Opinion
No. 17205 Ind. No. 3150/15 Case No. 2019-1029
04-25-2023
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lamar Davenport, Defendant-Appellant.
Caprice R. Jenerson, Office of Appellate Defender, New York (Karen Brill of counsel), for appellant. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Alexander Michaels of counsel), for respondent.
Caprice R. Jenerson, Office of Appellate Defender, New York (Karen Brill of counsel), for appellant.
Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Alexander Michaels of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Renwick, A.P.J., Webber, Singh, Rodriguez, Higgitt, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ellen N. Biben, J.), rendered January 17, 2019, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 20 years, unanimously affirmed.
The court, sitting as trier of fact in this nonjury trial, correctly declined to consider the affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect under Penal Law § 40.15. Although it is undisputed that, at the time of the offense, defendant suffered from phencyclidine (PCP)-induced psychosis and that, as a result, he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, we conclude that defendant's mental state was not the "result of mental disease or defect" within the meaning of the statute since his psychosis was temporary and due only to voluntary use of an illegal substance (see e.g. Commonwealth v DiPadova, 460 Mass. 424, 431-432, 951 N.E.2d 891, 897 [2011] [applying rule derived from Model Penal Code § 4.01]; see also People v Adams, 26 N.Y.2d 129, 134-135 [1970], cert denied 399 U.S. 931 [1970] [describing legislative development of Penal Law § 1120, the predecessor provision to Penal Law § 40.15]). The inclusion of PCP-induced psychosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, while relevant, is not dispositive, because that text does not seek to define "mental disease or defect"-as a legal matter or at all. Defendant's reliance on People v Santarelli (49 N.Y.2d 241 [1980]) is misplaced, because that case addressed a Molineux issue and did not analyze Penal Law § 40.15's scope or the viability of the defendant's amphetamine-induced "temporary insanity" defense. Finally, the present facts are distinguishable from "settled" or permanent mental illness resulting from prolonged substance abuse, for which a defense under Penal Law § 40.15 may be available (see People v Gillis, 281 A.D.2d 698, 699 [3d Dept 2001], lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 918 [2001]; Latterell v Conway, 430 F.Supp.2d 116, 125-126 [WD NY 2006]).
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.