, when a ward is committed to SYTF, "[p]recommitment [custody] credits for time served must be applied against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision." (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C), italics added.)
Section 875, Subdivision (c)(2): Maximum Confinement Term Is Same as "Maximum Term of Imprisonment" in Section 726, Subdivision (d)(2)
Section 875, subdivision (c)(2) further provides, "[f]or purposes of this section, 'maximum term of confinement' has the same meaning as 'maximum term of imprisonment,' as defined in … Section 726[, subdivision (d)(2)]." (§ 875, subd. (c)(2), italics added.)
Section 726, Subdivision (d)(2): "Maximum Term of Imprisonment" as Used in Sections 726 and 731
Section 726, subdivision (d)(2) provides, "As used in this section and in Section 731, 'maximum term of imprisonment' means the middle of the three time periods set forth in paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code, but without the need to follow the provisions of subdivision (b) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code or to consider time for good behavior or participation pursuant to Sections 2930, 2931, and 2932 of the Penal Code, plus enhancements which must be proven if pled." (§ 726, subd. (d)(2), italics added).)
Section 726, Subdivision (d)(1): "Maximum Exposure Time" (DJJ & SYTF)
Section 726, subdivision (d)(1) provides that, "[i]f the minor is removed from the physical custody of the minor's parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the middle term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult .…" (§ 726, subd. (d)(1).)
Section 726, Subdivision (d)(5): "Physical Confinement" (DJJ & SYTF)
Section 726, subdivision (d)(5) defines "physical confinement" to include both commitment to the DJJ and SYTF. (§ 726, subd. (d)(5).)
Section 731, Subdivisions (b), (c): "Maximum Custodial Term" (DJJ)
Section 731, subdivision (b) provides that "[a] ward committed to the [D]J] shall not be confined in excess of the term of confinement set by the committing court. The court shall set a maximum term based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation. The court shall not commit a ward to the [D]J] for a period that exceeds the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense." (§ 731, subd. (b), italics added.) Section 731 "shall remain in effect until the final closure of the [D]J]." (§ 731, subd. (c).)
Standard of Review
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. (In re Corrine W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 522, 529 ["We review this question of statutory interpretation independently, seeking, as always, to ascertain the Legislature's intent so as to give effect to the law's purpose."].) A statute's words are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent and should be given their usual and commonsense meaning. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141; In re T.O. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 252, 286.) "When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. However, when the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part." (People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1063.)
Equal Protection
"Both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution guarantee to all persons the equal protection of the laws. The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when 'the government … treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.' [Citations.] 'The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.'" (People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 195.)
"The degree of required justification depends on the classification at issue. Distinctions that involve suspect classifications (such as race) or affect fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny, and will be upheld only if they are necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. [Citation.] But when 'a statute involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, it need only meet minimum equal protection standards, and survive "rational basis review."' [Citation.] Under that standard, 'equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no "rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." '" (M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 465.)
We review equal protection claims de novo. (People v. Yang (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 120, 125.)
C. Analysis
Minor contends the juvenile court erred when it applied his precommitment custody credits against the maximum confinement term on four grounds: (1) because the Legislature intended SYTF commitments be "treated similarly, if not the same as DJJ commitments," we must apply the findings of Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 31, which held precommitment custody credits of a ward committed to the DJJ must be applied against the "maximum custodial term"; (2) the language of section 875 contradicts itself; (3) equal protection requires a minor committed to SYTF be provided the same protections afforded minors committed to the DJJ, because SYTF is the "functional equivalent" of the DJJ; and (4) the differing lengths of time cases may take violates equal protection if precommitment custody credits are applied to the maximum confinement term, rather than the baseline term.
Here, the juvenile court did not err when it applied minor's precommitment custody credits against the maximum confinement term of 27 years, as the language of section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) is clear. Further, the application of minor's precommitment custody credits to the maximum confinement term does not violate equal protection.
Statutory Language and Ernesto L.
Minor contends "[t]he Legislature has expressly linked the minor's DJJ custodial term with the minor's SYTF baseline term," so "[t]his must therefore include the application of the minor's custody credits to his SYTF baseline term .…" We disagree. The language of section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) is clear and unambiguous that the precommitment custody credits must be applied to the maximum confinement term and makes no reference to the baseline term of section 875, subdivision (b). (See § 875, subd. (c)(1)(C).)
