Opinion
NO. 4-13-0786
06-25-2014
In re: DAVID D., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. DAVID D., Respondent-Appellant.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from
Circuit Court of
Macon County
No. 13MH135
Honorable
Katherine M. McCarthy,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Pope and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Where this case is moot and no justiciable issues exist, we grant the motion to withdraw as counsel filed by the Guardianship and Advocacy Commission. ¶ 2 In August 2013, a petition for involuntary admission of respondent, David D., was filed and, following a hearing, the trial court ordered him to be hospitalized for a period not to exceed 90 days. Thereafter, the Guardianship and Advocacy Commission (GAC) was appointed to represent him on appeal. ¶ 3 On appeal, GAC moves to withdraw its representation of respondent pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), contending any appeal in this cause would be meritless. We grant GAC's motion and affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 On August 27, 2013, a petition for the involuntary admission of respondent was filed pursuant to section 3-600 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-600 (West 2012)). The petition alleged respondent had a mental illness and was in need of immediate hospitalization for the prevention of various harms. Two physician certificates were also filed and both indicated respondent was subject to involuntary inpatient admission and in need of immediate hospitalization. ¶ 6 On August 30, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on the petition. Prior to the start of the hearing and before respondent appeared, appointed counsel reported to the court that respondent had discharged him. Counsel indicated respondent had become "very agitated" and "kicked [him] out." Counsel then called a witness to describe respondent's actions in discharging his attorney. The court also heard testimony from respondent's psychiatrist, Dr. Rohi Patil, regarding possible safety issues that might arise with respondent's appearance. Dr. Patil stated respondent was "extremely dangerous" and "very psychotic." Following a recess, respondent appeared with newly appointed counsel. ¶ 7 The State presented seven witnesses during the hearing and respondent testified on his own behalf. Aaron Larson testified respondent had been leaving letters for Larson's wife at their residence. At approximately 11:30 p.m. one evening, respondent knocked on Larson's door and stated he had been leaving letters on the clothesline. Larson responded that the letters were addressed to "Linda," but no one with that name lived there. Respondent then threw a letter at Larson and left. Larson stated the letter indicated respondent had killed someone and would be with Larson's wife. Larson called the police, and officers gave respondent a "no trespassing" warning. The next morning, Larson found a diagram of a female's vaginal area with the words "This is where our children will come from once I have you." Larson went to the police. ¶ 8 Dr. Patil testified respondent suffers from schizoaffective disorder, consisting of paranoia, suspiciousness, agitation, delusions, and losing touch with reality. Patil also stated respondent has been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder as well as alcohol dependence in remission. Since being admitted, respondent "will not talk" and "just shuts down and stares into space." Based on the schizoaffective disorder and other complications, Dr. Patil opined respondent would place either himself or someone else in a position of physical harm if not treated on an inpatient basis. Patil stated no alternative to long-term care existed. ¶ 9 Stephen Rathnow, a licensed clinical professional counselor, testified the only alternative for respondent was admission to McFarland Mental Health Center (McFarland). Rathnow stated a "serious risk of serious physical harm" existed with respondent. Given respondent's paranoid delusions and fantasy relationship with his neighbor, Rathnow believed females in the community "could be at great danger." ¶ 10 Respondent testified he understood the proceedings and noted he had been to McFarland several times. He was discharged in July 2013 and moved into an apartment. Respondent stated he refused to take medication because he did not feel he needed it. He was not willing to continue treatment at McFarland because he had "better things to do." ¶ 11 The trial court found the State proved the allegations in the petition by clear and convincing evidence. The court found respondent was subject to involuntary admission and ordered him hospitalized for a period not to exceed 90 days. This appeal followed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 The Anders procedure has been found to be applicable in the context of an appeal from an involuntary-commitment order. In re Juswick, 237 Ill. App. 3d 102, 104, 604 N.E.2d 528, 530 (1992). GAC has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and has attached to the motion a supporting memorandum pursuant to Anders. GAC stated it sent a copy of the motion and the supporting memorandum to respondent. This court granted respondent leave to file additional points and authorities on or before May 26, 2014. None have been filed. Based on an examination of the record, we conclude, as has GAC, that no meritorious issues are presented for review and any appeal would be without merit. ¶ 14 Appellate counsel acknowledges this case is moot as the 90-day commitment order entered on August 30, 2013, has expired. However, issues raised in an otherwise moot appeal may be reviewed when (1) addressing the issues involved is in the public interest; (2) the case is capable of repetition, yet evades review; or (3) the respondent will potentially suffer collateral consequences as a result of the trial court's judgment. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 355-61, 910 N.E.2d 74, 80-83 (2009). GAC addresses several potential issues for review in its motion to withdraw and the possibility that those issues would meet the exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
