Opinion
2017–03567 S.C.I. No. 1235/13
01-24-2018
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Sukhjinder DHILLON, appellant.
Mark M. Baker, New York, NY, for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Ellen C. Abbot, and Merri Turk Lasky of counsel), for respondent.
Mark M. Baker, New York, NY, for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Ellen C. Abbot, and Merri Turk Lasky of counsel), for respondent.
L. PRISCILLA HALL, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SANDRA L. SGROI, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDERAppeal by the defendant from a resentence of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Stephanie Zaro, J.), imposed March 6, 2017, upon his conviction of manslaughter in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, after remittitur from this Court for resentencing (see People v. Dhillon, 143 A.D.3d 734, 39 N.Y.S.3d 181 ), the resentence being a determinate term of imprisonment of 17 years to be followed by 5 years' postrelease supervision.
ORDERED that the resentence is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the determinate term of imprisonment from 17 years to 12 years; as so modified, the resentence is affirmed.
"The determination of whether to grant or deny youthful offender status rests within the sound discretion of the court and depends upon all the attending facts and circumstances of the case" ( People v. Hesterbey, 121 A.D.3d 1127, 1128, 994 N.Y.S.2d 421 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Mullings, 83 A.D.3d 871, 872, 921 N.Y.S.2d 152 ; People v. Fearon, 182 A.D.2d 698, 699, 582 N.Y.S.2d 653, lv granted 79 N.Y.2d 1048, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 596 N.E.2d 414 ). Here, weighing all the relevant circumstances, including the gravity of the crime and the manner in which it was committed, the fact that the defendant has no prior criminal record, the defendant's psychological diagnoses, and his prospects for rehabilitation and hope for a future constructive life, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's application for youthful offender status (see People v. Hopkins, 163 A.D.2d 416, 558 N.Y.S.2d 137, 572; People v. Lutchmidat, 134 A.D.2d 286, 287, 520 N.Y.S.2d 612 ).
However, the resentence imposed was excessive to the extent indicated herein (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
HALL, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.