As stated above, a statute's words are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent and should be given their usual and commonsense meaning. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
Section 875, the recently enacted statute that applies to minors committed to SYTF, expressly states in subdivision (c)(1)(C) that "[p]recommitment credits for time served must be applied against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision." (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C), italics added.) Section 875, subdivision (c) further states the "maximum term of confinement" is "the longest term of confinement in a facility that the ward may serve subject to" certain limitations, and must be set "based upon the facts and circumstances" of the matter. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(A), (B), italics added.)
In contrast, section 875, subdivision (b) provides the baseline term must be "based on the most serious recent offense for which the ward has been adjudicated" and "shall represent the time in custody necessary to meet the" rehabilitation needs of the ward. (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) The baseline term of confinement must be consistent with the DJJ discharge consideration guidelines. (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).)
Section 875, subdivision (c) makes no reference to the baseline term or subdivision (b). (§ 875, subd. (c).)
As "the language of [the] statute is clear, we need go no further." (See People v. Flores, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1063.) Accordingly, we conclude the language of section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) is clear that its reference to "the maximum term of confinement" refers to subdivision (c) of section 875, which defines the "maximum term of confinement" as "the longest term of confinement in a facility that the ward may serve subject to" certain limitations, and must be set "based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter .…" (§ 875, subd. (c), italics added.) Accordingly, section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) requires that precommitment custody credits of minor, who is committed to SYTF, must be applied against the maximum confinement term set under section 875, subdivision (c).
Minor next contends that the Legislature intended SYTF commitments be "treated similarly, if not the same as DJJ commitments," and accordingly, that Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 31, which found precommitment custody credits were to be applied against the "maximum custodial term" set under section 731 for a DJJ ward, is "directly applicable" to minor's case. Minor thus urges, according to the reasoning of Ernesto L., the "maximum custodial term" set under section 731 for wards committed to the DJJ is the "functional equivalent" of the "baseline term" set under section 875, subdivision (b) for wards committed to SYTF, while the "maximum confinement term" set under section 875, subdivision (c) is akin to the "maximum exposure term" of section 7. Accordingly, he contends his precommitment custody credits must be applied against the "baseline term" of section 875, subdivision (b), rather than the "maximum confinement term" set under section 875, subdivision (c).
First, as we conclude the language of section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) is clear that for SYTF wards, precommitment custody credits must be applied against the maximum confinement term set under section 875, subdivision (c), we need not reinterpret the Legislature's intent according to minor's interpretation of Ernesto L., which applied only to wards committed to the DJJ, not SYTF.
Further, we disagree with minor's interpretation of Ernesto L. We conclude the "maximum custodial term" of section 731 that applies to DJJ wards actually functions similarly to the "maximum confinement term" of section 875, subdivision (c), not the "baseline term" of section 875, subdivision (b). Accordingly, the juvenile court's application of minor's precommitment custody credits against his "maximum confinement term" set under section 875, subdivision (c) was consistent with Ernesto L.'s finding that precommitment custody credits for wards committed to the DJJ are to be applied against the "maximum custodial term" set under section 731.
In Ernesto L., the appellate court found that precommitment custody credits for wards committed to the DJJ must be applied against "the actual maximum term set under section 731 [the maximum custodial term]," rather than against "the theoretical maximum term under section 726 [the maximum exposure term]." (Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.) Ernesto L. explained that section 726 provides "if a minor is removed from a parent's physical custody after being adjudged a ward of the court, the dispositional order must 'specify [under section 726] that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the middle term of imprisonment' that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense [the maximum exposure term]. (… § 726, subd. (d)(1).) But [for DJJ commitments] in particular, the juvenile court has discretion, [under section 731] 'based upon the facts and circumstances,' to set an even lower maximum term of physical confinement [the maximum custodial term]. (§ 731, subd. (b).)" (Id. at p. 34.)
The minor in Ernesto L. was committed to the DJJ, and thus was not subject to the statutory scheme of juvenile justice realignment and newly enacted section 875. Rather, his "maximum custodial term" was set by the juvenile court under section 731. (Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.) Section 731 is expressly limited to wards committed to the DJJ and does not apply to a ward, like minor, committed to SYTF. The Ernesto L. court itself noted its holding was limited because "most juveniles can no longer be committed to DJJ, which [closed] June 30, 2023." (Ernesto L., at p. 34, fn. 2; § 731.)
The Ernesto L. court stated it published the holding only because it disagreed with another Court of Appeal decision on that point, In re A.R. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1076. (Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34, fn. 2.)