¶ 15 A. Public-Interest Exception
¶ 16 The public-interest exception permits review of otherwise moot cases when (1) the question is of a public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officials; and (3) the question is likely to recur in the future. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 355, 910 N.E.2d at 80. ¶ 17 Counsel raises issues involving the procedural requirements of respondent's admission under the Mental Health Code. For example, counsel raises possible issues with the compliance with the petition by peace officers (405 ILCS 5/3-606 (West 2012)), the adequacy of the predispositional report (405 ILCS 5/3-810 (West 2012)), and the trial court's ordering of the least-restrictive alternative for treatment (405 ILCS 5/3-811 (West 2012)). ¶ 18 "Involuntary admission procedures implicate substantial liberty interests." In re Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d 126, 130, 601 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1992). The procedures that regulate the involuntary admission of a person suffering from a mental illness are a matter of public concern. In re Robert F., 396 Ill. App. 3d 304, 311, 917 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (2009). ¶ 19 Here, respondent has a history of mental illness and has received treatment in a hospital setting. Thus, there exists a possibility he will again face involuntary-commitment proceedings. However, we conclude an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officials is not necessary as the procedural issues raised by counsel have already been addressed in previous appellate decisions. See In re John N., 364 Ill. App. 3d 996, 998, 848 N.E.2d 577, 578 (2006) (addressing section 3-606 of the Mental Health Code); In re Daryll C., 401 Ill. App. 3d 748, 755-58, 930 N.E.2d 1048, 1054-56 (2010) (addressing section 3-810 of the Mental Health Code); In re James H., 405 Ill. App. 3d 897, 905-07, 943 N.E.2d 743, 750-52 (2010) (addressing section 3-811 of the Mental Health Code). The public-interest exception to the mootness does not apply to these issues. ¶ 20 We note counsel also raises the issue of appointed counsel and his effectiveness. The Mental Health Code mandates that a person facing involuntary admission proceedings be provided with an attorney. 405 ILCS 5/3-805 (West 2012). This right to counsel includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel. In re Carmody, 274 Ill. App. 3d 46, 54-57, 653 N.E.2d 977, 983-85 (1995) (addressing section 3-805 of the Mental Health Code). The effectiveness of counsel is determined by using the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Daryll C., 401 Ill. App. 3d at 754, 930 N.E.2d at 1054. As the record indicates newly appointed counsel represented respondent at the hearing and cross-examined witnesses, and considering the case law on section 3-805, we find the public-interest exception does not apply to this issue.
¶ 21 B. Capable-of-Repetition-Yet-Evading-Review Exception
¶ 22 The capable-of-repetition-yet-evading review exception applies when (1) the action is too short to be fully litigated prior to the expiration of the underlying order and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the complaining party will be subject to the same action in the future. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 358, 910 N.E.2d at 82. ¶ 23 Respondent meets the first criteria of this exception. Respondent's involuntary admission order was limited to 90 days, causing the order to be of such short duration that it could not have been fully litigated prior to its expiration. However, respondent does not meet the second requirement of the exception. Respondent has to show a substantial likelihood that a resolution of the procedural issues in this case will "have some bearing on a similar issue" in a later case. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 360, 910 N.E.2d at 83. Whether respondent's procedural rights were violated is a fact-based determination and will not likely have an impact on future litigation. Thus, the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception does not apply in this case.
¶ 24 C. Collateral-Consequences Exception
¶ 25 The collateral-consequences exception applies to mental-health cases and is decided on a case-by-case basis. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 362, 910 N.E.2d at 84. This exception allows for appellate review even though an order has expired because respondent has suffered, or is threatened with, an actual injury traceable to petitioner that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 361, 910 N.E.2d at 83. Although our supreme court has recognized that mere reversal "will not, in itself, purge a respondent's mental health records of any mention of the admission or treatment, that is not the same as saying that there is no effect whatsoever." Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 362, 910 N.E.2d at 84. Reversal could have several benefits, such as affecting respondent's ability to seek employment and preventing respondent's hospitalization from being mentioned in a subsequent proceeding. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 362, 910 N.E.2d at 84. ¶ 26 In the case sub judice, the exception does not apply because collateral consequences have already attached by way of respondent's prior felony conviction. See Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 363, 910 N.E.2d at 84. Because none of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine would apply here, we would dismiss this appeal as moot. Accordingly, as any appeal in this cause would be without merit, GAC is granted leave to withdraw as counsel.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we grant GAC's motion and affirm the trial court's judgment. ¶ 29 Affirmed.