Despite this, minor argues that because "SYTF … expressly replaced DJJ," newly enacted section 875, subdivision (b)'s "baseline term" is "similar to, if not the equivalent of" section 731's "maximum custodial term." Thus, he contends, "[t]here was no practical distinction between the question facing the [c]ourt in Ernesto L., and the question facing the juvenile court in [minor's] case."
However, the "maximum custodial term" of section 731 and the baseline term of section 875, subdivision (b) differ: while section 731's "maximum custodial term" is a fixed limit on how long a minor can be confined, section 875's baseline term of confinement is a temporary calculation based on DJJ discharge guidelines that can be reduced at the review hearings depending on a ward's progress and the court may end a SYTF commitment and place the ward in a less restrictive program. (§ 875, subds. (b), (e)(1), (f)(1).) Accordingly, section 731's maximum custodial term is not the equivalent of section 875, subdivision (b)'s baseline term, and Ernesto L. does not dictate precommitment custody credits awarded under section 875 be applied against the baseline term of minor's SYTF commitment.
M.B., published in January 2024, after the parties here submitted their briefs, addressed this issue. There, the minor also argued Ernesto L. applied and that" '[b]ecause an SYTF commitment has now replaced a DJJ commitment,' the application of precommitment credits should be similar in the two schemes," so that precommitment custody credits are now applied to the baseline term of section 875, subdivision (b). (M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 466.) However, the M.B. court concluded that "the statutes governing SYTF commitments and the application of precommitment credits in that context already do operate in the way Ernesto L. determined the statutes should operate in the DJJ context," but contrary to the minor's contention, Ernesto L.'s holding means section 875, subdivision (c) requires precommitment custody credits must be applied to the "maximum confinement term," not the baseline term. (M.B., at p. 466.) The M.B. court stated, "[i]n our view, the functional equivalent of the maximum custodial term for DJJ commitments (§ 731, subd. (b); Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34) is the maximum term of confinement set in the SYTF context under section 875, subdivision (c)." (M.B., at p. 468.)
The M.B. court explained, "[I]n both [D]J and SYTF] settings, section 726, subdivision (d)(1)- which generally applies when a minor is removed from the physical custody of a parent after being adjudged a ward-provides the dispositional order must 'specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the middle term of imprisonment' that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense. (§ 726, subd. (d)(1), italics added; see Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.) Section 726 defines' "[p]hysical confinement"' to include both DJJ and SYTF placements, among other things. (§ 726, subd. (d)(5).) The maximum period of confinement permitted by statute-the middle term of imprisonment that would apply to an adult-is thus the same under section 726 for both types of commitments. And section 875 states this same limitation for SYTF commitments in particular. (§ 875, subd. (i); see id., subd. (c)(1)(B).)
"Second, as discussed, the specific statutes governing DJJ and SYTF commitments-sections 731 and 875 respectively-give the juvenile court discretion, 'based upon the facts and circumstances,' to set a maximum term that is lower than the maximum permitted by statute. (§§ 731, subd. (b) ['maximum term'], 875, subd. (c)(1) ['maximum term of confinement']; [In re] Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th [487,] 495 [§ 731]; Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34 [§ 731].) Sections 731 and 875 describe [the terms 'maximum custodial term' and 'maximum confinement term'] in identical language, stating the term is to be 'based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation.' (§§ 731, subd. (b), 875, subd. (c)(1).)
"Finally, in both settings, precommitment credits are to be applied against the potentially lower maximum term set by the court. As discussed, for DJJ commitments, Ernesto L. held precommitment credits must be applied to this actual maximum term (what it called the 'maximum custodial term'), concluding that result is compelled by the requirement in section 731, subdivision (b) that a ward must 'not be confined' in excess of that term. (Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 41-42.) And for SYTF commitments, section 875, subdivision (c) specifies precommitment credits 'must be applied against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision' (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C)), i.e., the maximum term set by the court 'based upon the facts and circumstances' (id., subd. (c)(1)), which may be lower than the maximum permitted by statute. [¶] … [¶]
"In contrast, the baseline term under section 875, subdivision (b), is not a maximum term. Instead, it 'represent[s] the time in custody necessary to meet the developmental and treatment needs of the ward and to prepare the ward for discharge to a period of probation supervision in the community.' (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) Pending the development of offense-based classifications by the Judicial Council, the baseline term is to be set using (with some permitted deviation) the 'discharge consideration date guidelines' applied by the DJJ prior to its closure (found in Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 30807-30813). (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).)
"Accordingly, even if it were necessary to identify functional equivalents as to each aspect of the now-phased-out DJJ and current SYTF schemes-and we do not think that is the case, since the Legislature is free to change the juvenile justice system over time … the closest analogue of the SYTF baseline term is the set of DJJ discharge consideration date guidelines that are temporarily to be borrowed in setting the baseline term. Those guidelines existed alongside the court's duty to set a maximum term for a ward committed to the DJJ under section 731, subdivision (b), just as a court that now commits a ward to an SYTF must set both a baseline term and a maximum term of confinement under section 875, subdivisions (b) and (c)." (M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 466-468, fns. omitted, first italics in original, second, third & fourth italics added.)
Further, the M.B. court noted the Legislature expressly provided for application of credits to be applied against the baseline term of section 875, subdivision (b) in other circumstances, but not in the case of precommitment custody credits, stating, "other provisions of [section 875] provide for application of credits to the baseline term in specified circumstances, not including credits for time spent in precommitment custody. (§ 875, subds. (f)(2) [if a ward is transferred from an SYTF to a less restrictive placement and then back to an SYTF, the baseline term is to be 'adjusted to include credit for the time served by the ward in the less restrictive program'], (b)(2) [youth who are transferred from the DJJ to an SYTF shall receive credit against the baseline term 'for all programs completed or substantially completed' at the DJJ].) The court here correctly applied [the minor's] precommitment credits against the maximum term of confinement, rather than against the baseline term." (M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 469-470.)
Accordingly, we conclude the reasoning of Ernesto L. and the language of sections 726, 731, and 875 mean that precommitment custody credits for a minor committed to SYTF are to be applied against the maximum confinement term, not the baseline term.
Minor next contends that section 875, subdivision (c)(2) expressly contradicts subdivision (c)(1)(C) because "[s]ubdivision (c)(2) defines 'maximum term of confinement' as the maximum exposure [term] as set forth in section 726. However, this aspect of subdivision (c)(2) contradicts all previous provisions." He argues, "[s]ubdivision (c)(2) expressly contradicts [subdivision] (c)(1)(C), which states that precommitment credits are to be applied pursuant to this subdivision, 'this' subdivision expressly contemplating the maximum custodial term set forth by section 731, and otherwise expressed by section 875 as the baseline term." (First italics in original, second italics added.)
Minor does not specify which subdivision of section 726 he is referring to when he makes this argument.
We disagree with minor's interpretation of the statutory language.
First, as discussed above, section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) expressly states precommitment custody credits must be applied against the maximum confinement term pursuant to "this subdivision," referring to section 875, subdivision (c)(1), and section 875, subdivision (c)(1) explicitly states the court must set a "maximum term of confinement" based on the "facts and circumstances." (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(C).) Section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) does not refer to subdivision (b)'s "baseline term."
Second, minor's argument that section 875, "[s]ubdivision (c)(2) defines 'maximum term of confinement' as the maximum exposure time as set forth in section 726" is inaccurate.
Section 875, subdivision (c)(2) states the" 'maximum term of confinement' has the same meaning as 'maximum term of imprisonment,' as defined in … Section 726[, subdivision (d)(2)]." (§ 875, subd. (c)(2), italics added.)
Section 726, subdivision (d)(2) states, "[a]s used in this section and in Section 731 , 'maximum term of imprisonment' means the middle of the three time periods" to which adults can be sentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1170. (§ 726, subd. (d)(2), italics added.)
Section 731's "maximum custodial term," is a maximum term to be set by the court "based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter," not to exceed the "middle term of imprisonment," defined by section 726, subdivision (d)(2) as the middle term under Penal Code section 1170. (§§ 726, subd. (d)(2), 731, subd. (b).) Likewise, as discussed in M.B., section 875, subdivision (c)(1)'s "maximum confinement term" is also not to exceed the "maximum term of imprisonment," set by section 726, subdivision (d)(2) as the middle term of imprisonment for an adult under Penal Code section 1170, subject to the juvenile court's discretion to set a lower term "based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter." (§§ 726, subd. (d)(2), 875, subd. (c).)
Accordingly, section 875, subdivision (c)(2) does not contradict subdivision (c)(1)(C)'s directive to apply precommitment custody credits to the "maximum confinement term," as the "maximum confinement term" is not the same as section 726's "maximum exposure term" or "maximum term of imprisonment," as it is subject to the court's discretion "based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter." (§ 875, subd. (c)(1).)
Equal Protection
Minor next argues that, "[i]n declining to expressly extend the reasoning and holding of Ernesto L. to [minor's] case, the juvenile court adopts a classification that treats the two similarly situated groups differently, and to the disadvantage of those ordered to SYTF," violating the equal protection clause of the United States and California Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) He contends, "[t]hose subject to the previous most restrictive disposition of DJJ received predisposition custody credits pursuant to section 731 against the maximum imposed term of confinement," but "those subject to the most restrictive disposition of SYTF receive predisposition custody credits pursuant to section 875, subdivision (c)(2) and therefore section 726 against the maximum possible criminal term of confinement." Again, we disagree.
First, as discussed above, section 875, subdivision (c)(2) does not direct that SYTF wards' precommitment custody credits be applied against section 726's maximum exposure term. Rather, it directs SYTF wards' credits be applied against the maximum confinement term set pursuant to section 875, subdivision (c)(1), for which the maximum term of imprisonment, pursuant to section 726, subdivision (d)(1) is the middle term for adults, and is subject to the court's discretion to set a lower term, based on the facts and circumstances of the matter. (§§ 726, subd. (d)(1), (2), 875, subd. (c)(1), (2).)
M.B. also addressed this issue. There, the minor argued SYTF wards and DJJ wards were treated differently because," 'the baseline term at an SYTF is the functional equivalent of the maximum term of confinement at DJJ.'" (M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 464.) However, as stated above, the M.B. court found that "[s]ection 875, subdivision (c) … directs that, for SYTF placements, precommitment credits are to be applied in the same way Ernesto L. held they should be applied in the DJJ setting." (M.B., at p. 467.) Accordingly, the M.B. court noted that because DJJ wards and SYTF wards are treated the same under section 875, subdivision (c) and section 731, "there is no disparate treatment that could give rise to an equal protection problem." (M.B., at p. 467.) We agree with the M.B. court's reasoning that "[b]ecause DJJ and SYTF wards are not treated differently, we need not address the parties' arguments as to whether the two groups are similarly situated, or as to which legal standard-strict scrutiny or rational basis-should be used to analyze any disparate treatment." (Id. at p. 467, fn. 26.)
Minor also argues that a failure to apply precommitment custody credits against the baseline term of section 875, subdivision (b) violates equal protection by penalizing wards whose cases take longer to resolve because "not awarding predisposition credits [to the baseline term] would encourage attempts at resolutions at the earliest possible moment in order to start earning credits and avoid serving what is commonly known as 'dead time' (time in custody that is not being applied to a sentence)." Minor notes that the length of time a case takes may depend on a number of variables, such as the complexity of the matter or how busy the court is, arguing, "[a]ny continuance of the case that prolongs resolution (a continuance to have a parent present, a continuance from the DA to prepare for disposition, etc.) has the effect of pushing back a potential release date." Again, we disagree.
The minor in M.B. also argued, as minor does, that potential "dead time" in this context violated equal protection, noting that a ward who spends longer in precommitment custody and then serves a baseline term may spend more total time in custody than another ward who spends less time in precommitment custody but receives the same baseline term. (M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 470.) However, the M.B. court concluded the two sets of wards identified-" 'those whose cases resolve slowly and those whose resolve quickly' "-are treated equally. (M.B., at p. 471.) The court explained, "For both sets of wards, precommitment credits are applied to their maximum terms of confinement. ([§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C)].) Neither group has their baseline term reduced based on precommitment credits. Both are potentially eligible for discharge to probation upon completion of their baseline terms. (Id., subd. (e)(3).) And for both groups, the precommitment credits apply to a maximum term of confinement they may not reach because they may age out of the SYTF by that time. (Id., subd. (c)(1)(A).)
"[Thus, t]o the extent a ward may in some instances spend more total time in custody than another ward with a similar baseline term, that is because of the numerous variables that can affect the length of precommitment custody, not because section 875 provides for the unequal application of credits … [and] section 875 does not deny credits to certain groups while granting them to others. There is no disparate treatment here and no equal protection violation." (M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 471.)
Accordingly, because section 875 provides that precommitment custody credits must be applied consistently to the maximum confinement term, and the length of cases depends on innumerable independent variables, we conclude section 875 does not create disparate treatment for minors whose cases take different lengths of time, and thus, does not violate equal protection.
Thus, we conclude the juvenile court did not err when it followed the directive of section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) and applied minor's precommitment custody credits to his maximum confinement term set under section 875, subdivision (c).
DISPOSITION
The disposition order is affirmed.
[*] Before Franson, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and DeSantos, J.